Barnes, J.
David Lee Marshall (“Marshall”) appeals the trial court’s order denying his petition for expungement of Class D felony and misdemeanor records. He presents the sole issue of whether he was entitled to expungement because he had no subsequent criminal convictions, despite his admission, as a requirement of a pretrial diversion program, to committing another crime. We affirm.
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In 1992, [1995, 2002, 2004, and 2005,] Marshall was convicted of … [various] misdemeanors. … In 1999, he was convicted of Operating While Intoxicated, as a Class D felony. … In 2006, he pled guilty to a second felony, Operating While Intoxicated.
On April 26, [In] 2013, Marshall was charged with Operating a Vehicle as a Habitual Traffic Violator, a Class D felony … [and] Driving While Suspended, a Class A misdemeanor. On September 13, 2013, Marshall signed a pre-trial diversion agreement admitting that he had committed the offense of Driving While Suspended. The charges were dismissed upon Marshall’s completion of the pre-trial diversion program.
On January 9, 2015, Marshall filed his “Verified Petition for Expungement of Records of Misdemeanor Convictions Under I.C. 35-38-9-2 and Minor Class D or Level 6 felony Convictions under I.C. 35-38-9-3.” (App. at 44.) The State opposed the petition, contending that Marshall had not remained crime-free during the requisite period of time for expungement.
On May 14, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing on the expungement petition. The petition was denied on June 30, 2015, the trial court having concluded that Marshall had committed a crime in 2013. This appeal ensued.
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Marshall argues that the trial court erroneously denied his petition for expungement because he met the statutory requirements under Indiana Code Sections 35-38-9-3 (Class D or Level 6 felony) and 35-38-9-2 (misdemeanor) and he is entitled to expungement upon satisfaction of the statutory requirements. The State responds that, despite the lack of a criminal conviction, the trial court properly considered the mandate of Indiana Code Section 35-38-9-9(d), requiring the petitioner to prove that the facts alleged in the verified petition were true, among them an affirmation that he had “not committed another crime within the period required for expungement.” [Footnote omitted.] I.C. § 35-38-9-8(b)(6).
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At the time Marshall filed his petition, [footnote omitted] Indiana’s expungement law provided, in part, that * * * [a petitioner] was required to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence:
* * * the person has not been convicted of a crime within the previous eight (8) years (or within a shorter period agreed to by the prosecuting attorney if the prosecuting attorney has consented to a shorter period under subsection (c)[.]
I.C. § 35-38-9-3(e). A petitioner seeking to have misdemeanor records expunged had a like burden of proof, except that the period of time without a conviction was five years. I.C. § 35-38-9-2(d).
… There is no dispute that Marshall has shown the requisite lapse of time, the absence of pending charges, the satisfaction of obligations, and the lack of a new criminal conviction in the relevant time frame. Thus, in isolation, Indiana Code Sections 35-38-9-3(d) and 35-38-9-2(d) would require expungement.
However, we consider the expungement statutes as a whole. [Citation omitted.] We may not simply delete those provision[s] that required Marshall to allege and then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had not committed another crime. Marshall’s mere allegation that he had not committed another crime does not satisfy his burden. Although Marshall has not been convicted of a new crime, he has, by his own admission in diversionary proceedings, committed a new crime.
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The trial court did not err in denying Marshall’s petition to have the records relating to his felony and misdemeanor convictions expunged.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.