Vaidik, J.
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The State charged Cory Lowden with aggravated battery after he punched another man, breaking the man’s jaw so severely that surgery was required to repair it. At trial, Lowden tendered a jury instruction that applied the mens rea to every element of aggravated battery, including the severity of the resulting injury. According to Lowden’s instruction, the State would have to prove that, when he punched his victim in the face, Lowden acted with knowledge that one punch would result in protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ. The trial court rejected Lowden’s instruction. According to Indiana Code section 35-41-2-2(d), the level of culpability required for the commission of an offense is required with respect to “every material element of the prohibited conduct.” The prohibited conduct in the aggravated battery statute is to inflict injury on another. The severity of the injury is not an element of the prohibited conduct, but a result of it. Accordingly, the trial court properly rejected Lowden’s tendered instruction as an incorrect statement of the law. We affirm.
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Lowden’s tendered instruction provided:
PROPOSED FINAL INSTRUCTION NO. 3
A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he doing so.
With regard to the offense charged in the information, Aggravated Battery, a Class B felony, a person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that his conduct would lead to a serious bodily injury, including the protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ.
[Record citation omitted.] The trial court gave only the first paragraph of Lowden’s instruction. Lowden contends that the trial court also should have given the second paragraph, which applies the mens rea to the severity of the injury.
… “Prohibited conduct” and “element” are not synonymous. [Citation omitted.] The culpability requirement applies to the conduct prohibited by the statute, not to the result of that conduct. [Citation omitted.] The prohibited conduct in the aggravated-battery statute is to “inflict injury on another[.]” [Citation omitted.]
Additionally, this Court has held that the severity of the injury and the identity of the victim are aggravating factors—not elements of conduct—under other battery statutes. [Citations omitted.] Applying the reasoning from our prior decisions to the aggravated-battery statute, we conclude that the severity of the injury is not an element of the prohibited conduct, but a result of it. Accordingly, the State * * * was not required to prove that Lowden was “aware of a high probability that his conduct would lead to a serious bodily injury,” as suggested by Lowden’s tendered instruction. Because it was not a correct statement of the law, the trial court properly refused to submit Lowden’s instruction to the jury. [Footnote omitted.]
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Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.