David, J.
While Newland McElfresh was in jail awaiting his guilty plea hearing, he wrote an intimidating and coercive letter to the mother of the child victim who was the subject of the child molestation charges McElfresh was intending to plead guilty to. The letter and the surrounding circumstances provided sufficient evidence to support a conviction for attempted obstruction of justice. … Regardless of whether some of the statements within the letter were true, true statements may still be coercive and sufficient to support an obstruction of justice conviction. …
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… McElfresh filed a plea agreement, in which he agreed to plead guilty to three counts of Class C Felony Child Molesting. … Before the plea hearing, on May 3rd, McElfresh wrote a letter to A.W., [the mother of T.W., one of his victims], from jail. … The letter … attempted to explain how he could not be guilty of the child molesting allegations. He stated, “I would like for you to ask [T.W.] about the whole incident. Why? Because it never happened!!! I never touched [T.W., K.S., or A.S.]!! I want to know why they said that happened. . . . I know you will be able to get the truth out of [T.W.].” [Record citations omitted throughout.] McElfresh believed “[s]omeone told them what to say!” and “[t]hey were coached on what to say, and I know if anyone could find out the truth, it would be you!”
As the letter went on, McElfresh explained … “[i]f [he] had gotten either [T.W.] or [K.S.] to admit it never happened, they would have been charged with a ‘D’ felony of ‘False Informing.’ They would have … gotten themselves into serious trouble.” In addition, McElfresh pointed out that the girls could also have been exposed to additional criminal charges, such as conspiracy. As the letter concluded, McElfresh asked that A.W. “not talk to the Prosecutor about this.”
… [T]he trial court found McElfresh guilty [of D-felony attempted obstruction of justice] and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 600 days executed in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in the child molesting cause.
… The Court of Appeals held that there was insufficient evidence to support McElfresh’s conviction for attempted obstruction of justice, explaining that “McElfresh essentially told T.W.’s mother that if T.W. intended to lie under oath, she would face legal consequences for the dishonesty. That is simply the truth. We cannot believe that in the State of Indiana it can constitute a crime to make a true statement, even if the subject matter of the true statement involves the future testimony of a witness in a criminal proceeding.” [Citation omitted.] …
… We find this statement overly broad. In some circumstances, it is possible for a true statement to be threatening or coercive under the obstruction of justice statute.
For example, when an abuse victim testifies against her abuser, he or she would often have to retell the horrific details of the abuse. It would be a true statement if the abuser were to tell the victim what a horrible experience testifying would be, and how it would be much easier to not testify at all, and even if he or she did testify, people may not believe the allegation. Yet, we do not hesitate to conclude that the statement would be an attempt to coerce the victim to not testify. The present case also presents a situation in which a truthful statement could reasonably be interpreted as coercive in nature.
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In viewing the letter and circumstances together, the “natural and usual sequence to which such conduct” points, is that McElfresh’s last hope was that the “truth” would come out before his guilty plea hearing, and he could avoid going to jail. The trier of fact did not need McElfresh to explicitly state, “You need to get T.W. to change her statement so I can get out of this plea agreement.” The content of the letter, and the circumstances surrounding its drafting, support a reasonable inference that McElfresh did intend for that to occur.
Again, we acknowledge that portions of the letter indicate a different intent, and McElfresh also testified that it was not his intent to persuade T.W. to change her testimony. But this Court has reiterated that “judging the credibility of witnesses lies squarely within the province of the [trier of fact] and we will not reassess its credibility determinations.” [Citation omitted.] …
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We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support McElfresh’s conviction for attempted obstruction of justice. …
Rush, C.J., Dickson, Rucker, and Massa, J.J., concur.