Massa, J.
Sidney Lamour Tyson is charged with failing to register as a sex offender in Indiana, the basis of that requirement being his obligation to register in Texas because of a delinquency adjudication. Tyson has moved to dismiss that charge, arguing … his duty to register upon moving to Indiana violates our Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to him since the definition was amended after he committed the underlying offense. Because Tyson is required to register in another state, we find he satisfies our statutory definition, and he must do so here. And, holding today that maintaining a registry requirement across state lines does not amount to a punitive burden, we see no ex post facto violation. We affirm.
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In Texas in 2002, then-thirteen-year-old Sidney Tyson was adjudicated delinquent for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child, and he was required to register there as a sex offender until 2014. Although at the time of his offense, he would not have had to register in Indiana if he moved here, in 2006 our law changed: the legislature amended the Sex Offender Registry Act’s definition of sex offender to include “a person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.” 2006 Ind. Acts 2318. In 2009, Tyson moved to Indiana; a few years later a police officer pulled him over for driving with an expired plate and discovered Tyson was required to (and did) register as a sex offender in Texas but had not registered here.
The State charged Tyson with Class D felony failure to register as a sex offender. He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that enforcing the registry requirement constituted an ex post facto violation since his offense occurred before the change to the definition of sex offender took effect. After a hearing, the trial court denied his motion.
Tyson filed an interlocutory appeal, and in a unanimous opinion, our Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Tyson v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1074, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The panel reasoned that … because he was already required to register in Texas until 2014, … he merely remained a sex offender upon relocation; he did not become one by operation of the amendment. Id. at 1077. Tyson sought transfer, arguing the relevant date for the ex post facto analysis is the commission of the offense, not relocation.
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As a sex offender living in Indiana, our Sex Offender Registration Act mandated that Tyson register here for the duration of his Texas requirement. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7(a), -19(f). Tyson asserts that, as applied to him, this obligation violates Indiana’s prohibition against ex post facto laws because at the time he committed the underlying offense, our statutory definition had not yet been amended to include him.
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…[S]ix years after the Supreme Court of the United States found Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act was regulatory and therefore could be applied retroactively without offending the Federal Ex Post Facto Clause, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003), we found our own Act [footnote omitted] violated Indiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it imposed a punitive burden as applied to an offender who committed his crime—and even served his sentence—before any registration requirement existed. Wallace [v. State], 905 N.E.2d [371,] 384 [(Ind. 2009)]. [Footnote omitted.] But that same day, we found an amendment to that Act, which lengthened the mandatory registration period for sexually violent predators from ten years to life [footnote omitted], presented no ex post facto violation as applied to an offender who was already under a requirement to register. Jensen [v. State], 905 N.E.2d [384,] 394 [(Ind. 2009)]. Two years later, we upheld a similar amendment enhancing an offender’s present registration requirement. Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 813 (Ind. 2011) (“Harris’s claim fails for the same reasons Jensen’s claim failed.”).
In deciding all three cases, we adopted the Supreme Court’s intent-effects test as the proper vehicle for analyzing whether the statute imposes a punishment—which cannot be done retroactively pursuant to our Ex Post Facto Clause—or whether the statute is merely part of a non-punitive, regulatory scheme. [Citations omitted.] We find that same test drives our analysis today.
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Taken as a whole, we find the effects of the amended definition of sex offender in Indiana Code section 11-8-8-5(b)(1), as applied to Tyson, are regulatory and non-punitive. This outcome makes sense in light of other as-applied ex post facto challenges to the Sex Offender Registration Act we’ve previously considered: unlike Wallace, where the offender had no obligation to register anywhere before the Act was passed, Tyson was required to register in Texas years before our statutory definition was amended to include him. His circumstances are much more similar to those in Jensen and Harris, where both offenders already had to register; the challenged amendments merely lengthened that requirement. We simply cannot say that transferring the obligation upon moving is any more punitive than lengthening it to potentially last a lifetime.
Finding Tyson merely maintained his sex offender status across state lines, we conclude he has failed to show the amended definition retroactively punishes him in violation of our Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws.
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Rush, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.
Sidney Lamour Tyson is charged with failing to register as a sex offender in Indiana, the basis of that requirement being his obligation to register in Texas because of a delinquency adjudication. Tyson has moved to dismiss that charge, arguing … his duty to register upon moving to Indiana violates our Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to him since the definition was amended after he committed the underlying offense. Because Tyson is required to register in another state, we find he satisfies our statutory definition, and he must do so here. And, holding today that maintaining a registry requirement across state lines does not amount to a punitive burden, we see no ex post facto violation. We affirm.
….
In Texas in 2002, then-thirteen-year-old Sidney Tyson was adjudicated delinquent for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child, and he was required to register there as a sex offender until 2014. Although at the time of his offense, he would not have had to register in Indiana if he moved here, in 2006 our law changed: the legislature amended the Sex Offender Registry Act’s definition of sex offender to include “a person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.” 2006 Ind. Acts 2318. In 2009, Tyson moved to Indiana; a few years later a police officer pulled him over for driving with an expired plate and discovered Tyson was required to (and did) register as a sex offender in Texas but had not registered here.
The State charged Tyson with Class D felony failure to register as a sex offender. He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that enforcing the registry requirement constituted an ex post facto violation since his offense occurred before the change to the definition of sex offender took effect. After a hearing, the trial court denied his motion.
Tyson filed an interlocutory appeal, and in a unanimous opinion, our Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Tyson v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1074, 1075 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The panel reasoned that … because he was already required to register in Texas until 2014, … he merely remained a sex offender upon relocation; he did not become one by operation of the amendment. Id. at 1077. Tyson sought transfer, arguing the relevant date for the ex post facto analysis is the commission of the offense, not relocation.
….
As a sex offender living in Indiana, our Sex Offender Registration Act mandated that Tyson register here for the duration of his Texas requirement. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7(a), -19(f). Tyson asserts that, as applied to him, this obligation violates Indiana’s prohibition against ex post facto laws because at the time he committed the underlying offense, our statutory definition had not yet been amended to include him.
….
…[S]ix years after the Supreme Court of the United States found Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act was regulatory and therefore could be applied retroactively without offending the Federal Ex Post Facto Clause, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003), we found our own Act [footnote omitted] violated Indiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause because it imposed a punitive burden as applied to an offender who committed his crime—and even served his sentence—before any registration requirement existed. Wallace [v. State], 905 N.E.2d [371,] 384 [(Ind. 2009)]. [Footnote omitted.] But that same day, we found an amendment to that Act, which lengthened the mandatory registration period for sexually violent predators from ten years to life [footnote omitted], presented no ex post facto violation as applied to an offender who was already under a requirement to register. Jensen [v. State], 905 N.E.2d [384,] 394 [(Ind. 2009)]. Two years later, we upheld a similar amendment enhancing an offender’s present registration requirement. Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 813 (Ind. 2011) (“Harris’s claim fails for the same reasons Jensen’s claim failed.”).
In deciding all three cases, we adopted the Supreme Court’s intent-effects test as the proper vehicle for analyzing whether the statute imposes a punishment—which cannot be done retroactively pursuant to our Ex Post Facto Clause—or whether the statute is merely part of a non-punitive, regulatory scheme. [Citations omitted.] We find that same test drives our analysis today.
….
Taken as a whole, we find the effects of the amended definition of sex offender in Indiana Code section 11-8-8-5(b)(1), as applied to Tyson, are regulatory and non-punitive. This outcome makes sense in light of other as-applied ex post facto challenges to the Sex Offender Registration Act we’ve previously considered: unlike Wallace, where the offender had no obligation to register anywhere before the Act was passed, Tyson was required to register in Texas years before our statutory definition was amended to include him. His circumstances are much more similar to those in Jensen and Harris, where both offenders already had to register; the challenged amendments merely lengthened that requirement. We simply cannot say that transferring the obligation upon moving is any more punitive than lengthening it to potentially last a lifetime.
Finding Tyson merely maintained his sex offender status across state lines, we conclude he has failed to show the amended definition retroactively punishes him in violation of our Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws.
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Rush, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.