Massa, J.
In an opinion handed down today, Tyson v. State, we concluded that the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act’s amended definition did not violate our Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws as applied to an offender with an out-of-state obligation to register. We reach the same conclusion here. Because Scott Zerbe was required to register as a sex offender in Michigan, we find maintaining that requirement in Indiana does not retroactively punish him. Thus, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Zerbe’s petition to remove his designation.
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In Michigan in 1992, Scott Zerbe was convicted of criminal sexual conduct with a minor. Two years later, both Michigan and Indiana enacted laws requiring convicted sex offenders to register with local law enforcement. [Citations omitted.] Pursuant to Michigan’s Act, upon his release from prison in 1999, Zerbe was required to register as a sex offender for 25 years. [Citation omitted.] ….
Zerbe does not dispute that he fits our definition of sex offender under Indiana Code section 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and thus has a statutory duty to register here for the duration of his Michigan requirement. [Citations omitted.] His argument is that, as applied to him, enforcing this obligation would amount to retroactive punishment violating Indiana’s prohibition against ex post facto laws. Today in Tyson v. State, we upheld this same amended definition, finding it non-punitive in intent and effects when applied to an offender already required to register in another jurisdiction. But Zerbe distinguishes his case from Tyson’s: when Tyson committed his offense in 2001, Texas had a registration requirement in place, whereas when Zerbe committed his offense ten years earlier, neither Michigan nor Indiana had enacted any registration laws. We do not find this fact compels a different outcome.
… Zerbe argues that because he committed his sex crime before 1994, he is just like [the defendant in] Wallace [v. State], 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009)]. But here, it is not Zerbe’s crime that triggers his obligation to register as a sex offender in Indiana; rather, it is his Michigan registry requirement that does so. Although Michigan’s Act was not yet in effect when Zerbe committed the underlying offense, Michigan courts have determined its Act can apply retroactively to offenders like Zerbe. [Citations omitted.] It is simply not for us to second-guess the legitimacy of Michigan’s registry requirement as it applies—albeit retroactively—to Zerbe.2
[Footnote 2:] Zerbe relies on Burton v. State, a case with very similar facts, asking us to strictly focus on the date of the underlying crime rather than what triggers the Act’s application, his valid registry requirement. 977 N.E.2d 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied, 985 N.E.2d 339 (Ind. 2013) (table) (4–1, Rush, J., voting to grant). … [We] find Burton was wrongly decided, because where another state has determined an individual must register as a sex offender under its laws, we will not substitute its state constitutional analysis with our own.
Instead, the scope of our analysis is limited to determining whether the 2006 definitional amendment to our Act imposes a punitive burden on Zerbe beyond that which the State of Michigan has already imposed. In answering this narrow question, we see no reason the intent-effects test in this case ought to lead to any outcome other than the one we reached in Tyson: although the amended definition results in the affirmative obligation to notify another state government and in potential exposure to increased stigma, the significant responsibilities with respect to Zerbe’s registration are merely maintained across state lines, to be fulfilled where he currently lives and works. In light of the Act’s regulatory purpose to protect the public from repeat sex offenders—no matter what jurisdiction determined sex offender status was warranted—we find the amended definition is non-punitive as applied to Zerbe, and as such, we find it does not offend our Ex Post Facto Clause.
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Rush, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.