Rucker, J.
In a joint proceeding the trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to their daughter concluding there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal will not be remedied and that termination is in the child’s best interests. Determining the evidence in this case does not clearly and convincingly support termination of Father’s parental rights, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
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Although this evidence clearly and convincingly supports the finding that rather than separating from his spouse, Father “has chosen, instead, to remain with his wife,” App. at 17 (Order at 8, ¶ 2), Father’s unwillingness to live separately from a mentally ill spouse, without more, is an insufficient basis upon which to terminate his parental rights. As our courts have long held: “Mental [disability] of the parents, standing alone, is not a proper ground for terminating parental rights.” Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234 (citing Ind. Code § 31-6-5-4(c) (1990); Matter of Dull, 521 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (“find[ing] that retardation of a parent by itself is not a ground for termination of parental rights” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted))); but see R.W., Sr., v. Marion Cnty. Dep’t of Child. Servs., 892 N.E.2d 239, 249, 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights not only due to “Mother’s refusal to take readily available steps to bridge the communication gap caused [by her disability, which] seriously hindered Mother’s ability to effectively care for her children” but concluding that “[i]n addition to not being able to appropriately supervise the children, [both parents] fail[ed] to complete home-based services, and fail[ed] to improve their ability to effectively communicate with each other, . . . [and] the parents had also not achieved the dispositional goal of securing and maintaining a safe and stable home”); R.G. v. Marion Cty. Office, Dep’t of Family & Children, 647 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (properly considering the parents’ mental disabilities as a factor in affirming the termination of parental rights for mentally impaired parents and concluding that termination was appropriate because “Mother and Father ha[d] been both unable and unwilling to develop the skills necessary to fulfill their legal obligations as a parent”), trans. denied.
Because we have long found the custodial parent’s mental disability to be an insufficient basis for termination, we fail to see how simply living with a relative suffering from mental illness provides a more satisfactory basis for termination. And this is particularly so here since the trial court did not find, and the record does not support, that V.A. had been abused by Mother during the time that she was in her Father’s custody. In fact, as Drury testified, the very reason that DCS became involved was because Mother contacted them “reporting that she was feeling very overwhelmed with V.A. and caring for V.A. She was requesting assistance.” Tr. at 122.
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Of course, the trial court may ultimately determine that Mother’s mental condition presents a sufficient danger to V.A. that reunification with Father is not possible while he continues cohabitating with Mother. And this is so regardless of any improvement in Father’s understanding of his wife’s illness. In that eventuality—where neither termination of parental rights nor reunification appear to be viable options—DCS is not left without a remedy. Our statute governing permanency plans allows for the appointment of a legal guardian for the child “that is intended to be permanent and self-sustaining,” as the legal guardian receives the parental rights of “[c]are, custody, and control of the child.” I.C. § 31-34-21-7.5(c)(1)(E). Although the current DCS plan is that of adoption, the record is silent on whether the guardianship option was ever considered. In any event, employing that option in this case—should reunification prove unfeasible—would be consistent with our well-established precedent that “involuntary termination of parental rights is an extreme measure that is designed to be used as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 916 (Ind. 2011).
Conclusion
The evidence in a case involving the termination of a parent’s constitutional right to parent his or her child must meet the heightened burden of clear and convincing. The evidence in this case does not meet that burden. We thus reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this cause for further proceedings.
Rush, C.J, and Dickson, David and Massa, JJ. concur.