Bailey, J.
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Order on Grandparent Visitation
Parents also argue the court’s order denying Parents’ verified petition for termination of grandparent visitation rights was an abuse of discretion.
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As to modification, the Act provides: “The court may modify an order granting or denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child.” I.C. § 31-17-5-7. Parents argue that Grandparents “wholly failed to present any testimony, exhibits, or evidence to support that it is in the best interest of the children” and therefore “the order for visitation must fail.” (Appellant’s Br. 11.) In other words, they seek to shift the burden to Grandparents to show that grandparent visitation is still in Children’s best interests.
We have found no Indiana case that specifically speaks to the burden of proof on a petition to modify an existing order of grandparent visitation rights. However, our courts have addressed the burden of proof necessary to modify an existing order of parenting time rights following an initial custody determination. Using nearly identical language to the grandparent visitation statute, Indiana Code section 31-17-4-2 provides, in relevant part: “The court may modify an order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever modification would serve the best interests of the child.” For the purposes of custody and parenting time rights, both parents are presumed equally entitled to custody in an initial custody determination. In re Paternity of Snyder, 26 N.E.3d 996, 998 (quoting Julie C. v. Andrew C., 924 N.E.2d 1249, 1256 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). However, after the initial determination, a petitioner seeking modification of a parenting time order bears the burden of showing that custody should be altered. Id.
The similarity in statutory language suggests that we place the burden on modification of grandparent visitation rights with the same party as on modification of parenting time rights. Even though the petitioning grandparent carries a high burden on the initial petition for grandparent visitation rights, the petitioner seeking a subsequent change in a grandparent visitation order bears the burden of showing the order should be modified. As the moving party, Parents thus bore the burden of demonstrating that modification of the existing visitation order would serve Children’s best interests.
In making their argument for modification, Parents again relied on evidence and testimony about events that pre-dated the court’s May 2012 and August 2012 orders. The trial court thus found that “Parents have failed to show a change of circumstances since the last Order that would make it no longer in the best interest of the minor children to have a relationship with their Grandparents.” (App. 35.)
By presenting no new evidence to support termination of visitation, Parents’ motion to terminate amounted to nothing more than an attempt to re-litigate issues already brought before the court and affirmed on appeal. Now Parents argue that “[w]ith three (3) years of no visitation between [Grandparents] and the children, such a lapse in time between visits is in and of itself a substantial change of circumstances.” (Appellant’s Br. 14.) However, Parents presented no evidence at the hearing that the lapse in time alone would be detrimental to Children’s well-being. Further, Parents fail to acknowledge that the lack of communication between Grandparents and Children was a direct result of Parents’ contumacious conduct.
Where Parents did not present any evidence showing a change of circumstances to support modification, let alone termination, of the visitation order, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Parents’ petition to terminate grandparent visitation rights.
Conclusion
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Parents in contempt and ordering Parents to pay $17,282.50 in attorney fees (plus $2,000 in previously-ordered attorney fees) as a sanction for contempt. The trial court’s order denying Parents’ petition to terminate grandparent visitation rights was not an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J. and Crone, J., concur.