Baker, J.
Nicole Miller appeals the trial court’s interlocutory order denying her motion to suppress evidence. A police officer, responding to a call of a “disturbance” but lacking probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity, asked Miller to speak with him. When she instead walked away, she was arrested for resisting law enforcement. Reasserting the principles of Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind. 2014), we find that this arrest violated Miller’s well-established right to walk away; consequently, the subsequent search incident to the arrest violated her Fourth Amendment rights. We reverse and remand.
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On May 17, 2014, two Indianapolis police officers received a message over their radio that a woman was causing a disturbance at a local convenience store. As the officers arrived at the intersection, they saw a woman—later identified as Miller—walking across the street away from the store. An employee of the store came outside and pointed at her. The officers drove toward Miller and turned on their emergency lights.
By the time the officers pulled up, Miller was approaching the door of an apartment. One officer exited his vehicle and said, “Hey, I need to talk to you.” [Record citations omitted throughout.] Miller turned, looked at the officer, ignored him, and entered the apartment.
The officers went up to the porch of the residence and knocked on the door. A different woman answered and told the officers that Miller was using the restroom. Ten to fifteen minutes later, Miller came outside. When asked why she did not initially stop to speak with the officer, she said, “I didn’t know what you wanted to talk to me about.” The officer immediately placed Miller under arrest for resisting law enforcement. He patted her down and found what he believed to be Spice and a single Ecstasy pill.
The other officer then walked back to the convenience store and spoke with the clerk. The clerk alleged that he and Miller got into an argument over the price of a soda; he further alleged that Miller became upset and damaged the EBT card reader. All of this information was relayed to the arresting officer after the arrest and search had been completed.
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We make two initial observations. First, Miller’s arrest cannot be legitimized by her activities in the convenience store. At the time of her arrest, the officers only had a report of a “disturbance,” coupled with the clerk pointing at Miller. Our Supreme Court has explained that “a report of a disturbance, without more, is not a sufficient basis upon which to conduct an investigatory stop,” much less an arrest. Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2014).
Second, Miller’s arrest cannot be legitimized by her jaywalking. It is true that … that Indiana Code section 34-28-5- 3(a) permits officers to detain violators of municipal codes in order to identify the person and inform her of the allegation; and that those who refuse to provide information to an officer who has stopped them for an ordinance violation commit a class C misdemeanor. I.C. § 34-28-5-3.5(1). But there is no evidence in the record that Miller refused to give the officers information, or that she was informed of the alleged violation. The undisputed evidence shows that the officer asked Miller why she did not stop, she answered, and then she was immediately placed under arrest.
We are left with the rationale on which the trial court relied: that the officer had probable cause to believe that Miller had committed the crime of resisting law enforcement by fleeing. [Footnote omitted.] …
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[Gaddie held] the resisting law enforcement by fleeing statute “must be understood to require that [an] order to stop rest on probable cause or reasonable suspicion ….” Gaddie, 10 N.E.3d at 1255. Anything less would violate a “person’s well-established freedom to walk away. . . .” Id.
Although the present case comes to us in a different procedural posture [than Gaddie]—a motion to suppress evidence rather than a conviction for resisting law enforcement—we find Gaddie’s rationale to compel a reversal. Our Supreme Court recognized that a person’s freedom to walk away is rendered illusory if she is subjected to criminal penalty for exercising that freedom. Just the same, a person’s freedom to walk away is rendered illusory if she is subjected to arrest for exercising that freedom. [Footnote omitted.]
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The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.