Robb, J.
[In two separate OWI prosecutions in which the defendants were in pre-trial diversion, the trial court ordered the BMV to permit defendants to reinstate their driving privileges without showing SR22 proof of financial responsibility.]
….
The BMV intervened and filed motions for relief from judgment in both cases on November 25, 2014. The trial court consolidated the cases to conduct a hearing on the motions. The BMV maintained,
[U]nder Indiana Code § 9-30-6-12, an individual whose license is suspended for failing a chemical test pursuant to Indiana Code § 9-30-6, is required to maintain proof of financial responsibility by filing the SR22 following a suspension for the failure, regardless of whether there has been a conviction.
[Record citations omitted throughout.] Accordingly, the BMV argued the trial court’s orders permitting Mooney’s and McCool’s driving privileges to be reinstated without proof of future financial responsibility were “contrary to law.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court expressed disagreement with the BMV’s interpretation of Indiana Code section 9-30-6-12 and denied both motions. This appeal followed.
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The State’s motions—filed on November 25, 2014—did not identify any “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect” suffered by the State, nor any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. At the hearing on its motions, the State briefly mentioned what it characterized as “delay” in the trial court sending the relevant orders to the BMV:
[T]here appears to be some delay in getting [the court’s orders] to the BMV and it also takes the BMV some time to process those. But in both cases it appears that they were re-sent to the BMV some months later. So in Miss McCool’s case it looks like it was faxed to the BMV on May 15th, but then again emailed on September 5th. So there was quite a delay for some reason there. And then with Mr. Mooney’s the order is file stamped July 23rd, 2014, but the chronological case summary says that the order was granted on August 5th and the Clerk was to re-send it to the BMV on September 5th. So again, not quite as big of a delay, but a little bit of a delay there.
But we cannot agree the act of re-sending the orders to the BMV constituted “delay.” There is nothing in the record suggesting the BMV did not receive the orders the first time they were sent, and the BMV offered no explanation for why it waited months to intervene in either case. [Citation omitted.]
The State argues we need not determine whether the BMV established grounds of “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect” because (1) the trial court’s denial of the motions was based solely on the legal merits of the judgment, and (2) Mooney and McCool did not object to the State’s motions for failing to establish “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect.” We are unpersuaded. … [T]he trial court’s remark indicating its disagreement with the BMV’s interpretation of the relevant statute … certainly suggests the trial court did not believe the State had a “meritorious claim or defense,” [but] it does not relieve the State’s burden of establishing “the procedural, equitable grounds justifying relief.” [Citation omitted.] As for the defendants’ failure to object, the burden was on the State to demonstrate its entitlement to relief under Trial Rule 60(B). [Citation omitted.]
The State has not established prima facie error in the trial court’s denial of its motions for relief from judgment. The State failed to identify any circumstances warranting relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(1) or (B)(8), and its motions addressed only the legal merits of the judgments.6 We will not entertain the State’s attempt to resurrect an untimely appeal.7
[Footnote 6:] We express no opinion as to the legal merits of the judgment.
[Footnote 7:] The legal merits of the judgment were reviewable by way of a timely appeal or motion to correct error. [Citations omitted.]
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The State has not established prima facie error in the trial court’s denial of its motions for relief from judgment. We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Altice, J., concur.