Vaidik, C. J.
Case Summary
After Nicholas Hargrave was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in a manner that endangered a person, Hargrave surrendered his Commercial Drivers License (CDL) and pleaded guilty. The trial court withheld judgment of conviction, and Hargrave was ordered to participate in a diversion program. Hargrave’s case was deferred with a provision that it would be dismissed if he successfully completed the diversion program. In the meantime, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (the BMV) refused to reinstate Hargrave’s driving privileges without proof he held SR22 insurance. After the trial court granted Hargrave’s petition asking it to order the BMV to reinstate his driving privileges without requiring him to provide proof of SR22 insurance, the BMV intervened in the case and filed a motion to correct error. In this motion, the BMV asked the trial court to determine that 1) Hargrave was not eligible for a diversion program because he held a CDL at the time of the offense, and 2) Hargrave was required to provide proof of insurance for three years following the termination of his suspension. The trial court denied the motion, and the State appealed.
Because the BMV properly interpreted federal regulations adopted by Indiana statutes to mean that a person who holds a CDL at the time he commits a traffic violation may not participate in a diversion program, the trial court erred in denying the State’s motion to correct error on this issue. In addition, because Hargrave’s driving privileges were suspended under Indiana Code section 9-30- 6-9, Hargrave is required to file proof of financial responsibility for three years following the termination of his suspension under Indiana Code section 9-30-6- 12, and the trial court erred in denying the State’s motion to correct error on this issue as well. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of the State’s motion to correct error.
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Here, as the agency tasked with interpreting and implementing motor vehicle laws, the BMV has interpreted 49 C.F.R. § 384.226, as adopted by Indiana Code section 9-24-6-2, to “mean that a person who holds a CDL license at the time he commits a traffic violation may not participate in a diversion program or have judgment deferred on that conviction.” Appellant’s Br. p. 7. We agree with the State that this is a reasonable interpretation of the federal regulation adopted by our state’s legislature. [Footnote omitted.]
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For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s decision withholding judgment on Hargrave’s conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and allowing him to enter a diversion program is contrary to Indiana and federal law, and the trial court therefore abused its discretion in denying the BMV’s motion to correct error on this issue.
Reversed.
Pyle, J., concurs.
Robb, J., concurring with separate opinion.
Robb, Judge, concurring. [1] I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately only to note the inconsistent treatment of those who currently hold CDLs and those who do not (but could in the future). As the majority notes, allowing an individual to surrender her CDL, avoid conviction by completing a diversion program, and then return to driving professionally with no record of the offense is “precisely what the anti-masking law is designed to prevent.” Slip op. at ¶ 18. But if an individual does not hold a CDL at the time of the offense, that individual can participate in a diversion program and later drive professionally with no record of the offense. See 49 C.F.R. § 384.225(a)(1) (requiring each state to maintain as part of the CDLIS driver record of each CDL holder “[a]ll convictions, disqualifications and other licensing actions for violations of any State or local law relating to motor vehicle traffic control (other than parking, vehicle weight, or vehicle defect violations) committed in any type of vehicle”). In light of the purpose of the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act, i.e. “to reduce the number and severity of accidents involving commercial motor vehicles,” slip op. at ¶ 14, I find it difficult to justify this inconsistency.