Baker, J.
Landon Harbert appeals his conviction for Robbery, a class B felony, and the twenty-year sentence imposed by the trial court. [Footnote omitted.] Malcolm Smith, Harbert’s co-defendant, appeals his convictions for two counts of Robbery, a class B felony. [Footnote omitted.]
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[Defendants were charged with robbing a money lending store in West Lafayette. Their first trial resulted in mistrial when a witness, Officer Harris, violated a motion in limine barring evidence of the co-defendants’ prior arrests.] Before the second trial, both defendants moved to dismiss all charges on the basis of double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The second trial ended in another mistrial after the jury deadlocked.
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The third jury trial took place on August 4-7, 2014. Following the trial, the jury found both defendants guilty as charged. … Both defendants now appeal.
Smith and Harbert argue that principles of double jeopardy required dismissal … under [I.C. § 35-41-4-3](b) because the prosecutor, in eliciting the complained-of testimony from Officer Harris, acted with intent to cause termination of the trial.
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In this case, as in Willoughby [v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. 1996)], there is no evidence that the prosecutor intended to cause a mistrial, that the prosecutor colluded with Officer Harris, or that Officer Harris knew that his comments would cause a mistrial. The prosecutor had not advised Officer Harris to refrain from testifying about the prior arrests, but did not believe that an advisement was necessary given the officer’s professional experience. Moreover, the prosecutor was trying to elicit testimony regarding the vehicle’s BMV records, rather than the prior arrests, in questioning Officer Harris. Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss the charges following the first mistrial.
Harbert argues that he should be afforded greater protections by virtue of the Indiana Constitution. In support of this argument, he cites to Oregon’s interpretation of an identical constitutional provision that bars retrial in cases where the prosecutor demonstrated indifference to mistrial or reversal. [Citation omitted.] We decline to adopt the Oregon interpretation, but note that even if we did, it would not aid the defendants here. There is no evidence in the record that the prosecutor demonstrated indifference to mistrial or reversal. Consequently, this argument is unavailing, and we decline to reverse on this basis.
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Finally, Smith argues that the trial court erred by denying his post-trial motion to correct error based upon newly-discovered evidence * * * consist[ing] of media reports of three robberies occurring at Lafayette gas stations and a Lafayette check cashing business in October and November 2014. We do not find that this is “evidence” that is “worthy of credit” or that it could be produced on retrial. Instead, these unsubstantiated media reports constitute an attempt by Smith to seek aid from the court to conduct discovery in the hope that he would eventually find exculpatory evidence. But the motion to correct error standard requires that, to be entitled to a new trial, the defendant must already have the creditable, producible evidence on hand. Smith does not meet this test.
Furthermore, we note that the unsubstantiated media reports indicate that the suspect identified in the gas station robberies is not the same ethnicity as either appellant, nor does it match the description of the perpetrators provided at trial. And the check cashing robber was reported to be significantly shorter than Smith. Therefore, even if we were to find that this evidence is worthy of credit and producible, we would not find that it would probably produce a different result on retrial. In sum, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Smith’s motion to correct error.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.