Crone, Judge.
… During a valid traffic stop of Hansbrough’s vehicle, police officers conducted a dog sniff around the vehicle. After the canine alerted to the presence of narcotics, officers searched the vehicle and found a firearm. Hansbrough unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search arguing that the dog sniff prolonged the traffic stop in violation of his constitutional rights. … The sole restated issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained as a result of the search. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
….
In this case, Hansbrough does not dispute the validity of the initial traffic stop. Instead, he asserts that the stop became unlawful because the dog sniff prolonged the duration of the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the original purpose of the stop, and that Officer Silbaugh lacked reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity to otherwise extend the stop. Therefore, he argues, the subsequent search of the vehicle was invalid and the evidence obtained was inadmissible. We must disagree.
….
We need not engage in a reasonable suspicion analysis here because the record reveals that the dog sniff of Hansbrough’s vehicle did not prolong the duration of the valid traffic stop. In Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015), the United States Supreme Court recently held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Specifically, the Rodriguez court held that “[a] seizure justified by only a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). The court explained that, beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop such as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at 1615. The court determined that the police may not extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff. Id. The critical question is whether “conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop[.]’” Id. at 1616; see Washington v. State, 42 N.E.3d 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (rehearing opinion reaffirming conviction pursuant to Rodriguez and concluding that dog sniff did not prolong traffic stop), opinion on reh’g, trans. denied.4
[Footnote 4:] For a detailed summary of previous “Indiana dog sniff cases” that we believe remain consistent with Rodriguez, see State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Bush v. State, 925 N.E.2d 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), clarified on reh’g, 929 N.E.2d 897), trans. denied (2014)).
The facts and inferences from the record indicate that the dog sniff of Hansbrough’s vehicle was conducted while his valid traffic stop was ongoing, or in other words, before the traffic stop was completed. The police dash cam evidence establishes that the dog sniff occurred within sixteen minutes of the start of the traffic stop. Officer Silbaugh testified that he had not yet completed his paperwork and was still on the phone checking for outstanding warrants on Hansbrough when the canine unit arrived and conducted the sweep. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the dog sniff prolonged or added any time to the valid traffic stop. Therefore, the subsequent search of Hansbrough’s vehicle was not rendered invalid, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained during that search.5 See Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind. 2005) (finding no error in trial court’s determination that dog sniff occurred while traffic stop was ongoing because officer was explaining traffic citation to defendant while canine was performing sniff and only thirteen minutes had elapsed from start of traffic stop).
[Footnote 5:] While we need not reach the issue, we conclude that even if the dog sniff prolonged Hansbrough’s traffic stop, the evidence establishes that Officer Silbaugh had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (based upon his observation of what he believed to be marijuana shake) in order to detain Hansbrough beyond the time necessary to complete the mission of the stop. See Gray, 997 N.E.2d at 1152 (recognizing that once a justifiable stop is made, the scope of the officer’s investigation may be broadened beyond the purpose for which the person was stopped only if additional particularized and objective suspicions come to light; although additional suspicion is not required to perform a dog sniff, suspicion is required for any additional seizure that the dog sniff caused).
Hansbrough urges that Officer Silbaugh knew “how long the canine officer [would] take to get there,” and therefore his testimony that he was not finished with his ordinary traffic stop inquiries when the canine unit arrived and conducted the sniff was “suspect.” He argues that accepting an officer’s testimony in this regard “creates a real danger of officers slowing down their processes to allow time for the canine to arrive.” We acknowledge the legitimacy of his concerns. Nevertheless, the Rodriguez court observed that the reasonableness of a seizure depends “on what the police in fact do” and reasonable diligence on the part of police can only be gauged “by noting what the officer actually did and how he did it [.]” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. We remind Hansbrough that it was the trial court’s prerogative to accept or reject Officer Silbaugh’s testimony, and we do not reweigh the evidence but defer to the trial court’s factual determinations unless clearly erroneous. Meredith [v. State], 906 N.E.2d [867,] 869 [(Ind. 2009)]. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court’s determinations here were clearly erroneous. We affirm Hansbrough’s conviction.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
… During a valid traffic stop of Hansbrough’s vehicle, police officers conducted a dog sniff around the vehicle. After the canine alerted to the presence of narcotics, officers searched the vehicle and found a firearm. Hansbrough unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search arguing that the dog sniff prolonged the traffic stop in violation of his constitutional rights. … The sole restated issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained as a result of the search. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
….
In this case, Hansbrough does not dispute the validity of the initial traffic stop. Instead, he asserts that the stop became unlawful because the dog sniff prolonged the duration of the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the original purpose of the stop, and that Officer Silbaugh lacked reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity to otherwise extend the stop. Therefore, he argues, the subsequent search of the vehicle was invalid and the evidence obtained was inadmissible. We must disagree.
….
We need not engage in a reasonable suspicion analysis here because the record reveals that the dog sniff of Hansbrough’s vehicle did not prolong the duration of the valid traffic stop. In Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015), the United States Supreme Court recently held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Specifically, the Rodriguez court held that “[a] seizure justified by only a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). The court explained that, beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop such as “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. at 1615. The court determined that the police may not extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog sniff. Id. The critical question is whether “conducting the sniff ‘prolongs’—i.e., adds time to—‘the stop[.]’” Id. at 1616; see Washington v. State, 42 N.E.3d 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (rehearing opinion reaffirming conviction pursuant to Rodriguez and concluding that dog sniff did not prolong traffic stop), opinion on reh’g, trans. denied.4
[Footnote 4:] For a detailed summary of previous “Indiana dog sniff cases” that we believe remain consistent with Rodriguez, see State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Bush v. State, 925 N.E.2d 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), clarified on reh’g, 929 N.E.2d 897), trans. denied (2014)).
The facts and inferences from the record indicate that the dog sniff of Hansbrough’s vehicle was conducted while his valid traffic stop was ongoing, or in other words, before the traffic stop was completed. The police dash cam evidence establishes that the dog sniff occurred within sixteen minutes of the start of the traffic stop. Officer Silbaugh testified that he had not yet completed his paperwork and was still on the phone checking for outstanding warrants on Hansbrough when the canine unit arrived and conducted the sweep. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the dog sniff prolonged or added any time to the valid traffic stop. Therefore, the subsequent search of Hansbrough’s vehicle was not rendered invalid, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained during that search.5 See Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind. 2005) (finding no error in trial court’s determination that dog sniff occurred while traffic stop was ongoing because officer was explaining traffic citation to defendant while canine was performing sniff and only thirteen minutes had elapsed from start of traffic stop).
[Footnote 5:] While we need not reach the issue, we conclude that even if the dog sniff prolonged Hansbrough’s traffic stop, the evidence establishes that Officer Silbaugh had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (based upon his observation of what he believed to be marijuana shake) in order to detain Hansbrough beyond the time necessary to complete the mission of the stop. See Gray, 997 N.E.2d at 1152 (recognizing that once a justifiable stop is made, the scope of the officer’s investigation may be broadened beyond the purpose for which the person was stopped only if additional particularized and objective suspicions come to light; although additional suspicion is not required to perform a dog sniff, suspicion is required for any additional seizure that the dog sniff caused).
Hansbrough urges that Officer Silbaugh knew “how long the canine officer [would] take to get there,” and therefore his testimony that he was not finished with his ordinary traffic stop inquiries when the canine unit arrived and conducted the sniff was “suspect.” He argues that accepting an officer’s testimony in this regard “creates a real danger of officers slowing down their processes to allow time for the canine to arrive.” We acknowledge the legitimacy of his concerns. Nevertheless, the Rodriguez court observed that the reasonableness of a seizure depends “on what the police in fact do” and reasonable diligence on the part of police can only be gauged “by noting what the officer actually did and how he did it [.]” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616. We remind Hansbrough that it was the trial court’s prerogative to accept or reject Officer Silbaugh’s testimony, and we do not reweigh the evidence but defer to the trial court’s factual determinations unless clearly erroneous. Meredith [v. State], 906 N.E.2d [867,] 869 [(Ind. 2009)]. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court’s determinations here were clearly erroneous. We affirm Hansbrough’s conviction.
Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.