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The question before the Court today goes beyond the general acceptance that a warrantless search incident to a valid arrest is reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11. Garcia does not dispute that the search of his person was permissible as a search incident to arrest. Rather, he challenges the permissible scope of such a search. Garcia contends that while the pill container found on his person during the pat-down search could be seized, a search incident to arrest under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution does not permit the officer to open the container found on his person without a warrant or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. After consideration of the three Litchfield [v. State, 25 N.E.3d 786 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)] factors and federal precedent on this very issue, we disagree. In the present case, opening the container found on Garcia’s person during the course of a search incident to a valid arrest was reasonable under the Indiana Constitution.
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As recited above, the reasonableness of a search requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, which is done by balancing the three Litchfield factors. Although Garcia puts great emphasis upon the lack of suspicion surrounding the search of the container itself, the degree of suspicion is but one factor to be considered. Additionally, … this Court has long recognized that “[a] search incident to a valid arrest is lawful regardless of what it reveals.” [Citation omitted.] We address each factor in turn.
A. Degree of concern, suspicion or knowledge that an offense has occurred
This factor may be assessed quickly and ultimately falls in favor of the State. We have previously recognized that “once a lawful arrest has been made, authorities may conduct a ‘full search’ of the arrestee for weapons or concealed evidence. No additional probable cause for the search is required, and the search incident to arrest may ‘involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person.’” [Citation omitted.] … Officer Robinett did not need any additional degree of suspicion specifically in relation to the cylinder container found on Garcia in order to open that container incident to Garcia’s lawful arrest.
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B. Degree of intrusion upon the citizen’s ordinary activities
Next, we consider the degree to which the search intruded upon Garcia’s ordinary activities. … The arrest alone was a significant intrusion into Garcia’s ordinary activities. A pat-down is minimally intrusive in comparison to Garcia being detained, transported to the police station, booked, and held in jail while criminal charges are potentially brought against him.
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Moreover, the degree of intrusion in the present case is easily distinguishable from the unreasonable [strip] search in Edwards [v. State], 759 N.E.2d [626 (Ind. 2001)]. …
Garcia attempts to argue that only the opening of the pill container should be considered in conducting the reasonableness analysis, and goes on to claim that a pill container is especially private, making the intrusion in opening the container great. We are not persuaded … :
A police officer’s determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (emphasis added). Again, it is not a single aspect of the search that is considered, but the entirety of the search.
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C. The extent of law enforcement needs
The needs of law enforcement to conduct a search can vary greatly depending upon the circumstances. Among the most commonly recognized bases for conducting a search includes “ensuring that the arrestee is unarmed, preventing the arrestee from brin[g]ing contraband into jail, and preventing the destruction of evidence.” [Citation omitted.] …
When the pill container was discovered on Garcia’s person, it is insignificant that Officer Robinett acknowledged that the container could contain legal or illegal substances or that he did not subjectively view Garcia or the container as dangerous. … [T]he objective reasonableness of the search is controlling, not Officer Robinett’s subjective views. … Under an objective standard, we agree that “unknown physical objects may always pose risks, no matter how slight, during the tense atmosphere of a custodial arrest.” Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). …
We also seek to reiterate our recent statement in Guilmette [v. State] … explain[ing] the practical rationalization for allowing the search [of items lawfully seized incident to arrest]: “[I]t would be extremely cumbersome to require law enforcement to take the ‘belt-and-suspenders’ approach of applying for an independent warrant anytime they wish to examine or test a piece of evidence they have already lawfully seized.” [14 N.E.3d 38, 42 (Ind. 2014)]. Similarly, we see no basis in the present circumstances why an independent warrant should be required to search an item already lawfully seized.
Thus, we conclude that the final Litchfield factor also weighs in favor of the State. When taking an individual into custody, officer safety is a primary concern. Small and seemingly innocuous items have the potential to pose a threat. We see no reason to delay the officer’s ability to inspect such items once they have already been lawfully seized.
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We affirm the trial court’s denial of Garcia’s motion to suppress the pill container found on his person during a search incident to a valid arrest. In doing so, we hold that the search of Garcia’s person, which included opening the container, was within the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest and reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Rush, C.J., Dickson and Massa, J.J., concur.
Rucker, J., concurs in result only.