Pyle, J.
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Pursuant to Ordinance 5-2-1, Lawrence County has altered the speed limit on Leesville Road from the statewide default of 55 miles per hour to 35 miles per hour. During the time relevant to this appeal, however, there were no signs on Leesville Road giving northbound motorists notice of the altered speed limit. On November 29, 2014, Coleman was driving north on Leesville Road when a patrolling law enforcement officer clocked him going 46 miles per hour. The officer performed a traffic stop and ultimately issued Coleman a speeding ticket.
Coleman … conceded that he exceeded 35 miles per hour, but argued that the applicable speed limit was 55 miles per hour. In support of this contention, he argued that there are no signs giving notice of the 35 mile per hour speed limit facing northbound traffic on Leesville Road. He stated that there was a speed limit sign facing southbound traffic, but that the sign had been illegally placed by a private citizen. According to Coleman, in the absence of signage notifying northbound motorists of the altered speed limit, the 55-mile-per-hour statewide default speed limit applied. …
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… In this case … the relevant facts are undisputed and we are presented with a pure question of law. “When the issue on appeal is a pure question of law, we review the matter de novo.” Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind. 2011).
Resolution of this case turns on our determination of the applicable speed limit on Leesville Road. The parties do not dispute that the statewide default maximum speeds established by I.C. § 9-21-5-2 and applicable to Leesville Road is 55 miles per hour. [Footnote omitted.] I.C. § 9-21-5-6 authorizes local jurisdictions to alter these default maximum speeds within certain parameters. These altered speed limits are “effective at all times . . . when appropriate signs giving notice of the altered limit are erected on the street or highway.” I.C. § 9-21-5-6(c).
In enacting Lawrence County Ordinance 5-2-1, the county sought to reduce the speed limit throughout Lawrence County to 35 miles per hour. However, it is undisputed that there are no signs on Leesville Road notifying northbound motorists of the altered speed limit. Thus, pursuant to I.C. § 9-21-5-6(c), the altered speed limit was not effective as to northbound traffic, and the default speed limit of 55 miles per hour was applicable. Because Coleman was alleged to have been traveling at 46 miles per hour, he did not commit the civil infraction of speeding.
We reject the State’s argument that judgment against Coleman was nevertheless appropriate because he had actual knowledge of the 35-mile-per-hour speed limit due to his familiarity with the area and the presence of other speed limit signs nearby, including one on Leesville Road facing southbound traffic. I.C. § 9-21-5-6 sets forth the procedure a local jurisdiction must follow for an altered speed limit to be effective, including placing signs notifying motorists of the altered speed. A specific motorist’s subjective knowledge of the speed limit is irrelevant. … Because there were no “appropriate signs giving notice of the altered speed limit” to northbound drivers on Leesville Road, the statewide default speed limit of 55 miles per hour was applicable. See I.C. § 9- 21-5-6(c). As Coleman did not exceed that speed, the judgment against him was in error.
Judgment reversed.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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Pursuant to Ordinance 5-2-1, Lawrence County has altered the speed limit on Leesville Road from the statewide default of 55 miles per hour to 35 miles per hour. During the time relevant to this appeal, however, there were no signs on Leesville Road giving northbound motorists notice of the altered speed limit. On November 29, 2014, Coleman was driving north on Leesville Road when a patrolling law enforcement officer clocked him going 46 miles per hour. The officer performed a traffic stop and ultimately issued Coleman a speeding ticket.
Coleman … conceded that he exceeded 35 miles per hour, but argued that the applicable speed limit was 55 miles per hour. In support of this contention, he argued that there are no signs giving notice of the 35 mile per hour speed limit facing northbound traffic on Leesville Road. He stated that there was a speed limit sign facing southbound traffic, but that the sign had been illegally placed by a private citizen. According to Coleman, in the absence of signage notifying northbound motorists of the altered speed limit, the 55-mile-per-hour statewide default speed limit applied. …
….
… In this case … the relevant facts are undisputed and we are presented with a pure question of law. “When the issue on appeal is a pure question of law, we review the matter de novo.” Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ind. 2011).
Resolution of this case turns on our determination of the applicable speed limit on Leesville Road. The parties do not dispute that the statewide default maximum speeds established by I.C. § 9-21-5-2 and applicable to Leesville Road is 55 miles per hour. [Footnote omitted.] I.C. § 9-21-5-6 authorizes local jurisdictions to alter these default maximum speeds within certain parameters. These altered speed limits are “effective at all times . . . when appropriate signs giving notice of the altered limit are erected on the street or highway.” I.C. § 9-21-5-6(c).
In enacting Lawrence County Ordinance 5-2-1, the county sought to reduce the speed limit throughout Lawrence County to 35 miles per hour. However, it is undisputed that there are no signs on Leesville Road notifying northbound motorists of the altered speed limit. Thus, pursuant to I.C. § 9-21-5-6(c), the altered speed limit was not effective as to northbound traffic, and the default speed limit of 55 miles per hour was applicable. Because Coleman was alleged to have been traveling at 46 miles per hour, he did not commit the civil infraction of speeding.
We reject the State’s argument that judgment against Coleman was nevertheless appropriate because he had actual knowledge of the 35-mile-per-hour speed limit due to his familiarity with the area and the presence of other speed limit signs nearby, including one on Leesville Road facing southbound traffic. I.C. § 9-21-5-6 sets forth the procedure a local jurisdiction must follow for an altered speed limit to be effective, including placing signs notifying motorists of the altered speed. A specific motorist’s subjective knowledge of the speed limit is irrelevant. … Because there were no “appropriate signs giving notice of the altered speed limit” to northbound drivers on Leesville Road, the statewide default speed limit of 55 miles per hour was applicable. See I.C. § 9- 21-5-6(c). As Coleman did not exceed that speed, the judgment against him was in error.
Judgment reversed.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.