Kirsch, J.
Jeffrey Stant (“Jeffrey”) appeals the trial court’s order denying his “Action in Mandamus to Compel Delivery of Accounting” (“Mandamus Action”). Appellant’s App. at 26-27. In this interlocutory appeal, Jeffrey raises the following consolidated and restated issue: whether the trial court erred when it construed Indiana Code section 30-5-6-4 to apply only to powers of attorney created after July 1, 2012 and held that Jeffery was not entitled to request and receive a copy of an accounting of his mother’s finances.
We reverse and remand.
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Jeffrey argues that the trial court erred when it found that he was not entitled to request and receive an accounting of Natalie’s finances pursuant to Indiana Code section 30-5-6-4, which sets forth who may make a request and receive an accounting from an attorney in fact. The statute was most recently amended as of July 1, 2014 and presently provides that a child of the principal may request and receive an accounting from the attorney in fact. Ind. Code § 30-5-6-4(c), (d). In this appeal, Jeffrey contends that, because he was the child of the principal and because his request for the accounting occurred after the amendments to the statute that allow for a child to request and receive an accounting, he was entitled to receive the accounting from William. Jeffrey asserts that the trial court incorrectly construed Indiana Code section 30-5-6-4 to only apply to children requesting an accounting under a power of attorney created after July 1, 2012. Jeffrey claims that it is not retroactive application of the statute to allow him to request and receive an accounting because the trial court impermissibly read a temporal limitation into the statute.
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We find Indiana Code section 30-5-6-4 to be unambiguous. It provides that, as of July 1, 2014, a child of the principal may request an accounting, and if requested, the attorney in fact shall render and deliver the accounting to the child. Ind. Code § 30-5-6-4(c), (d) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that Jeffrey meets the requirements to receive an accounting; his mother, Natalie, is the principal, and as her child, he is entitled to receive an accounting when requested. However, although Jeffrey met the unambiguous requirements of Indiana Code section 30-5-6-4, the trial court read into the statute a requirement that the power of attorney, for which the accounting is requested, must have been created prior to July 1, 2012, the date when the statute was amended to allow children of the principal to request an accounting.
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Contrary to the trial court’s determination, we do not find a temporal limitation in the current version of Indiana Code section 30-5-6-4. Nothing in the language of the statute limits the requirement of delivering an accounting requested by a child of the principal to only apply to powers of attorney created after the July 1, 2012 amendment to the statute. “A court may not read into a statute that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature.” S. Newton Sch. Corp. Bd. of Sch. Trs. v. S. Newton Classroom Teachers Ass’n, 762 N.E.2d 115, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Here, the legislature did not include any specific temporal limitations as to when a power of attorney must have been created for the statute to apply.
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Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur