Massa, J.
Leandrew Beasley appeals his convictions for the murder of James Allen, the attempted murder of Gerald Beamon, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. We now grant transfer with respect to a single issue raised by Beasley on appeal: whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Beamon’s testimony that Allen told Beamon he had shot Beasley the day before Allen’s murder, on the grounds his statements “had so great a tendency . . . to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability” such that “a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made [the statement] only if the person believed it to be true,” as permitted by Indiana Evidence Rule 804(b)(3). We find that it was not error for the trial court to admit Beamon’s challenged testimony on that basis, and thus affirm.
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Beasley contends it was harmful error to admit Beamon’s hearsay testimony of Allen’s statements to him, because: (1) Allen’s statements described acts of self-defense that would not subject him to any criminal liability, and thus their admission under Rule 804(b)(3) was error; and (2) since this was the State’s only evidence of Beasley’s motive, the error was harmful.
We agree with Beasley’s second contention, in principle. “While motive is not an element of the crime, the absence of motive is a significant exculpatory factor . . . .” Kiefer v. State, 761 N.E.2d 802, 806 (Ind. 2002) (reversing conviction for attempted murder in the absence of any evidence of motive, in part because “an inference is necessary to establish Kiefer’s intent to kill”). Likewise, the inclusion of evidence of motive is likely a significant incriminating factor in the eyes of the jury. Moreover, we can discern no independent evidence in the record to explain why Beasley would have shot Allen and Beamon aside from Beamon’s hearsay testimony of the previous night’s altercation between Beasley and Allen; thus, the State’s loss of that evidence would almost certainly have made it more difficult to reach a conviction. Beasley is therefore correct that if this testimony were erroneously admitted, it would be grounds for reversal.
We do not, however, agree with Beasley’s first contention, and we find the trial court was within its discretion in ruling that Allen’s statements were against his interests, such that they were admissible hearsay.
Indiana Evidence Rule 804(b)(3) reads, in relevant part:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness.2
. . .
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement that [] a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . .
[Footnote 2:] It is undisputed that Allen is unavailable as defined by Indiana Evidence Rule 804(a)(4) due to his death.
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In both Jervis [v. State, 679 N.E.2d 875 (Ind. 1997)] and Camm [v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 2009)], the declarants’ statements sought to be admitted (one referencing dumping off a woman and the other having bodies on one’s conscience) were vague and subject to interpretation. Here, we have no such ambiguity: Allen gave Beamon a precise account of his altercation with Beasley, and stated in no uncertain terms that he shot Beasley in the face. [Record citations omitted throughout.] Even if Allen believed the shooting was justified as a matter of self-defense, it does not necessarily follow that Allen believed there was no possibility of future civil or criminal liability for the act. Beasley opposes this position by likening Allen’s statements to telling someone you “drove home drunk last night,” in support of his assertion that “trivial ‘confessions’ of criminal conduct” should not be rendered admissible hearsay under Rule 804(B)(3). We cannot agree that the act of shooting a fellow human being in the face qualifies as “trivial.” Rather, we find the trial court could have reasonably determined that admitting to such a violent act would have “so great a tendency . . . to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability” that it was admissible hearsay under Rule 804(b)(3).
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Although … corroborating evidence is not strictly required by our Rule 804(b)(3),5 [there is corroborating evidence in this case that] certainly supports the trial court’s determination that Beamon’s hearsay testimony was reliable, which “is, after all, the ultimate justification for admission of statements against interest.” Jarvis, 679 N.E.2d at 879. We thus find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these hearsay statements under Rule 804(b)(3).
[Footnote 5:] By contrast, its federal counterpart expressly requires “corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate [the statement’s] trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
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Rush, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.