Najam, J.
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D.A. appeals the trial court’s denial of his request to apply an expungement order to the records of a civil forfeiture proceeding that arose from the same facts underlying his now-expunged convictions. D.A. raises a single issue for our review, which is an issue of first impression: whether our expungement statutes apply to the records of civil forfeiture proceedings. We hold that, on these facts, the trial court erred when it did not apply the expungement order to the records of D.A.’s civil forfeiture proceeding. [Footnote omitted.]
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… On February 28, 2003, D.A. was convicted of dealing in marijuana, as a Class C felony, and possession of cocaine, as a Class C felony…. Meanwhile, the State also filed a civil forfeiture action against the $720 seized from D.A. during his arrest for the criminal offenses. … Following D.A.’s convictions for the underlying offenses, on October 21, 2003, the trial court ordered the $720 forfeited either because D.A. had used that money to facilitate his commission of the underlying offenses or because that money was the proceeds from those offenses.
In August of 2014, D.A. filed a petition to expunge the records of his convictions. … The trial court granted D.A.’s petition. Thirteen days later, D.A. requested the court to amend its expungement order to include and expunge the records of … the civil forfeiture proceeding. After a hearing, the court denied D.A.’s request that the expungement order also be applied to the records of the civil forfeiture proceeding. This appeal ensued.
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The essential question in this appeal is whether our expungement statutes apply narrowly only to “conviction records” or apply more broadly to any records that “relate to . . . [a] conviction.” See I.C. § 35-38-9-4(c). …
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The first question we must consider is whether our expungement statutes are ambiguous with respect to the scope of the records to be expunged. We must conclude that they are. Again, Section 4 states that a person “may petition a court to expunge all conviction records, including records contained in[] a court’s files . . . that relate to the person’s felony conviction.” I.C. § 35-38-9-4 (emphases added). This language is ambiguous. The phrase “conviction records” appears limiting, but the phrase “records . . . that relate to the person’s felony conviction” appears broad. * * * We will not read that additional [broader] directive as meaningless surplusage; rather, “we are obliged to suppose that the General Assembly chose the language it did for a reason.” [Citation omitted.]
Accordingly, we interpret Section 4 to require the court to expunge both a person’s “conviction records,” such as a judgment of conviction, and any other records “that relate to the person’s felony conviction.” I.C. § 35-38-9-4. And we conclude that where, as here, a civil forfeiture is ancillary to and premised on criminal activity for which the defendant was convicted, the records of that civil forfeiture “relate” to that conviction. …
The expungement statutes are inherently remedial and, as such, should be liberally construed to advance the remedy for which they were enacted. [Citation omitted.] … That purpose would be frustrated by providing only incomplete or partial relief. Accordingly, we hold that, where, as here, a civil forfeiture is ancillary to a criminal conviction and the nexus between the civil forfeiture and the criminal conviction is established, a defendant may petition the trial court to expunge the records of that civil forfeiture along with the records of the related criminal conviction. In other words, where the factual basis for a criminal conviction and a civil forfeiture are the same, the records of the civil forfeiture proceeding relate to the person’s conviction for purposes of our expungement statutes. Because the trial court erred when it concluded otherwise, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Kirsch, J., concurs.
Barnes, J., dissents with separate opinion.
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Barnes, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I certainly understand, as the majority recognizes, that the overarching purpose of the expungement statutes is to remove “stigmas” associated with criminal convictions and to allow a fresh start for persons who meet the statutory requirements. [Citation omitted.] However, I do not believe we are free to add language to the statutes to permit the expungement of records related to civil forfeitures.
First, although the majority does not find the distinction to be relevant, it is well settled that forfeiture proceedings such as the one D.A. seeks to have expunged are civil in nature, not punitive or criminal. [Citation omitted.] Indeed, it is possible for a forfeiture to occur even if the person whose property is forfeited has never been convicted or even charged with a crime. [Citation omitted.] What that means for purposes of this case is that, if D.A. had never been convicted of a crime but merely had his property forfeited, there is no possible basis upon which he could have sought expungement of the forfeiture records. In other words, a person who is subject to only forfeiture has no right to expungement, while a person who is also convicted of a related crime is entitled to expungement under the majority’s holding. It does not seem fair or equitable to me that a person also convicted of a crime is entitled to preferential treatment over a person who is not convicted of a crime.
Second, I note the general rule of statutory construction, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” which means that the enumeration of certain things in a statute implies the exclusion of all other things. [Citation omitted.] … The expungement statutes were first enacted in 2013 and represented a sea change in Indiana criminal law. They have been amended twice since then. I presume the legislature carefully considered these statutes. At no time did it see fit to include forfeiture proceedings within the enumerated list of records subject to expungement, which expressly includes Department of Correction, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, and treatment records. I believe we should not add civil forfeitures to the list of records to be expunged by judicial action. If the legislature chooses to act on civil forfeitures, so be it.
Finally, I believe it is appropriate to consider the practical effect of expungement. … An expungement under [I.C. § 35-38-9-4] does not result in sealing of the conviction records; instead, they remain public records. [Citation omitted.] … In other words, the expungement cannot as a practical matter literally wipe a person’s slate clean in the eyes of an intrusive and technologically-savvy public. The effect of expungement, despite this public access and knowledge, comes through Indiana Code Section 35-38-9-10, which prohibits discrimination against someone based on an expunged criminal conviction. D.A. is entitled to this protection, regardless of whether his civil forfeiture record is expunged. I conclude he has received all the protection to which he is entitled by expungement of records directly related to his conviction and that he is not additionally entitled to expungement of the civil forfeiture judgment. These statutes, in my view, promise the erasure of a conviction, not anonymity and not more than the statutory language speaks to.
For these reasons, I dissent and vote to affirm the trial court.