Baker, J.
Carol Storch appeals the judgment of the trial court holding that her father’s estate is not entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to a residence agreement entered into between her father and his assisted living facility. Finding that the plain language of the residence agreement compels an award of attorney fees in this case, we reverse.
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Here, the trial court held that Storch could not recover under the terms of the residence agreement because she did not bring a breach of contract claim. It reasoned:
[T]he Plaintiff and Defendants elected not to submit the breach of contract matter to the jury to determine if the Defendants did or did not breach the contract between Plaintiff and Defendants. The jury was only required to determine if the Defendants committed negligence in this case. Thus, the Plaintiff is not the prevailing party regarding “any controversy, claim or dispute between the parties hereto, arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof” and the Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney’s fees under this agreement.
Appellant’s Br. p. 23. According to this interpretation, the phrase—“any controversy, claim, or dispute between the parties hereto, arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof”—can refer only to claims of breach of the contract, and not to claims premised on a tort theory of liability. Appellant’s App. p. 58 (emphases added).
Such an interpretation is plainly incorrect given the clear meaning of the language used. Had Greentree intended this provision to apply only to claims of breach of the agreement itself, it could simply have written a provision awarding attorney fees to the prevailing party “in any action brought to enforce this agreement.” Such language is commonly found in attorney fee provisions. See Kuntz v. EVI, LLC, 999 N.E.2d 425, 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Yet the provision at issue here clearly goes further, covering not only actions for breach of the agreement, but also “any” other dispute “arising out of or relating to” the agreement “or the breach thereof.” Appellant’s App. p. 58. Were we to adopt the trial court’s interpretation, these latter terms would be rendered meaningless. The above-referenced principles of contract interpretation compel us to avoid such outcomes and, therefore, we must conclude that the plain language of the provision contemplates more than actions for breach of the agreement.
We now must determine whether the present dispute, while a tort claim, nevertheless falls into the category of any claim that arises out of or relates to the agreement. Guidance on this issue from courts of this State is currently limited to decisions interpreting agreements to arbitrate. Similar language is frequently used in such agreements and we have shown no hesitation in holding that it encompasses tort claims.
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We find no basis for such a distinction in the plain meaning of the word “relate.” According to a modern dictionary, two things “relate” if they simply “have relationship or connection.” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merrianwebster.com/dictionary/relate (last visited November 30, 2015). This definition is clearly very broad, but parties have the right to contract in broad terms if they wish. Looking to other states for guidance, we note that appellate courts in Colorado have had occasion to define “relate”—in the attorney fees context nonetheless—and they have chosen to do so in a similarly broad fashion, holding that such language “encompass[es] all issues surrounding the underlying subject matter.” In re Estate of Gattis, 318 P.3d 549, 558 (Colo. App. 2013).
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Turning to the facts of this case, there can be no doubt that the underlying subject matter of Sindledecker’s residence agreement was, indeed, his residence at Greentree. And there can also be no doubt that the events that led to his negligence claim occurred because he resided there, which would not have been the case absent the residence agreement. Thus, reading the contractual language in light of its plain, simple, and intentionally broad meaning, it is hardly difficult to conclude that Sindledecker’s negligence claim involves the same underlying subject matter as, and therefore relates to, his residence agreement. Consequently, we find that the parties must have intended the disputed attorney fees provision to apply to such a claim.
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The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded so that the trial court may calculate reasonable attorney fees and award those fees to Sindledecker’s estate, as called for in the parties’ residence agreement.
Bradford, J., and Pyle, J., concur.