Bradford, J.
Effective July 1, 2013, the Indiana General Assembly (the “General Assembly”) adopted a law allowing for the expungement of certain conviction records if the petitioning individual meets certain requirements. On February 27, 2014, Appellee J.S., who held a commercial driver’s license (“CDL”), petitioned to have the records relating to his April 6, 2009 convictions for Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement expunged. On July 7, 2014, the trial court issued an order granting J.S.’s petition. As part of this order, the trial court prohibited the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles from disclosing J.S.’s 2009 OWI conviction to the Commercial Driver’s License Information System (“CDLIS”) as is required by existing federal and Indiana law.
Appellants the State of Indiana, the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, and Kent W. Abernathy, in his position as Commissioner of the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (collectively, the “BMV”), now appeal the trial court’s order prohibiting the BMV from disclosing J.S.’s conviction to the CDLIS. In challenging the trial court’s July 7, 2014 order, the BMV argues that the portion of the trial court’s ruling relating to the BMV is erroneous as it is inconsistent with the intent of the General Assembly. Specifically, the BMV argues that the ruling violates both existing federal and Indiana law and would lead to illogical and absurd results. Concluding that the BMV is not barred from challenging the trial court’s order and that the trial court erred in prohibiting the BMV from disclosing J.S.’s conviction to the CDLIS, we reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to amend its July 7, 2014 order to specifically allow the BMV to comply with the existing federal and Indiana laws requiring the BMV to disclose J.S.’s conviction to the CDLIS.
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The situation before us on appeal is similar to that presented in Gibson. 49 C.F.R. § 384.226 explicitly provides that the State must not mask, defer imposition of judgment, or allow an individual to enter into a diversion program that would prevent a CDL holder’s conviction for any violation, in any type of motor vehicle, from appearing on the individual’s CDLIS driver record. We believe that prohibiting the BMV from reporting the expunged conviction would violate 49 C.F.R. § 384.226 as it would force the BMV to prevent the conviction from appearing on J.S.’s CDLIS driver record. Considering both the plain language of the statutes in question and our prior opinion in Gibson, we conclude that the trial court’s ruling that the BMV was prohibited by Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 from reporting J.S.’s 2009 OWI conviction directly conflicts with 49 C.F.R. § 384.226. See generally, id. at 546 (providing that a state law actually conflicts with a federal law when it is impossible for a citizen or entity to comply with both the state and federal requirements).
Because we conclude that Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 conflicts with federal law, we further conclude that pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, 49 C.F.R. § 384.226 controls over Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6. See id. Furthermore, it is also of note that because Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 conflicts with 49 C.F.R. § 384.226, it also conflicts with Indiana Code section 9-24-6-2(d), which expressly adopted 49 C.F.R. § 384 as Indiana law.
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Given the substantial statutorily proscribed potential negative economic implications, it would be illogical and absurd to find that the General Assembly intended to create a law that would put Indiana at risk of losing over $32 million in federal aid or having its CDL program de-certified.
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In sum, we cannot foresee a situation where the General Assembly would intend to (1) create a law that is in direct conflict with existing state and federal law, (2) put Indiana at risk of losing substantial sums of federal aid, or (3) risk the de-certification of Indiana’s CDL program. Likewise, we believe that the recent amendment to Indiana Code section 35-38-9-2, which expressly allows the BMV to comply with the reporting requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 384.225 and Indiana Code section 9-24-6-2(d), indicates that the General Assembly has always intended for the BMV to comply with said laws.
We conclude that the trial court’s order prohibiting the BMV from doing so is contrary to the intent of the General Assembly. In addition, even if we were to conclude otherwise, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, any application of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-6 which would require noncompliance with the relevant federal authority would be without effect. See Gibson, 756 N.E.2d at 546. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court as it applies to the BMV and remand the matter to the trial court with the instruction to amend its July 7, 2014 order to specifically allow the BMV to comply with the existing federal and Indiana laws requiring the BMV to disclose J.S.’s 2009 OWI conviction to the CDLIS.[Footnote omitted.]
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instruction.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.