Barnes, J.
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Key presents two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as: whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct error, where the State objected to Key’s petition for expungement, but the trial court did not set the matter for a hearing before denying the petition.
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… Key was convicted [in 2005] … of Aiding Robbery, as a Class B felony, and Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Class D felony. … Key eventually completed his sentence on May 28, 2010.
On March 11, 2015, Key filed a verified petition for expungement asking the court to expunge both convictions…. On April 10, 2015, the State filed a response and objected to the expungement….
On April 24, 2015, the trial court entered [an] order summarily denying Key’s petition….
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We think [I.C. § 35-38-9-9] is clear and unambiguous. After an expungement petition is filed, the prosecuting attorney must reply within thirty days of receipt. I.C. § 35-38-9-8(f). If the prosecutor … objects, “the court shall set the matter for hearing.” I.C. § 35-38-9-9(c) (emphasis added). … Thus, when the prosecuting attorney objects to a petition for expungement, the statute grants the petitioner a due process right to a hearing on the petition.
Although a hearing is generally required when the prosecutor objects, Subsection 35-38-9-9(b) provides that a court “may” summarily deny a petition … , regardless of the prosecutor’s response, … where either the petition is facially defective (that is, non-conforming to Section 35-38-9-8’s requirements) or reveals the petitioner is not eligible for expungement. However, if summary denial is not appropriate under either of the two circumstances described in Subsection 35-38-9-9(b) and the prosecutor objects, a hearing is required.
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The State nevertheless urges us to affirm the court’s denial, reasoning that the court must have summarily denied the petition under Subsection 35-38-9-9(b) because the statements contained in the petition demonstrated that Key was not entitled to relief. Yet nothing in the trial court’s order indicates that the court summarily denied the petition under Subsection 35-38-9-9(b). …
Furthermore, even if the court did enter a summary denial under Subsection 35- 38-9-9(b), it appears the court would have been in error. Based on our review, … Key appears to be entitled to mandatory expungement of the Class D felony under Section 35-38-9-3 – a point the State concedes – and [is eligible for] discretionary expungement of the Class B felony under Section 35-38-9-4. Based on the record before us, summary denial would not have been appropriate under Subsection 35-38-9-9(b).
Finally, we turn to the State’s argument that to the extent Section 35-38-9-9 requires a hearing on every contested petition, it impermissibly conflicts with Trial Rule 12(C). …
It is a fundamental rule of Indiana law that when a procedural statute conflicts with a procedural rule adopted by the supreme court, the latter shall take precedence. [Citation omitted.] …
The State argues that there is a conflict between the expungement statute and Rule 12(C) because the statute requires a hearing on contested petitions, but Rule 12(C) permits judgment on the pleadings. Therefore, the State contends that Trial Rule 12(C) takes precedence over the statute and the trial court did not need to hold a hearing before entering judgment on the petition and response alone. …
… [T]he legislature’s inclusion of Subsection 35-38-9-9(b) avoids the potential conflict with which the State is concerned. Subsection 35-38-9-9(b) permits a court to enter summary denial when the petition reveals the petitioner has not met the statutory requirements for expungement. …
Finally, we observe that Subsection 35-38-9-9(c) is more than a procedural rule, as it grants the petitioner a due process right to a hearing when the prosecutor objects to the expungement petition. Key was entitled to a hearing under the plain and ordinary meaning of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-9(c).
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Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.
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Key presents two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as: whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct error, where the State objected to Key’s petition for expungement, but the trial court did not set the matter for a hearing before denying the petition.
….
… Key was convicted [in 2005] … of Aiding Robbery, as a Class B felony, and Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Class D felony. … Key eventually completed his sentence on May 28, 2010.
On March 11, 2015, Key filed a verified petition for expungement asking the court to expunge both convictions…. On April 10, 2015, the State filed a response and objected to the expungement….
On April 24, 2015, the trial court entered [an] order summarily denying Key’s petition….
….
We think [I.C. § 35-38-9-9] is clear and unambiguous. After an expungement petition is filed, the prosecuting attorney must reply within thirty days of receipt. I.C. § 35-38-9-8(f). If the prosecutor … objects, “the court shall set the matter for hearing.” I.C. § 35-38-9-9(c) (emphasis added). … Thus, when the prosecuting attorney objects to a petition for expungement, the statute grants the petitioner a due process right to a hearing on the petition.
Although a hearing is generally required when the prosecutor objects, Subsection 35-38-9-9(b) provides that a court “may” summarily deny a petition … , regardless of the prosecutor’s response, … where either the petition is facially defective (that is, non-conforming to Section 35-38-9-8’s requirements) or reveals the petitioner is not eligible for expungement. However, if summary denial is not appropriate under either of the two circumstances described in Subsection 35-38-9-9(b) and the prosecutor objects, a hearing is required.
….
The State nevertheless urges us to affirm the court’s denial, reasoning that the court must have summarily denied the petition under Subsection 35-38-9-9(b) because the statements contained in the petition demonstrated that Key was not entitled to relief. Yet nothing in the trial court’s order indicates that the court summarily denied the petition under Subsection 35-38-9-9(b). …
Furthermore, even if the court did enter a summary denial under Subsection 35- 38-9-9(b), it appears the court would have been in error. Based on our review, … Key appears to be entitled to mandatory expungement of the Class D felony under Section 35-38-9-3 – a point the State concedes – and [is eligible for] discretionary expungement of the Class B felony under Section 35-38-9-4. Based on the record before us, summary denial would not have been appropriate under Subsection 35-38-9-9(b).
Finally, we turn to the State’s argument that to the extent Section 35-38-9-9 requires a hearing on every contested petition, it impermissibly conflicts with Trial Rule 12(C). …
It is a fundamental rule of Indiana law that when a procedural statute conflicts with a procedural rule adopted by the supreme court, the latter shall take precedence. [Citation omitted.] …
The State argues that there is a conflict between the expungement statute and Rule 12(C) because the statute requires a hearing on contested petitions, but Rule 12(C) permits judgment on the pleadings. Therefore, the State contends that Trial Rule 12(C) takes precedence over the statute and the trial court did not need to hold a hearing before entering judgment on the petition and response alone. …
… [T]he legislature’s inclusion of Subsection 35-38-9-9(b) avoids the potential conflict with which the State is concerned. Subsection 35-38-9-9(b) permits a court to enter summary denial when the petition reveals the petitioner has not met the statutory requirements for expungement. …
Finally, we observe that Subsection 35-38-9-9(c) is more than a procedural rule, as it grants the petitioner a due process right to a hearing when the prosecutor objects to the expungement petition. Key was entitled to a hearing under the plain and ordinary meaning of Indiana Code section 35-38-9-9(c).
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Reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Crone, J., concur.