Crone, J.
Billy Deon Blackmon … argues that the trial court clearly erred in rejecting his [Batson] claim…. The prosecutor gave two reasons for his peremptory strike, one of which was demeanor-based. The trial court allowed the peremptory strike without explicitly stating which of the prosecutor’s reasons it found to be credible and not racially motivated. …
Given the circumstances present here, we reject Blackmon’s contention that the trial court was required to explicitly credit the prosecutor’s demeanor-based reason. We conclude that the prosecutor’s second reason is suspicious and raises an inference of discriminatory motive. However, we conclude that reversal of Blackmon’s conviction is not required because it is clear that the prosecutor would have struck the juror based on the demeanor-based reason alone.
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At the second step [of a race-based Batson claim], … the burden shifts to the prosecution to “‘offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question.’” [Citation omitted.] “[T]he race-neutral explanation … need not be ‘persuasive, or even plausible.’” [Citation omitted.] “‘[T]he issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.’” [Citation omitted.] … Here, the prosecutor gave two reasons for striking Juror 3: her lack of engagement with the jury selection process and the possibility that she might know defense witness Linda Williams. These reasons are based on something other than the race of the juror, and therefore, on their face, they are racially neutral. [Citation omitted.]
At the third step, the trial court must determine “‘whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.’” [Citation omitted.] “It is then that ‘implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.’” [Citation omitted.] … Although this third step involves evaluating “the persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by the prosecutor, “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” [Citation omitted.] …….
Blackmon advances two alleged errors in the trial court’s ruling. First, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to state whether it found both of the prosecutor’s reasons credible or only one of his reasons credible. Generally, a trial court is not required to make explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge. [Citation omitted.] However, Blackmon asserts that because one of the prosecutor’s reasons was based on Juror 3’s demeanor, the trial court’s failure to identify which reason it was relying on resulted in an inadequate ruling and leaves us without a basis to conclude that the trial court found the demeanor-based reason credible. Blackmon does not otherwise argue that the demeanor-based reason is constitutionally infirm. Second, Blackmon contends that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge because the prosecutor’s other reason was a pretext for discrimination. We address each claim in turn.
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We do not read Snyder as requiring a trial court to make explicit findings every time the prosecution justifies a peremptory strike based on a juror’s demeanor. … Blackmon argued in support of his Batson claim, specifically identifying two white panelists who he said were as equally unengaged as Juror 3. The prosecutor disagreed with defense counsel’s characterization of other white panelists.
We assume that the trial court listened to and considered the parties’ arguments. The trial court, not the appellate court, is in the best position to consider the juror’s demeanor, the nature and strength of the parties’ arguments, and the attorney’s demeanor and credibility. … In this case, there are no circumstances that call into question the usual deference we give to the trial court’s superior ability to evaluate the panelists’ demeanor and the attorneys’ arguments and demeanor.
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We now turn to the second reason the prosecutor advanced in support of his peremptory strike of Juror 3. The prosecutor said that Officer Lee told him that Juror 3 “might know” Linda Mitchell. [Record citations omitted throughout.] For background purposes, we note that after the panelists were sworn in, the prosecutor introduced himself and informed the panel of the names of the State’s witnesses. Defense counsel followed suit, telling the panel that Blackmon’s aunt, Linda Mitchell, was a potential defense witness. The trial court asked the panelists whether any of them recognized the names of the potential witnesses. Juror 3, who was under oath, did not indicate that she knew Mitchell. After additional questions from the trial court, the prosecutor had an opportunity to question the panel. The prosecutor did not ask Juror 3 whether she knew Mitchell. “‘The State’s failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination.’” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1215 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246). …
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Taking stock of matters thus far, we have a demeanor-based reason for striking Juror 3 that supports the trial court’s denial of Blackmon’s Batson claim. If that were the only reason given, we would have no basis to find that the trial court clearly erred in denying his Batson claim. However, there was a second reason provided that, although facially race-neutral, appears to be a pretext. We must determine the proper remedy under these circumstances, which neither party nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed. The Indiana Supreme Court dealt with a somewhat similar situation in McCormick, 803 N.E.2d 1108. There, the prosecutor gave several reasons for striking the only African-American on the panel[,] … one of [which]—that the juror would find it difficult “passing judgment on a member of one’s own in the community”—was not facially race-neutral. Id.
In determining the appropriate remedy, the court considered two alternative approaches: the dual motivation approach and the tainted approach. The dual motivation approach “proceeds under the theory that ‘[a] person may act for more than one reason’ and that when a prosecutor offers both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for a strike, further analysis is required.” [Citation omitted.] The tainted approach maintains that “‘[r]egardless of how many other nondiscriminatory factors are considered, any consideration of a discriminatory factor directly conflicts with the purpose of Batson and taints the entire jury selection process.’” [Citation omitted.] The McCormick court observed that the dual motivation analysis “is inconsistent with the facially valid standard announced by the Supreme Court in Purkett.” [Citation omitted.] Therefore, the McCormick court applied the tainted approach and concluded that “the State failed to meet its burden under the second prong of Batson to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike. McCormick is thus entitled to a new trial.” [Citation omitted.]
In sum, the McCormick court applied the tainted approach because one of the reasons for the peremptory challenge was race-based on its face. … Here, the prosecutor’s second reason was facially race-neutral, and therefore McCormick is not controlling. We decline to extend it to the circumstances present here, in which the prosecutor satisfied the second step of the Batson analysis and the trial court ruled that Blackmon failed to establish purposeful discrimination.
… We think that the dual motivation analysis is appropriate to apply in this case. “[U]nder dual motivation analysis, if the trial court finds that the proponent of the strike has articulated both race-based and race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike, then the proponent bears the burden of demonstrating that the strike would have been exercised even in the absence of any discriminatory motivation.” McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1112. In this case, the record clearly establishes that the predominant reason that the prosecutor wished to strike Juror 3 was that she was not fully engaged with the jury selection process. The prosecutor stated that he “didn’t really want to put her on the jury to begin with,” and that when he learned that she might know a defense witness, it was merely the “final straw.” Tr. at 109. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor would have exercised the peremptory challenge in the absence of any discriminatory purpose. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in denying Blackmon’s Batson challenge.
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Affirmed.
May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
Billy Deon Blackmon … argues that the trial court clearly erred in rejecting his [Batson] claim…. The prosecutor gave two reasons for his peremptory strike, one of which was demeanor-based. The trial court allowed the peremptory strike without explicitly stating which of the prosecutor’s reasons it found to be credible and not racially motivated. …
Given the circumstances present here, we reject Blackmon’s contention that the trial court was required to explicitly credit the prosecutor’s demeanor-based reason. We conclude that the prosecutor’s second reason is suspicious and raises an inference of discriminatory motive. However, we conclude that reversal of Blackmon’s conviction is not required because it is clear that the prosecutor would have struck the juror based on the demeanor-based reason alone.
….
At the second step [of a race-based Batson claim], … the burden shifts to the prosecution to “‘offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question.’” [Citation omitted.] “[T]he race-neutral explanation … need not be ‘persuasive, or even plausible.’” [Citation omitted.] “‘[T]he issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.’” [Citation omitted.] … Here, the prosecutor gave two reasons for striking Juror 3: her lack of engagement with the jury selection process and the possibility that she might know defense witness Linda Williams. These reasons are based on something other than the race of the juror, and therefore, on their face, they are racially neutral. [Citation omitted.]
At the third step, the trial court must determine “‘whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.’” [Citation omitted.] “It is then that ‘implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.’” [Citation omitted.] … Although this third step involves evaluating “the persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by the prosecutor, “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” [Citation omitted.] …….
Blackmon advances two alleged errors in the trial court’s ruling. First, he argues that the trial court erred by failing to state whether it found both of the prosecutor’s reasons credible or only one of his reasons credible. Generally, a trial court is not required to make explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge. [Citation omitted.] However, Blackmon asserts that because one of the prosecutor’s reasons was based on Juror 3’s demeanor, the trial court’s failure to identify which reason it was relying on resulted in an inadequate ruling and leaves us without a basis to conclude that the trial court found the demeanor-based reason credible. Blackmon does not otherwise argue that the demeanor-based reason is constitutionally infirm. Second, Blackmon contends that the trial court erred in denying his Batson challenge because the prosecutor’s other reason was a pretext for discrimination. We address each claim in turn.
….
We do not read Snyder as requiring a trial court to make explicit findings every time the prosecution justifies a peremptory strike based on a juror’s demeanor. … Blackmon argued in support of his Batson claim, specifically identifying two white panelists who he said were as equally unengaged as Juror 3. The prosecutor disagreed with defense counsel’s characterization of other white panelists.
We assume that the trial court listened to and considered the parties’ arguments. The trial court, not the appellate court, is in the best position to consider the juror’s demeanor, the nature and strength of the parties’ arguments, and the attorney’s demeanor and credibility. … In this case, there are no circumstances that call into question the usual deference we give to the trial court’s superior ability to evaluate the panelists’ demeanor and the attorneys’ arguments and demeanor.
….
We now turn to the second reason the prosecutor advanced in support of his peremptory strike of Juror 3. The prosecutor said that Officer Lee told him that Juror 3 “might know” Linda Mitchell. [Record citations omitted throughout.] For background purposes, we note that after the panelists were sworn in, the prosecutor introduced himself and informed the panel of the names of the State’s witnesses. Defense counsel followed suit, telling the panel that Blackmon’s aunt, Linda Mitchell, was a potential defense witness. The trial court asked the panelists whether any of them recognized the names of the potential witnesses. Juror 3, who was under oath, did not indicate that she knew Mitchell. After additional questions from the trial court, the prosecutor had an opportunity to question the panel. The prosecutor did not ask Juror 3 whether she knew Mitchell. “‘The State’s failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination.’” Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1215 (quoting Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 246). …
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Taking stock of matters thus far, we have a demeanor-based reason for striking Juror 3 that supports the trial court’s denial of Blackmon’s Batson claim. If that were the only reason given, we would have no basis to find that the trial court clearly erred in denying his Batson claim. However, there was a second reason provided that, although facially race-neutral, appears to be a pretext. We must determine the proper remedy under these circumstances, which neither party nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed. The Indiana Supreme Court dealt with a somewhat similar situation in McCormick, 803 N.E.2d 1108. There, the prosecutor gave several reasons for striking the only African-American on the panel[,] … one of [which]—that the juror would find it difficult “passing judgment on a member of one’s own in the community”—was not facially race-neutral. Id.
In determining the appropriate remedy, the court considered two alternative approaches: the dual motivation approach and the tainted approach. The dual motivation approach “proceeds under the theory that ‘[a] person may act for more than one reason’ and that when a prosecutor offers both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for a strike, further analysis is required.” [Citation omitted.] The tainted approach maintains that “‘[r]egardless of how many other nondiscriminatory factors are considered, any consideration of a discriminatory factor directly conflicts with the purpose of Batson and taints the entire jury selection process.’” [Citation omitted.] The McCormick court observed that the dual motivation analysis “is inconsistent with the facially valid standard announced by the Supreme Court in Purkett.” [Citation omitted.] Therefore, the McCormick court applied the tainted approach and concluded that “the State failed to meet its burden under the second prong of Batson to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strike. McCormick is thus entitled to a new trial.” [Citation omitted.]
In sum, the McCormick court applied the tainted approach because one of the reasons for the peremptory challenge was race-based on its face. … Here, the prosecutor’s second reason was facially race-neutral, and therefore McCormick is not controlling. We decline to extend it to the circumstances present here, in which the prosecutor satisfied the second step of the Batson analysis and the trial court ruled that Blackmon failed to establish purposeful discrimination.
… We think that the dual motivation analysis is appropriate to apply in this case. “[U]nder dual motivation analysis, if the trial court finds that the proponent of the strike has articulated both race-based and race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike, then the proponent bears the burden of demonstrating that the strike would have been exercised even in the absence of any discriminatory motivation.” McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1112. In this case, the record clearly establishes that the predominant reason that the prosecutor wished to strike Juror 3 was that she was not fully engaged with the jury selection process. The prosecutor stated that he “didn’t really want to put her on the jury to begin with,” and that when he learned that she might know a defense witness, it was merely the “final straw.” Tr. at 109. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor would have exercised the peremptory challenge in the absence of any discriminatory purpose. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in denying Blackmon’s Batson challenge.
….
Affirmed.
May, J., and Bradford, J., concur.