Barnes, J.
Case Summary
F. John Rogers, as the personal representative of Paul Michalik, deceased, and R. David Boyer, as trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Jerry Chambers, (collectively “the Appellants”) appeal the trial court’s granting of a motion to strike and a motion for summary judgment filed by Angela Martin. We reverse and remand.
Issues
The Appellants raise two issues. [Footnote omitted.]We address the dispositive issues, which we restate as:
I. whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the Appellants’ Dram Shop Act claim; and
II. whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the Appellants’ claim that Martin negligently failed to render aid.
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Martin contends that she did not owe Michalik a duty to render aid because Section 314A does not impose such a duty on a social host. Although this provision does not expressly impose a duty to render aid on a social host, it was not intended to be an exclusive list of relationships that create a duty to render aid. See Restatement (Second) § 314A cmt b (“The relations listed are not intended to be exclusive, and are not necessarily the only ones in which a duty of affirmative action for the aid or protection of another may be found.”). Thus, although Section 314A does not specifically include a social host/guest relationship, it does not exclude the imposition of such a duty.
….
Martin contends that she did not owe Michalik a duty to render aid because Section 314A does not impose such a duty on a social host. Although this provision does not expressly impose a duty to render aid on a social host, it was not intended to be an exclusive list of relationships that create a duty to render aid. See Restatement (Second) § 314A cmt b (“The relations listed are not intended to be exclusive, and are not necessarily the only ones in which a duty of affirmative action for the aid or protection of another may be found.”). Thus, although Section 314A does not specifically include a social host/guest relationship, it does not exclude the imposition of such a duty.
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…Having determined that the social host/guest relationship is a special relationship, we believe that the same moral and humanitarian concerns require a social host to render assistance to an injured person in his or her home regardless of the cause of the injury.
Thus, having considered the relationship between a social guest and a host, the foreseeability of harm to someone who is unconscious after an evening of drinking and a fist fight, and the moral and humanitarian concerns of requiring one to aid an injured guest in his or her home, we conclude that Martin had a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. This conclusion is consistent with our holding in Baker, in which we held a business invitor had a duty provide assistance to a patron even though the business was not responsible for the patron’s illness. See Baker, 793 N.E.2d at 1210.
Conclusion
Because there is a question of fact regarding whether Martin furnished alcohol to Brothers, the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to Martin on the Appellants’ Dram Shop Act claim. Further, we conclude that Martin, as a social host, owed Michalik a duty to render aid, and questions of fact remain regarding whether she breached that duty. We reverse and remand. [30] Reversed and remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Najam, J., concur.