Barnes, J.
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Rex Lovett (“Lovett”) filed a petition for relief from sex offender registration requirements under Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”). … Because Lovett was, at the time of and as a result of his original offense, subject to sex offender reporting requirements in another state, we conclude that an ongoing requirement to register in Indiana is not an additional, ex post facto punishment under the Indiana Constitution.
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On August 28, 1991, Lovett was convicted of rape of a child and child molestation in the State of Washington. After serving his sentence, Lovett was released from incarceration on May 13, 2003. Under Washington law, Lovett is required to register as a sex offender indefinitely.
Upon his release from incarceration in May 2003, Lovett moved to Indiana. In addition to being required to register as a sex offender, in 2007, Lovett was required to register as a serious violent predator and comply with more rigorous restrictions after the General Assembly passed amendments to SORA. [Footnote omitted.]
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… Lovett argues that because his conviction date precedes the adoption of Indiana’s SORA, the imposition of a lifetime registration requirement in Indiana is an ex post facto punishment as to him. He argues that Wallace [v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009)], as well as a line of cases from this Court, mandate this result because, he says, the date of an individual’s conviction has been deemed determinative for Indiana ex post facto analysis in Hough v. State, 978 N.E.2d 505 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; Andrews v. State, 978 N.E.2d 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; Burton [v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied]. An examination of each of these cases shows that they are distinguishable from the case at bar, and that none of them impose the rule Lovett’s argument suggests: that a conviction date for a crime committed outside Indiana and prior to the enactment of Indiana’s SORA is by itself dispositive as to Indiana’s ex post facto analysis.
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… The question is, instead, whether such a requirement would impose additional punishment for Lovett’s offenses beyond those burdens already placed upon him at the time of his conviction.
We conclude that the registration requirement does not do so, and thus Indiana’s SORA is not an ex post facto punishment as to Lovett. [Footnote omitted.] Lovett was subject to registration requirements in the State of Washington from the date of his conviction; it is not adding to his punishment to require continued registration in Indiana. And he should not be allowed to evade these requirements simply by relocating to Indiana, when the sole basis for that evasion would be a conviction date for a crime committed outside Indiana. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Mathias, J., concurs.
Baker, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Baker, Judge, dissenting.
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I acknowledge that in this case, SORA imposed no additional burdens on Lovett because he was already required to register in Washington. That was also the case in Hough and in Burton, however. [Citations omitted.]
I see no meaningful distinction between those cases and the instant case. In neither Wallace, nor Hough, nor Burton, nor Andrews, did the court explicitly include as part of its analysis the date of enactment of the SORA equivalent in the state of conviction. In my view, the majority engrafts this requirement onto the prior cases, creating a second prong of a test that does not otherwise exist. Consequently, I part ways with the majority’s analysis of the relevant cases.
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The State urges us to focus on the year in which Lovett moved to Indiana—2003. According to the State, because Lovett knew when he moved to Indiana that he would be required to register as a sex offender under SORA, there is no violation of the ex post facto clause.
While I see the logic in the State’s position on this issue, as well as the majority’s decision, the case law could not be clearer. Our Supreme Court, plus three panels of this Court, have plainly held that the date of primary importance is the date of the original conviction. Notwithstanding the state of the law at the time Lovett moved to Indiana, he is a resident of this State and “is entitled to the protections afforded to him by the Indiana Constitution. Therefore, even though he would be required to register as a sex offender under [Washington’s] laws, Indiana’s law controls.” Hough, 978 N.E. 2d at 510. Lovett was convicted of a sex offense before Indiana enacted SORA. Therefore, I believe that requiring him to register as a sex offender would violate Indiana’s constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws; I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.