Dickson, J.
Following the denial of his homeowner’s fire insurance claim, the plaintiff commenced this action against the company that issued his policy, the insurance agency, and the insurance agent. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all the defendants. We reverse in part the grant of summary judgment favoring the agency and agent, but otherwise affirm as a partial summary judgment.
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In challenging the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Agents, the plaintiff essentially argues that the Agents failed to make a prima facie showing of no factual dispute as to (1) the non-availability of fire insurance that would have covered the plaintiff’s property, and (2) the plaintiff’s ratification of a dwelling insurance application that inaccurately described the dwelling.
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To succeed at trial on his claim for negligent procurement, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate (1) a duty defendants owed him, (2) a breach of that duty by the defendants, and (3) an injury to him proximately caused by the breach. See French v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 881 N.E.2d 1031, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2007)), trans. not sought. Similarly, under the Crime Victims Act, the plaintiff needed to establish that he suffered the requisite “pecuniary loss as a result of” the Agents’ statutory violation. See Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1.
The complaint filed by the plaintiff is based solely on the alleged failure of the issued dwelling policy to provide fire coverage for the premises and does not specifically allege the negligent failure to procure appropriate insurance coverage. Rather, the complaint’s sole allegation against the Agents is that they “falsely and wilfully or negligently made false representations as to the occupancy status of the house on the application submitted to Indiana Insurance, contrary to the Plaintiff’s actual representations . . . .” Appellant’s App’x at 11. For relief, the complaint requested reinstatement of “the policy in question, and declaring that the Plaintiff’s loss is covered under it,” damages, and “all other appropriate relief.” Id. at 12. The complaint does not specifically seek damages consistent with a claim for negligent procurement. Notwithstanding Indiana’s recognition of notice pleading, a demand for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” and “a demand for relief to which the pleader deems entitled.” Ind. Trial Rule 8(A). The complaint itself does not present a claim alleging the negligent failure of the Agents to procure a more appropriate type of insurance policy.
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It is thus clear that the plaintiff asserted his theory of liability based on negligent procurement of insurance on summary judgment, that the Agents not only failed to object but also impliedly consented to litigation of the issue, and that the trial court considered the claim. Indiana’s summary judgment jurisprudence “consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003. An issue not pled as an affirmative defense may by implied consent be considered in summary judgment proceedings. Liberty Country Club v. Landowners of the Country Estates Hous. Dev., 950 N.E.2d 754, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) trans. not sought; Paint Shuttle, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 733 N.E.2d 513, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (issues clearly argued during summary judgment are not waived even if not expressly raised as an affirmative defense in a party’s answer) trans. denied. We therefore find the issues before the trial court in the summary judgment proceedings included both the plaintiff’s claims asserting (a) the Agents’ fault in accurately submitting information for a Dwelling Fire Policy to Indiana Insurance Company, and (b) the Agents’ negligent procurement of appropriate insurance.
….No dwelling fire insurance policy would have been issued based on such information. Although the Agents did not establish their entitlement to summary judgment as to the elements of duty and breach, they did establish a prima facie case to negate the element of proximate causation of damages from the alleged inaccurate reporting, to which the plaintiff failed to adequately respond. Similarly, with respect to the claimed negligence in providing information for the issuance of a dwelling fire policy, the requisite element of causation of the plaintiff’s alleged claims under the Crime Victims Act, “pecuniary loss as a result,” see Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1, was likewise sufficiently negated by the Agents as the parties moving for summary judgment, and the plaintiff did not designate any evidence showing any genuine issue of material fact to the contrary.
We reach a different conclusion, however, as to the plaintiff’s claim for negligent failure to procure appropriate insurance. As the parties moving for summary judgment, the Agents must establish a prima facie case negating at least one of the dispositive elements of the plaintiff’s claim. The Agents did show that even if the application had completely and truthfully reported the condition and use of the property, no dwelling fire insurance policy would have been issued. But the Agents failed to exclude the possibility that other types of fire insurance coverage for the property could have been obtained and issued. For this reason, summary judgment was improper on the plaintiff’s claim of negligent procurement of appropriate insurance.
Conclusion
We reverse in part the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the Agents to the extent that it may apply to the plaintiff’s claim for negligent procurement of insurance, but we direct the entry of partial summary judgment for the Agents as to the plaintiff’s claim alleging the Agents failed to accurately report dwelling fire policy information to the insurance company. As to summary judgment in favor of Indiana Insurance Company, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals.
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.