Robb, J.
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On March 30, 2015, Kunberger pleaded guilty to confinement, strangulation, and domestic battery. He pleaded open, without the benefit of a plea agreement, and provided the following factual basis after the trial court read the charging information:
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[Court:] Mr. Kunberger, how do you plead to Count I, Criminal Confinement, a Level 6 Felony?
[Kunberger:] Guilty.
[Court:] And how do you plead to Count II, Strangulation, a Level 6 Felony?
[Kunberger:] Guilty.
[Court:] How do you plead to Count III, Domestic Battery, a Class A Misdemeanor?
[Kunberger:] Guilty.
[Court:] And what did you do that makes you guilty?
[Defense counsel:] If I could assist?
[Court:] Yes.
[Defense counsel:] Mr. Kunberger on December 2nd, 2014 were you in Allen County, Indiana?
[Kunberger:] Yes.
[Defense counsel:] And on that date, that location did you knowingly and intentionally confine another person, that being [S.C.], without her consent?
[Kunberger:] Yes.
[Defense counsel:] The same date, the same location did you knowingly and intentionally in a rude, angry manner apply pressure to her neck which impeded her breathing?
[Kunberger:] Yes.
[Defense counsel:] Same date, same location did you also touch [S.C.] in a rude, insolent or angry manner and you guys have a child together?
[Kunberger:] Yes.
[Defense counsel:] And that resulted in bodily injury to her?
[Kunberger:] Yes.
[Record citation omitted.]
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We review whether multiple convictions violate double jeopardy de novo. Jones v. State, 976 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. To find a double jeopardy violation under the actual evidence test, we must conclude there is “a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact- finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense.” Garrett v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Richardson [v. State], 717 N.E.2d [32,] 53 [(Ind. 1999)]). Our supreme court has stated a “reasonable possibility” requires “substantially more than a logical possibility.” Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008).
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Here, as the State observes, it is practically impossible to review the double jeopardy claim Kunberger raises. The factual basis for the guilty plea consisted of Kunberger merely admitting the elements of each offense. Kunberger’s admissions provided a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea, [footnote omitted] but we are left with no basis on which to conclude there was a double jeopardy violation under the actual evidence test. Even if we resorted to the facts recounted in the probable cause affidavit, we could not say with any certainty whether the same act was the basis for all three offenses. Unlike Wharton [v. State, No. 49A02-1502-CR-85, slip op. at 3 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2015)], Graham [v. State, 903 N.E.2d 538, 540-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)], and McElroy [v. State, 864 N.E.2d 392, 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied], however, the offenses could have been established by “separate and distinct facts.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53. Given the time span and the conduct implicated, it is not unreasonable to believe they were.
To find a double jeopardy violation, we must conclude there is a “reasonable possibility” the facts used to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second offense. Garrett, 992 N.E.2d at 719. Since a “reasonable possibility” requires “substantially more than a logical possibility,” Lee, 892 N.E.2d at 1236, we cannot conclude Kunberger’s convictions violate double jeopardy.
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Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., concurs.
Pyle, J., concurs in part, dissents in part [concurring as to double jeopardy, but finding the sentence inappropriately lenient under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).].