Brown, J.
In this interlocutory appeal, Mary K. Patchett appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion in limine filed by Ashley N. Lee, and ordering that evidence of payments made by the Healthy Indiana Plan (“HIP”) to reimburse Lee’s medical providers in full satisfaction of Lee’s hospital bills, was barred by the collateral source statute, Ind. Code § 34-44-1-2, and is not admissible under Indiana caselaw. Patchett raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the court abused its discretion in ruling that such evidence was inadmissible. We affirm. [Footnote omitted.]
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Regardless of whether Subparagraph (B) or (C) is the relevant provision of the collateral source statute applicable here matters not, however, because we find that the rule in Stanley does not apply to these facts. Again, Stanley essentially ruled that “[g]iven the current state of the health care pricing system” in which “a medical provider’s billed charges do not equate to cost,” evidence of “discounted amounts” may be introduced in order to assist in determining the reasonable value of medical services so long as no reference to insurance is made in admitting those discounted amounts, and that such evidence does not violate the collateral source statute. 906 N.E.2d at 858. Accordingly, to the extent that Ind. Code § 34-44-1-2(1)(B) provides that evidence of “insurance benefits that the plaintiff or members of the plaintiff’s family have paid for directly” are inadmissible, merely admitting the discounted amount does not violate the statute. Id.
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After considering the relevant language in Stanley, we arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court. The Stanley Court began its discussion of whether to admit collateral source evidence by identifying different approaches jurisdictions have used, and at the outset observed that some states “apply the collateral source rule to negotiated discounts on the plaintiff’s medical care for which the plaintiff paid consideration” and that “[t]wo state courts have held that the medical discounts were a collateral source, but that they were compelled to set off the collateral source amount . . . under their respective state statutes.” 906 N.E.2d at 855 (emphases added). The emphasized language demonstrates that, indeed, the rule in Stanley is premised on the principle that the discounted amounts must be the product of negotiation. Further, the Court later quoted from Robinson, which discussed the “hybrid” approach adopted by the Court and similarly contemplated negotiated discounts where it stated that “[b]ecause no one pays the negotiated reduction, admitting evidence of [discounts] does not violate the purpose behind the collateral-source rule.” Id. at 857 (quoting Robinson 857 N.E.2d at 1200) (emphasis added). The Court stated that, based thereon, “both values were relevant evidence that should be submitted to a jury to determine the reasonable value of medical services.” Id.
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The Court in Stanley reaffirmed that a successful plaintiff in a personal injury suit is entitled to the reasonable value of that person’s medical expenses, and it held that evidence of “discounted amounts” arrived at as the result of negotiation between the provider and an insurer are probative in determining reasonable value and should be admitted. Here, because the HIP payments were not calculated based upon market negotiation but instead were set by government regulation, such amounts are not probative of the reasonable value of the medical expenses. Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the evidence of the HIP payment amounts. [Footnote omitted.]
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Finally, even if evidence of the HIP payment amounts are admissible under the collateral source statute and Stanley, such would not preclude the court, in its discretion, from excluding said amounts under Ind. Evidence Rule 403, which states that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” “A trial court decision regarding whether any particular evidence violates Evidence Rule 403 will be accorded a great deal of deference on appeal; we review only for an abuse of discretion.” Tompkins v. State, 669 N.E.2d 394, 398 (Ind. 1996). Here, the court examined the dollar figure associated with the HIP payments and ruled that such amount “would only cause confusion to the jury on how such amounts should be used or considered.” Appellant’s Appendix at 14. To the extent Patchett suggests that the court abused its discretion because it misinterpreted the law in Stanley, we disagree. The court invoked Rule 403 in the alternative when it “further” found that evidence of the HIP payments would cause confusion, and we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in that regard. Id.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order granting Lee’s motion in limine.
Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Altice, J., concur.