Baker, J.
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At about 2:00 a.m. on January 19, 2014, an anonymous woman called the police to report a disturbance at Causey’s residence in Indianapolis. Officers … knocked on the door.
Causey opened the door and the officers asked him to step outside and speak with them. Causey stated that everything was fine and that the officers had no business there and slammed the door shut. The officers knocked again. This time, … Causey told the officers that he was there by himself and again told them that they had no business there. Causey then stated “you won’t take me alive,” and slammed the door. [Record citations omitted throughout.] The officers went back to their vehicles and called for backup.
While the officers waited for backup to arrive, Causey opened the door and yelled: “[G]et off my property. You don’t belong on my property. If you come any closer I’ll shoot.” … As the [officers] spoke, Causey again opened the door and began yelling in an unintelligible manner. [One officer] could not understand what Causey was saying, [but] he recalled hearing the words “shoot” and “kill.” …
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… Following a jury trial, Causey was convicted of class D felony intimidation. [Footnote omitted.] …
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Causey argues that the State presented insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that he intended to place the officers in fear of retaliation for having responded to a disturbance. Rather than intending to place the officers in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act, Causey maintains that he was attempting to prevent the officers from taking future action. He points out that his statement—“If you come any closer I’ll shoot”—was directed toward the officers’ potential future acts, rather than any prior lawful ones.
We agree. Here, … the State had to prove that (1) Causey communicated a threat to the officers (2) with the intent that they be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act. [Citation omitted.] …
Accordingly, this Court has held that statements that are “conditional and aimed at future, rather than past, conduct,” will not support a finding that the defendant intended to place the victim in fear of retaliation for prior acts. [Citation omitted.] …
The State is correct to point out that intent must often be proven by circumstantial evidence and that the “fact finder is entitled to infer intent from the surrounding circumstances.” [Citation omitted.] However, … a jury could only infer that Causey’s threat related to the officers’ prior acts if it ignored the plain meaning of the words Causey spoke—“If you come any closer I’ll shoot.” Such an inference would not be reasonable.
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In sum, the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Causey communicated a threat to the officers that was intended to place them in fear of retaliation for responding to a call at his residence. …
As a general matter, we agree that one should not threaten a police officer. However, such behavior, in and of itself, does not constitute intimidation as defined by the statute. …
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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At about 2:00 a.m. on January 19, 2014, an anonymous woman called the police to report a disturbance at Causey’s residence in Indianapolis. Officers … knocked on the door.
Causey opened the door and the officers asked him to step outside and speak with them. Causey stated that everything was fine and that the officers had no business there and slammed the door shut. The officers knocked again. This time, … Causey told the officers that he was there by himself and again told them that they had no business there. Causey then stated “you won’t take me alive,” and slammed the door. [Record citations omitted throughout.] The officers went back to their vehicles and called for backup.
While the officers waited for backup to arrive, Causey opened the door and yelled: “[G]et off my property. You don’t belong on my property. If you come any closer I’ll shoot.” … As the [officers] spoke, Causey again opened the door and began yelling in an unintelligible manner. [One officer] could not understand what Causey was saying, [but] he recalled hearing the words “shoot” and “kill.” …
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… Following a jury trial, Causey was convicted of class D felony intimidation. [Footnote omitted.] …
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Causey argues that the State presented insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that he intended to place the officers in fear of retaliation for having responded to a disturbance. Rather than intending to place the officers in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act, Causey maintains that he was attempting to prevent the officers from taking future action. He points out that his statement—“If you come any closer I’ll shoot”—was directed toward the officers’ potential future acts, rather than any prior lawful ones.
We agree. Here, … the State had to prove that (1) Causey communicated a threat to the officers (2) with the intent that they be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act. [Citation omitted.] …
Accordingly, this Court has held that statements that are “conditional and aimed at future, rather than past, conduct,” will not support a finding that the defendant intended to place the victim in fear of retaliation for prior acts. [Citation omitted.] …
The State is correct to point out that intent must often be proven by circumstantial evidence and that the “fact finder is entitled to infer intent from the surrounding circumstances.” [Citation omitted.] However, … a jury could only infer that Causey’s threat related to the officers’ prior acts if it ignored the plain meaning of the words Causey spoke—“If you come any closer I’ll shoot.” Such an inference would not be reasonable.
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In sum, the State failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Causey communicated a threat to the officers that was intended to place them in fear of retaliation for responding to a call at his residence. …
As a general matter, we agree that one should not threaten a police officer. However, such behavior, in and of itself, does not constitute intimidation as defined by the statute. …
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.