Jeremy Darringer appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated. Darringer raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence. We reverse.
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The issue is whether the court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence obtained after the traffic stop. Darringer contends that the State failed to prove that the stop was based upon reasonable suspicion that Darringer committed a traffic violation or that Deputy Hibschman made an objectively reasonable mistake of fact or law justifying the stop of Darringer’s car. He argues that his interim license plate was properly displayed under the version of Ind. Code § 9- 32-6-11 in effect at the time of the stop, which permitted an interim plate to be displayed in the rear window. He notes that there is no dispute that Deputy Hibschman was unaware that Indiana law had changed to allow for the interim plate to be displayed in the rear window of a vehicle for almost a year before the stop, and contends that Deputy Hibschman’s mistake of law cannot be said to be objectively reasonable because it was not premised upon a reasonable interpretation of an existing statute. …
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Effective July 1, 2013, the legislature amended Ind. Code § 9-18-2-26 to provide that … “(c) [a]n interim license plate must be displayed in the manner required by IC 9-32-6-11(f).” The legislature also added Ind. Code § 9-32-6-11, titled “Interim plates,” effective July 1, 2013, and subsection (f) provided in part:
An interim license plate [footnote omitted] shall be displayed: (1) in the same manner required in IC 9-18-2-26; or (2) in a location on the left side of a window facing the rear of the motor vehicle that is clearly visible and unobstructed. The plate must be affixed to the window of the motor vehicle.
(Emphasis added.) … For almost one year prior to the stop in this case, the statute as amended allowed for an interim license plate to be displayed on the left side of the rear window of Darringer’s vehicle. Accordingly, we conclude that Deputy Hibschman stopped Darringer’s vehicle based upon an unreasonable mistake of law.
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To the extent that the State asserts that the stop was proper because the plate was not clearly visible, we acknowledge that “if a police officer makes a temporary detention on one basis, later determined to be insufficient, the stop may be upheld on another basis shown by the facts known to the officer.” [Citation omitted.] However, the critical component is whether the facts supplying a separate basis were known to the officer. [Citations omitted.]
The record reveals that Deputy Hibschman specifically testified that he did not look in the rear window or anywhere else on the vehicle other than the bumper. * * * Accordingly, we cannot say that the facts known to Deputy Hibschman would have otherwise provided a basis for the stop based upon the idea that the interim plate in the rear window was not clearly visible, where Deputy Hibschman specifically testified that he did not look in the rear window. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal traffic stop. Accordingly, we reverse Darringer’s conviction for operating while intoxicated as a class A misdemeanor.5
[Footnote 5:] Because we reverse Darringer’s conviction on the basis that he was subjected to an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, we do not reach Darringer’s claim that the seizure was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. [Citation omitted.]
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Reversed.
Altice, J., concurs.
Riley, J., concurs in result without opinion.