Dickson, J.
In accord with a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, we uphold the actions of the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles in the processing of applications for 2 personalized license plates.
This is a direct appeal from a trial court summary judgment declaring unconstitutional the statute that authorizes the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) to refuse to issue personalized license plates (“PLPs”). The trial court found that the statute and its related policies were vague, overbroad, and lacking in content-neutrality, violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The trial court also held that the Bureau violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by providing insufficient reasons for a denial or revocation of a PLP. The BMV appeals, arguing that because personalized license plates are government speech, the statute and policies are constitutional. For the reasons expressed below, we agree and reverse the trial court’s summary judgment for the plaintiffs on these issues and direct the trial court to enter summary judgment for the BMV on these claims.
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The plaintiffs, as a certified class, challenged the constitutionality of the PLP program. [Footnotes omitted.] They argue that “the decisionmaking process used in denying or revoking PLPs,” violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellee’s Br. at 1. The BMV argues in response that because PLPs are government speech, the challenged standards do not violate the Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the class, concluding that “Indiana Code § 9-18-5-4(b), 140 IAC 2-5-4, and the Policy Statement violate the First Amendment and due process as vague, overbroad, and lacking in contentneutrality.” Appellant’s App’x at 29. The trial court also held that “[t]he BMV denies procedural due process to those whose PLPs are denied or revoked” because “there are no specific factual bases given for the determination.” Id. at 35, 37. The BMV appeals these decisions. [Footnote omitted.]
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The three Walker factors apply with equal or even greater force to Indiana PLPs as they do to Texas’ specialty plates, demonstrating that Indiana’s PLPs are government speech.
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PLPs are government speech, and Indiana “is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says.” Walker, 135 S.Ct. at 2245, 192 L.Ed.2d at 281 (citing Summum, 555 U.S. at 467-68, 129 S.Ct. at 1131, 172 L.Ed.2d at 861). This is because “the Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.” Summum, 555 U.S. at 467, 129 S.Ct. at 1131, 172 L.Ed.2d at 861. The plaintiffs’ argument that the PLP regulations are not content-neutral therefore cannot succeed. “A government entity,” after all, “has the right to speak for itself . . . and to select the views that it wants to express.” Id. at 467-68, 1131, 861 (quoting Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 1354, 146 L.Ed.2d 193, 205 (2000)) (internal quotation omitted). The plaintiffs warn that this conclusion will lead to Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause violations, equal protection violations, embarrassment for the state, and employment discrimination claims. Because none of these issues are presented by the facts of this case, we decline to address them.
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Conclusion
Indiana’s personalized license plates are government speech. The Bureau of Motor Vehicles, therefore, does not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments in denying an application for a PLP or revoking a previously issued PLP. Furthermore, Due Process Clause protections do not apply because vehicle owners do not have a property interest in their personalized license plates. We reverse the trial court’s grant of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to these issues and direct the trial court to enter summary judgment on these claims for the BMV.
Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.