Crone, J.
Case Summary
Soon after Tracy and Doug Bonam moved next door to John and Mary Fox, their neighborly relationship soured. John obtained protective orders against the Bonams, and the Bonams petitioned for a protective order against John based on allegations of stalking. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that John committed stalking against Tracy and issued a protective order that includes restrictions involving his motorcycle, motorized tools, and firearms. John now appeals, contending that the protective order should be dismissed because he did not commit stalking and that the above restrictions are impermissible. We hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that John committed stalking but that it did err in imposing the restrictions. Therefore, we affirm the protective order in part and vacate those restrictions.
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Section 4 – The trial court erred in ordering John to surrender his firearms.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated,
I find that because of [John’s] use of the target, and the small [no trespassing] sign, both insinuating firearms and somebody’s death, and his admission that he has multiple firearms and that he will take care of anybody who walks over onto his property, that a clear and convincing threat of use of a deadly weapon of [sic] firearms exists. Therefore, I’m ordering that he be Brady disqualified, and the Sheriff per the written order and decree issued today go to his residence yet this afternoon and seize all firearms ….
Tr. at 366-367.
“Brady disqualified” is a reference to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which states in pertinent part that any person who is subject to a court order that “restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person” is prohibited from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(32) defines “intimate partner” as “the spouse of the person, a former spouse of the person, an individual who is a parent of a child of the person, and an individual who cohabitates or has cohabited with the person.” The protective order indicates that John is “Brady disqualified.” Appellant’s App. at 6. The order further states,
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(g), once a respondent has received notice of this order and an opportunity to be heard, it is a federal violation to purchase, receive or possess a firearm while subject to this order if the protected person is: (A) The respondent’s current or former spouse; (B) A current or former person with whom the respondent resided while in an intimate relationship; or, (C) A person with whom the respondent has a child.
Id. at 9.
John points out that he is not an “intimate partner” of Tracy for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922 and that the protective order specifically states that it “does not protect an intimate partner or child.” Appellant’s App. at 7. Thus, he argues, the trial court erred in ordering him to surrender his firearms to the county sheriff. As mentioned above, the motions panel of this Court stayed this portion of the protective order and directed that his firearms be returned.
Tracy contends that the trial court was authorized to order John to surrender his firearms pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-26-5-9(c), which provides in pertinent part that a court may
[p]rohibit a respondent from using or possessing a firearm, ammunition, or a deadly weapon specified by the court, and direct the respondent to surrender to a specified law enforcement agency the firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon for the duration of the order for protection unless another date is ordered by the court.
Subsection (f) of the statute contains a similar provision (“Upon a showing of domestic or family violence by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the threat of violence. The relief may include an order directing a respondent to surrender to a law enforcement officer or agency all firearms, ammunition, and deadly weapons: (1) in the control, ownership, or possession of a respondent; or (2) in the control or possession of another person on behalf of a respondent; for the duration of the order for protection unless another date is ordered by the court.”).
John points out that these provisions were not cited by the trial court and are not mentioned in the protective order. Also, he asserts that Indiana’s “protective order statutes as a whole make clear that 34-26-5-9(f) is simply the state law vehicle to effectuate the mandates of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), not an independent grant of authority to confiscate weapons every time a protective order is entered.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 17; see, e.g., Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(d)(5) (“The court shall … indicate in the [protective] order if the order and the parties meet the criteria under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8)”). John’s argument is compelling, but we need not address it because the trial court relied solely on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) in ordering him to surrender his firearms, and that statute does not apply in this case because Tracy is not John’s “intimate partner.” Therefore, we vacate that portion of the protective order.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.