Pyle, J.
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Logan M. Dull (“Dull”) appeals the trial court’s restitution order. Dull was charged by indictment with one count of Class D felony theft for stealing grain during the Summer or Fall of 2013. [Footnote omitted.] He pled guilty as charged, and, as part of his plea agreement, he agreed to pay restitution. When setting forth his factual basis for the crime, he admitted that he stole grain from the victim on or about one day that fell within the dates in the indictment. During the sentencing and restitution hearings, Dull admitted that he had stolen grain from the victim on two other occasions, and he agreed to pay restitution for these three occasions within the time period of the indictment. The trial court ordered him to pay $145,633.40 in restitution, and this amount included grain that Dull had sold up to one year prior to the dates contained in the indictment.
On appeal, Dull challenges only the amount of restitution ordered. Specifically, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay $145,633.40 in restitution because part of that amount was based on uncharged acts to which he neither pled guilty nor agreed to pay restitution. We agree with Dull’s assertion. Absent an agreement to pay restitution, a defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution for an act that did not result in a conviction. …
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The State argues that Dull should pay more than the $26,110.98 in restitution that he admits would have covered the amounts of grain sold to Andersons during the period covered by the indictment … because he agreed in his plea agreement to pay restitution. …
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We cannot agree with the State’s assertions that the restitution ordered for Dull’s uncharged acts was proper. First, Dull’s plea agreement term under which he generally agreed to pay restitution did not justify the trial court’s imposition of restitution for acts or crimes to which he did not plead guilty or of which he had not been convicted. See Kinkead v. State, 791 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that a term in a defendant’s plea agreement under which the defendant agreed to pay restitution did not “in itself represent an agreement to pay a greater amount . . . than that resulting from the crime to which [the defendant] pleaded guilty”), trans. denied.
Moreover, there is no indication in the record that Dull agreed to pay restitution to [the victim] for all of the 2012 and 2013 payments he received [for stolen grain he sold]. Here, Dull … as part of his factual basis, testified that he took grain from [the victim] around August 20, 2013. He further admitted … that he had gone to [the victim]’s grain elevator on two additional occasions and had stolen grain. [Record citation omitted.] Dull … specifically argued, during both the sentencing and restitution hearings, that restitution should be limited to these three occasions and by the dates in the indictment. Contrary to the State’s assertion, it is clear that Dull did not agree to pay restitution for amounts that occurred prior to the summer of 2013.
Because Dull did not plead guilty to committing theft of [the victim]’s grain prior to the summer of 2013 and because he did not agree to pay restitution for grain sold prior to that time period, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to do so. [Citations omitted.] We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s restitution order. [Footnote omitted.]
Because the trial court could only order Dull to pay restitution for the theft of grain between the summer and fall of 2013 as set forth in the indictment and because Dull agreed that his restitution for that time period would be $26,110.98, plus the $1,667.20 check dated September 16, 2013, there is no need for the trial court to hold a new restitution hearing. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate its prior restitution order and to enter a new restitution order for the amount of $27,778.18, the amount that Dull agreed was proper for restitution.
Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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Logan M. Dull (“Dull”) appeals the trial court’s restitution order. Dull was charged by indictment with one count of Class D felony theft for stealing grain during the Summer or Fall of 2013. [Footnote omitted.] He pled guilty as charged, and, as part of his plea agreement, he agreed to pay restitution. When setting forth his factual basis for the crime, he admitted that he stole grain from the victim on or about one day that fell within the dates in the indictment. During the sentencing and restitution hearings, Dull admitted that he had stolen grain from the victim on two other occasions, and he agreed to pay restitution for these three occasions within the time period of the indictment. The trial court ordered him to pay $145,633.40 in restitution, and this amount included grain that Dull had sold up to one year prior to the dates contained in the indictment.
On appeal, Dull challenges only the amount of restitution ordered. Specifically, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay $145,633.40 in restitution because part of that amount was based on uncharged acts to which he neither pled guilty nor agreed to pay restitution. We agree with Dull’s assertion. Absent an agreement to pay restitution, a defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution for an act that did not result in a conviction. …
….
The State argues that Dull should pay more than the $26,110.98 in restitution that he admits would have covered the amounts of grain sold to Andersons during the period covered by the indictment … because he agreed in his plea agreement to pay restitution. …
….
We cannot agree with the State’s assertions that the restitution ordered for Dull’s uncharged acts was proper. First, Dull’s plea agreement term under which he generally agreed to pay restitution did not justify the trial court’s imposition of restitution for acts or crimes to which he did not plead guilty or of which he had not been convicted. See Kinkead v. State, 791 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that a term in a defendant’s plea agreement under which the defendant agreed to pay restitution did not “in itself represent an agreement to pay a greater amount . . . than that resulting from the crime to which [the defendant] pleaded guilty”), trans. denied.
Moreover, there is no indication in the record that Dull agreed to pay restitution to [the victim] for all of the 2012 and 2013 payments he received [for stolen grain he sold]. Here, Dull … as part of his factual basis, testified that he took grain from [the victim] around August 20, 2013. He further admitted … that he had gone to [the victim]’s grain elevator on two additional occasions and had stolen grain. [Record citation omitted.] Dull … specifically argued, during both the sentencing and restitution hearings, that restitution should be limited to these three occasions and by the dates in the indictment. Contrary to the State’s assertion, it is clear that Dull did not agree to pay restitution for amounts that occurred prior to the summer of 2013.
Because Dull did not plead guilty to committing theft of [the victim]’s grain prior to the summer of 2013 and because he did not agree to pay restitution for grain sold prior to that time period, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to do so. [Citations omitted.] We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s restitution order. [Footnote omitted.]
Because the trial court could only order Dull to pay restitution for the theft of grain between the summer and fall of 2013 as set forth in the indictment and because Dull agreed that his restitution for that time period would be $26,110.98, plus the $1,667.20 check dated September 16, 2013, there is no need for the trial court to hold a new restitution hearing. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate its prior restitution order and to enter a new restitution order for the amount of $27,778.18, the amount that Dull agreed was proper for restitution.
Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.