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Pierce was on probation on October 8, 2014. A condition of his probation was that he could not commit any criminal offense. The State alleged he committed trespass and theft. Specifically, as to the trespass, the State alleged Pierce “did knowingly or intentionally interfere with the possession or use of the property of another person without the person’s consent, to-wit: property of Brent Ferree located [at specific address deleted],” [record citations omitted throughout], in violation of Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(4) (2014). The allegation of theft stated Pierce “did knowingly or intentionally exert unauthorized control over the property of Brent Ferree with the intent to deprive Brent Ferree of some or all of the value or use thereof,”3 in violation of Indiana Code § 35-43-4-2(a) (2014).
[Footnote 3:] Pierce asserts this allegation of theft was insufficient because indictments for theft are required to identify the allegedly stolen property with specificity. While that may be the case, this proceeding was not a criminal trial based on an indictment. Rather, it was a probation revocation, which does not endow a citizen with all the due process rights to which he is entitled prior to a conviction. Gleason v. State, 634 N.E.2d 67, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). … Pierce did not ask for clarification of the theft allegation prior to or at the hearing on the revocation petition. The petition’s allegation of theft indicated the owner of the allegedly stolen property and the date on which the theft allegedly occurred, and when read with the trespass allegation, which occurred on the same date and at the same victim’s property, the petition indicates the address on which the theft allegedly occurred. This was adequate notice of a violation for probation revocation purposes.
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As there was sufficient evidence Pierce committed trespass and theft, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Pierce’s probation. Accordingly, we affirm.
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Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.