Dickson, J.
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The testimony at the sentencing phase trial included the defendant’s expert witness, a clinical neuropsychologist, who opined that the defendant was in a dissociative state [footnote omitted] at the time of the murders but also stated that the defendant was a “heightened risk” to be “faking all of this.” [Record citations omitted throughout.] The expert witness stated, “My assumption has been that, as I mentioned earlier, that, number one, I do believe he was in a dissociative state, but number two, I do also believe that he was making stuff up.” … The expert specifically warned that “you [should] feel free to be very skeptical of [his childhood and mental health] as a contributing factor” if the defendant’s representations are refuted by the testimony of friends and family. There was no support at the guilt phase trial for the defendant’s reports to his expert. … Additionally, the expert testified:
My experience in situations like this is that prison oftentimes stabilizes unstable personalitites [sic]. Because they’re taken care of. And everything is routine, and they know that they can only go so far and no farther and can’t get into any more trouble. And so there are certain individuals that do thrive, actually, and do better in prison than they do in the outside world. My very strong sense is that Chris might be one of those guys. He’s done, from what I gather, pretty well in . . . different aspects of his prison life.
The defendant’s brief in this appeal does not attempt to connect his mental illnesses to either his character or the nature of the offense, and his argument does not separately address these two factors to be considered under Rule 7(B). We observe that a claim of mental illness may be the basis for a guilt phase claim of insanity or inviting a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. Since this appeal involves only the resentencing proceeding after remand, the record before us indicates only that such issues were not before the guilt phase jury. We cannot foreclose the possibility that the role of a defendant’s mental illness in the commission of a crime may, in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, be considered in a Rule 7(B) appellate sentence review in evaluating the nature of the offense. The present case, however, does not warrant such consideration.
In this case, the offense was a cold, calculated double murder of two coworkers without provocation. The defendant’s actions did not show restraint or a lack of brutality, and there was no evidence that either murder showed any regard for human life. Both of the victims received at least one gunshot wound from close range, and they both suffered all of their multiple gunshot wounds to their head and neck areas. Each inflicted wound was life threatening or death inducing independent of the other gunshot wounds. We do not find that the defendant’s claim of mental illness diminishes the gravity of his conduct in committing these murders. In addition, notwithstanding the alleged troubled childhood, mental illnesses, and lack of criminal history, consideration of the defendant’s character does not warrant a sentence revision.
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Alternatively, the defendant briefly argues that the jury’s decision to place more weight on the aggravating circumstance than the mitigating circumstances constituted an abuse of discretion. We understand the defendant to argue that his difficult childhood, mental illnesses, lack of prior criminal history, lack of violent behavior, lack of motive for this crime, and remorse, while not able to absolve him of responsibility for the murders, outweigh the single aggravating circumstance presented, making “[t]he jury’s verdict . . . an abuse of discretion.” …
The defendant does not challenge the jury’s finding of the statutory aggravator—that he committed or was convicted of another murder. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(7)-(8). … Instead, the defendant asks “this Court to exercise review of the jury’s balancing process [of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances].” He argues that in a case where the sentence is life imprisonment without parole, a jury’s balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review. We disagree.
The jury verdict in this case declared, “We, the Jury, find that the charged aggravating circumstances that exist outweigh any mitigating circumstances herein.” In a case involving the death penalty or a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, once a statutory aggravator is found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, “Indiana . . . places the weighing process [of any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances] in the hands of the jury” to recommend a punishment. Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind. 2004). The exercise of such judgment “is not capable of evaluation beyond a reasonable doubt, and our statute properly omits any standard by which it is to be measured.” Id. (emphasis added). … Because the defendant’s jury did not provide reasons for its sentence determination, there is no basis upon which we can evaluate the jury’s weighing of the evidence and balancing of the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circumstance. In light of the confidentiality and finality of jury deliberations, we find nonjusticiable the defendant’s claim that the jury’s weighing and balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors was an abuse of discretion. See Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946, 960-61 (Ind. 2009).
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Rush, C.J., and Rucker, David, and Massa, JJ., concur.