May, J.
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Strunk argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted a message he sent to J.B. via Facebook because the State did not properly authenticate the message. “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Ind. Evid. R. 901. Authentication of an exhibit can be established by either “direct or circumstantial evidence.” Newman v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be, by a witness with knowledge, is sufficient to authenticate an item. Evid. R. 901. Distinctive characteristics like “the appearance, contents, substance, [and] internal patterns” taken together with all the circumstances is another way to authenticate an item of evidence. Id. “Any inconclusiveness regarding the exhibit’s connection with the events at issue goes to the exhibit’s weight, not its admissibility.” Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
During J.B.’s testimony, the trial court admitted screen shots of Strunk’s Facebook profile and his message to J.B. J.B. testified that she had communicated with Strunk through the same profile page on previous occasions. She knew it was Strunk’s page because Strunk’s profile picture was a wolf and the screen shot in Exhibit 18 contained the same picture. J.B. knew the screen shot was Strunk’s Facebook profile because they had two mutual friends listed on Strunk’s page, one of which was her mother. J.B.’s mother also identified Exhibit 18 as a screen shot of Strunk’s Facebook profile and verified that she was one of Strunk’s mutual friends.
J.B. testified Strunk left her house around midnight and that after Strunk left, J.B. received his message through the same Facebook page she had used to communicate with Strunk earlier that day. The trial court properly admitted the Facebook message. See id. at 977 (showing that the message originated with the alleged sender’s personal cell phone, under circumstances in which it is reasonable to believe that only the alleged sender would have had access, creates a reasonable probability the item is authentic), trans. denied.
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Robb, J., and Mathias, J. concur.
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Strunk argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted a message he sent to J.B. via Facebook because the State did not properly authenticate the message. “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Ind. Evid. R. 901. Authentication of an exhibit can be established by either “direct or circumstantial evidence.” Newman v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be, by a witness with knowledge, is sufficient to authenticate an item. Evid. R. 901. Distinctive characteristics like “the appearance, contents, substance, [and] internal patterns” taken together with all the circumstances is another way to authenticate an item of evidence. Id. “Any inconclusiveness regarding the exhibit’s connection with the events at issue goes to the exhibit’s weight, not its admissibility.” Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
During J.B.’s testimony, the trial court admitted screen shots of Strunk’s Facebook profile and his message to J.B. J.B. testified that she had communicated with Strunk through the same profile page on previous occasions. She knew it was Strunk’s page because Strunk’s profile picture was a wolf and the screen shot in Exhibit 18 contained the same picture. J.B. knew the screen shot was Strunk’s Facebook profile because they had two mutual friends listed on Strunk’s page, one of which was her mother. J.B.’s mother also identified Exhibit 18 as a screen shot of Strunk’s Facebook profile and verified that she was one of Strunk’s mutual friends.
J.B. testified Strunk left her house around midnight and that after Strunk left, J.B. received his message through the same Facebook page she had used to communicate with Strunk earlier that day. The trial court properly admitted the Facebook message. See id. at 977 (showing that the message originated with the alleged sender’s personal cell phone, under circumstances in which it is reasonable to believe that only the alleged sender would have had access, creates a reasonable probability the item is authentic), trans. denied.
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Robb, J., and Mathias, J. concur.