Bradford, J.
Case Summary
Appellee-Plaintiff William Wressell brought a claim against his employer Appellant-Defendant R.L. Turner Corporation (“RLTC”) alleging that he did not receive wages he was entitled to under the Indiana Common Construction Wage Act (“CCWA”). The trial court found that RLTC provided insufficient fringe benefits to meet the minimum wage requirements of the CCWA and awarded Wressell compensatory damages for the unpaid fringe benefits as well as statutory treble damages. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees to Wressell pursuant to the fee shifting provision of the Indiana Wage Payment Statute.
On appeal, RLTC raises several issues which we consolidate and restate as follows: (1) whether the CCWA can form the basis for a private cause of action; (2) whether the trial court erred in finding that RLTC provided insufficient fringe benefits to meet the minimum requirements of the CCWA; and (3) whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Wressell. Wressell argues on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to consider his overtime hours in calculating the amount of wages he was entitled to. We affirm the judgment of the trial court; however, we remand with instructions that the trial court award Wressell additional damages for overtime compensation.
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RLTC argues that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was unreasonable (1) compared to the damages awarded and (2) because it was based on an unreliable calculation of actual hours worked.
In determining a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees, consideration should be given to the nature and difficulty of the litigation; the time, skill, and effort involved; the fee customarily charged for similar legal services; the amount involved; the time limitations imposed by the circumstances; and the result achieved in the litigation. See In re Eiteljorg, 951 N.E.2d 565, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); see also Zebrowski & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Indpls., By & Through its Bd. of Dirs. for Utils. of its Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 457 N.E.2d 259, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
i. Amount Involved and Result Achieved
RLTC neglects to analyze the reasonableness of the fee award under the aforementioned factors and instead argues that an attorney fee award of four times the potential recovery is patently unreasonable. RLTC cites Ponziano Construction Services. Inc. v. Quadri Enterprises, LLC to suggest that limits on attorney’s fee awards based on potential recovery have been upheld in Indiana. 980 N.E.2d 867, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). However, the Ponziano court was addressing a very narrow issue.
The award of attorney’s fees in an action to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien is not an attempt to compensate the attorney for all the legal services performed in connection with the lien; rather, the amount of the award is intended to reflect the amount the lienholder reasonably had to expend to foreclose on the lien. Such awards should be made with caution so that excessive awards of attorney’s fees do not discourage property owners from challenging defective workmanship on the part of lien holders. The amount awarded as attorney’s fees therefore should be reasonable in relation to the amount of the judgment secured.
Id. at 877 (citations omitted). Ponziano dealt with too distinct of an issue to provide significant support for a comparable limitation here. RLTC cites no other cases or statutes which support the imposition of limits to attorney’s fee awards based solely on the potential compensatory award.
We acknowledge the policy dilemma faced by lawmakers in striking an appropriate balance between (1) creating a mechanism which helps employees vindicate wage claims and (2) the risk of exploitation of that mechanism by attorneys to the detriment of employers. Our courts play a part in maintaining this balance by using the abovementioned factors to assure that all attorney’s fees awarded are reasonable. Despite RLTC’s argument, there is no precedent which provides for a definitive cap to attorney’s fee awards based on the potential or actual recovery. The recovery is only one consideration which the court may take into account when determining what amount of fees are reasonable. RLTC is free to lobby the legislature to promulgate such a rule but it is not this court’s place to do so.
In the same vein, RLTC argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider either the actual or potential award in its decision to award attorney’s fees. However, the trial court addressed both the “amount involved” and “result achieved” factors enunciated above. Wressell claimed that he was underpaid $8,205.82, (App. 209), and was ultimately awarded $3,852.82 in compensatory damages for unpaid wages and $7,705.64 in treble damages. The trial court noted that the disputed amount was relatively small, especially when compared to the attorney’s fees, but “[i]f an attorney cannot earn a fee commensurate with the significant work it takes to vindicate what might be a modest right or a modest injustice––$3,800.00 of underpaid wages over two years––than [sic] modest injustices will continue.” Appellant’s App. p. 210. The trial court’s reasoning echoes the purpose of the fee shifting provision; to deter employers from failing to pay workers their due wages. Steele, 766 N.E.2d at 706.
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In light of the protracted nature of this litigation, RLTC’s obstructive litigation behavior, the complexity of the issues, the mostly successful result achieved for Wressell, and the purpose behind the fee shifting provision of the Wage Payment Statute, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning its attorney’s fees award. As the trial court noted, “While the fees claimed in this matter are breathtaking and giving of pause to their imposition, the law is the law. If reasonable fees cannot be earned, no lawyer will take the case.” Appellant’s App. p. 210. Were we to find that the fees awarded in this case were unreasonable solely in light of the ultimate compensatory award, there would be a chilling effect on the ability of injured employees to find attorneys willing to take their cases.
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The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.