Rucker, J.
In this consolidated appeal juvenile cohorts Blake Layman and Levi Sparks challenge their convictions for felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary. We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
On the morning of October 3, 2012 sixteen-year-old Blake Layman and seventeen-year-old Levi Sparks were present at the home of sixteen-year-old Jose Quiroz. At some point, the trio discussed committing burglary in the neighborhood. They decided to search for a house where the residents were away because they were aware that the presence of a homeowner during a burglary could result in injuries and more severe legal consequences. Sparks knocked on the door of the first house targeted. When the juveniles heard dogs barking they ran away. Someone was home at the second house they targeted.
Believing no one was home at the time, the juveniles finally settled on the house across the street from where Quiroz lived, which belonged to Rodney Scott. They then contacted their friends, eighteen-year-old Anthony P. Sharp, Jr., and twenty-one-year-old Danzele Johnson, to “help to get into the house.” Tr. at 925. Unbeknownst to them, however, Scott was actually asleep in an upstairs bedroom. Unarmed, the group proceeded to break into Scott’s house. While Sparks stayed at Quiroz’s house serving as a lookout, Layman, Johnson, Sharp, and Quiroz entered Scott’s home by kicking in the rear door to the kitchen. … Scott immediately grabbed his handgun and cell phone and ran loudly downstairs to scare away any intruders. When Scott reached the bottom of the stairs he saw Sharp run out the back door. He then saw three of the intruders standing near a downstairs bedroom door. Scott began firing his weapon and Layman, Johnson, and Quiroz ran into the bedroom closet. Scott then held the young men at bay in the closet and called 911. While Scott was on the phone the closet door opened and Scott saw Johnson fall to the floor. Quiroz, whom Scott recognized as a neighbor, told Scott that Johnson had been shot. Shortly thereafter Layman yelled that he also had been shot.
When the police arrived, … Layman … was treated for a gunshot wound to his leg. Johnson’s body was found on the bedroom floor just outside the closet. He died at the scene from a gunshot wound. …
The State charged Layman, Sparks, Quiroz, and Sharp with felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary. … Over defense objections, Layman, Sparks, and Sharp were tried jointly. Quiroz pleaded guilty as charged and received a fifty-five-year sentence with ten years suspended to probation. He testified at the co-defendants’ jury trial which began August 19, 2013, at the conclusion of which the jury found each of the defendants guilty as charged. Thereafter the trial court sentenced Layman and Sharp to fifty-five years and sentenced Sparks to fifty years.
Discussion
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Appellants invite us to revisit and overrule Palmer [v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124 (Ind. 1999)] and instead adopt the view expressed by the dissenting Justices in that case, namely, that a plain reading of the felony murder statute does not authorize the imposition of liability for murder where the defendant’s fellow perpetrator was the person killed. …
We decline the invitation to overrule Palmer. First, it has been the law in this jurisdiction now for over a decade and a half. And we have since affirmed its validity on two occasions. See Forney v. State, 742 N.E.2d 934, 938 (Ind. 2001) (noting, “[t]he fact that the robbery resulted in the death of a co-perpetrator does not save Forney from criminal liability for murder”); Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 269-70 (Ind. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s contention that felony murder statute does not impose criminal liability for murder when resulting death is that of co-perpetrator). The doctrine of stare decisis requires that we apply “a principle of law which has been firmly established.” [Citation omitted.] …
Further, … in the years since Palmer was decided the Indiana Legislature has amended the felony murder statute on at least four occasions, [footnote omitted] but has not done so in a way that undermines this Court’s consistent interpretation of the statute. … Thus, both the doctrines of stare decisis as well as legislative acquiescence counsel against overruling our existing precedent in this area of the law.
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Layman and Sparks also contend the felony murder statute was not properly applied in this case. … The essence of their argument is that the death of their friend and co-perpetrator was not reasonably foreseeable. We view this claim as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
The evidence is clear that Layman, Sparks, and three co-perpetrators participated in a home invasion. [Footnote omitted.] Intending to commit theft—a felony—four of the perpetrators broke down the homeowner’s back door and entered the house while Sparks served as a lookout. In consequence, one of the co-perpetrators was fatally wounded. There is no question that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction. [Footnote omitted.]
In any event, although we affirm the continued validity of Palmer and its progeny, the facts in those cases are significantly different from the facts here. In Palmer, for example, although the defendant engaged in kidnapping—one of the felonies designated in the felony murder statute—he did so while pointing “a loaded and cocked handgun at the head of [an officer] and thereafter fired it, injuring the officer.” Palmer, 704 N.E.2d at 126. …
… The evidence in [Jenkins] showed that “the defendant held a gun to [robbery victim’s] stomach, . . . defendant and [co-perpetrator] then taped [victim’s] ankles together and his hands behind his back, . . . defendant retrieved [victim’s] girlfriend[] from the second level of the apartment, . . . defendant handed the gun to [coperpetrator], and the defendant taped [victim’s girlfriend’s] eyes, mouth, and hands and instructed her to sit in a chair [after which] defendant then took a spoon from a kitchen drawer and heated it, threatening to torture the two victims.” Jenkins, 726 N.E.2d at 270. …
Similarly, in Forney … the co-perpetrator pulled out a gun, pointed it at the stomach of the intended robbery victim and said, “Shut up, empty your pockets.” [Forney, 742 N.E.2d at 936.] A struggle over the gun ensued. The co-perpetrator fired the weapon, striking another co-perpetrator in the chest who died as a result.
Aside from the fact that in each case a co-perpetrator was fatally injured by someone other than the defendant, the common thread uniting Palmer, Jenkins, and Forney was that an armed defendant engaged in violent and threatening conduct, either as a principle or an accessory, that resulted in the “mediate or immediate cause” of a co-perpetrator’s death. By contrast the record here shows that when the group broke and entered the residence of the homeowner intending to commit a theft—a burglary—not only were they unarmed, but also neither the Appellants nor their cohorts engaged in any “dangerously violent and threatening conduct.” Jenkins, 726 N.E.2d at 271. There was simply nothing about the Appellants’ conduct or the conduct of their cohorts that was “clearly the mediate or immediate cause” of their friend’s death. Palmer, 704 N.E.2d at 126. Thus, while the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the underlying burglary, it is not sufficient to sustain a conviction for felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary. Accordingly, we reverse Layman’s and Sparks’ convictions for felony murder.
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Rush, C.J., and Dickson, David and Massa, JJ., concur.
In this consolidated appeal juvenile cohorts Blake Layman and Levi Sparks challenge their convictions for felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary. We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
On the morning of October 3, 2012 sixteen-year-old Blake Layman and seventeen-year-old Levi Sparks were present at the home of sixteen-year-old Jose Quiroz. At some point, the trio discussed committing burglary in the neighborhood. They decided to search for a house where the residents were away because they were aware that the presence of a homeowner during a burglary could result in injuries and more severe legal consequences. Sparks knocked on the door of the first house targeted. When the juveniles heard dogs barking they ran away. Someone was home at the second house they targeted.
Believing no one was home at the time, the juveniles finally settled on the house across the street from where Quiroz lived, which belonged to Rodney Scott. They then contacted their friends, eighteen-year-old Anthony P. Sharp, Jr., and twenty-one-year-old Danzele Johnson, to “help to get into the house.” Tr. at 925. Unbeknownst to them, however, Scott was actually asleep in an upstairs bedroom. Unarmed, the group proceeded to break into Scott’s house. While Sparks stayed at Quiroz’s house serving as a lookout, Layman, Johnson, Sharp, and Quiroz entered Scott’s home by kicking in the rear door to the kitchen. … Scott immediately grabbed his handgun and cell phone and ran loudly downstairs to scare away any intruders. When Scott reached the bottom of the stairs he saw Sharp run out the back door. He then saw three of the intruders standing near a downstairs bedroom door. Scott began firing his weapon and Layman, Johnson, and Quiroz ran into the bedroom closet. Scott then held the young men at bay in the closet and called 911. While Scott was on the phone the closet door opened and Scott saw Johnson fall to the floor. Quiroz, whom Scott recognized as a neighbor, told Scott that Johnson had been shot. Shortly thereafter Layman yelled that he also had been shot.
When the police arrived, … Layman … was treated for a gunshot wound to his leg. Johnson’s body was found on the bedroom floor just outside the closet. He died at the scene from a gunshot wound. …
The State charged Layman, Sparks, Quiroz, and Sharp with felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary. … Over defense objections, Layman, Sparks, and Sharp were tried jointly. Quiroz pleaded guilty as charged and received a fifty-five-year sentence with ten years suspended to probation. He testified at the co-defendants’ jury trial which began August 19, 2013, at the conclusion of which the jury found each of the defendants guilty as charged. Thereafter the trial court sentenced Layman and Sharp to fifty-five years and sentenced Sparks to fifty years.
Discussion
….
Appellants invite us to revisit and overrule Palmer [v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124 (Ind. 1999)] and instead adopt the view expressed by the dissenting Justices in that case, namely, that a plain reading of the felony murder statute does not authorize the imposition of liability for murder where the defendant’s fellow perpetrator was the person killed. …
We decline the invitation to overrule Palmer. First, it has been the law in this jurisdiction now for over a decade and a half. And we have since affirmed its validity on two occasions. See Forney v. State, 742 N.E.2d 934, 938 (Ind. 2001) (noting, “[t]he fact that the robbery resulted in the death of a co-perpetrator does not save Forney from criminal liability for murder”); Jenkins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 268, 269-70 (Ind. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s contention that felony murder statute does not impose criminal liability for murder when resulting death is that of co-perpetrator). The doctrine of stare decisis requires that we apply “a principle of law which has been firmly established.” [Citation omitted.] …
Further, … in the years since Palmer was decided the Indiana Legislature has amended the felony murder statute on at least four occasions, [footnote omitted] but has not done so in a way that undermines this Court’s consistent interpretation of the statute. … Thus, both the doctrines of stare decisis as well as legislative acquiescence counsel against overruling our existing precedent in this area of the law.
….
Layman and Sparks also contend the felony murder statute was not properly applied in this case. … The essence of their argument is that the death of their friend and co-perpetrator was not reasonably foreseeable. We view this claim as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
The evidence is clear that Layman, Sparks, and three co-perpetrators participated in a home invasion. [Footnote omitted.] Intending to commit theft—a felony—four of the perpetrators broke down the homeowner’s back door and entered the house while Sparks served as a lookout. In consequence, one of the co-perpetrators was fatally wounded. There is no question that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a burglary conviction. [Footnote omitted.]
In any event, although we affirm the continued validity of Palmer and its progeny, the facts in those cases are significantly different from the facts here. In Palmer, for example, although the defendant engaged in kidnapping—one of the felonies designated in the felony murder statute—he did so while pointing “a loaded and cocked handgun at the head of [an officer] and thereafter fired it, injuring the officer.” Palmer, 704 N.E.2d at 126. …
… The evidence in [Jenkins] showed that “the defendant held a gun to [robbery victim’s] stomach, . . . defendant and [co-perpetrator] then taped [victim’s] ankles together and his hands behind his back, . . . defendant retrieved [victim’s] girlfriend[] from the second level of the apartment, . . . defendant handed the gun to [coperpetrator], and the defendant taped [victim’s girlfriend’s] eyes, mouth, and hands and instructed her to sit in a chair [after which] defendant then took a spoon from a kitchen drawer and heated it, threatening to torture the two victims.” Jenkins, 726 N.E.2d at 270. …
Similarly, in Forney … the co-perpetrator pulled out a gun, pointed it at the stomach of the intended robbery victim and said, “Shut up, empty your pockets.” [Forney, 742 N.E.2d at 936.] A struggle over the gun ensued. The co-perpetrator fired the weapon, striking another co-perpetrator in the chest who died as a result.
Aside from the fact that in each case a co-perpetrator was fatally injured by someone other than the defendant, the common thread uniting Palmer, Jenkins, and Forney was that an armed defendant engaged in violent and threatening conduct, either as a principle or an accessory, that resulted in the “mediate or immediate cause” of a co-perpetrator’s death. By contrast the record here shows that when the group broke and entered the residence of the homeowner intending to commit a theft—a burglary—not only were they unarmed, but also neither the Appellants nor their cohorts engaged in any “dangerously violent and threatening conduct.” Jenkins, 726 N.E.2d at 271. There was simply nothing about the Appellants’ conduct or the conduct of their cohorts that was “clearly the mediate or immediate cause” of their friend’s death. Palmer, 704 N.E.2d at 126. Thus, while the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the underlying burglary, it is not sufficient to sustain a conviction for felony murder in the perpetration of a burglary. Accordingly, we reverse Layman’s and Sparks’ convictions for felony murder.
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Rush, C.J., and Dickson, David and Massa, JJ., concur.