Riley, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants-Defendants, Hoker Trucking, LLC, and Linda L. Phillips (collectively, Hoker Trucking), appeal the trial court’s order granting attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest to Appellee-Plaintiff, Pamela K. Robbins, as administratrix of the estate of Mike Douglas Robbins, deceased (Robbins).
We reverse.
ISSUES
Hoker Trucking raises four issues on appeal, one of which we find dispositive and which we restate as follows: Whether Robbins, as the surviving spouse of the decedent, is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the General Wrongful Death Statute.
….
Even though similar language—“may include but are not limited to”—is included in the first category of the GWDS, our supreme court reached the opposite conclusion in SCI Propane based on the distinct application and remedies afforded to the first category of decedents under the GWDS, i.e., those survived by a spouse/and or dependents. See SCI Propane, — N.E.3d —, at *7. Finding the phrase ambiguous, the supreme court relied on Estate of Kuba by Kuba v. Ristow Trucking Co., 508 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. 1987), and Durham ex. rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul International, 745 N.E.2d 755, 763 (Ind. 2001), to construe the language narrowly. See SCI Propane, — N.E.3d —, at *7. As such, the court concluded:
A wrongful death action is pursued by the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. As such, the estate is responsible for all legal expenses in pursuing a wrongful death claim. In wrongful death suits falling within the first GWDS category, however, the damages must be either: (1) a “reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense” or (2) “inure to the exclusive benefit” of the surviving spouse or dependent. Attorneys’ fees thus do not qualify as damages, because since the estate ultimately bears the burden for their payment, such fees do not “evolve from a deprivation to a survivor.” Although the payment of fees may deplete the estate and reduce the amount of a surviving spouse and/or [a] dependent’s inheritance, such depletion is not of the same genre as those damages enumerated in the statute, such as lost earnings.
Id. at *8 (emphasis in original) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). The court reasoned that:
This outcome is neither absurd nor contrary to public policy. The existence of a surviving spouse or dependent of a decedent creates a significant incentive for the personal representative of the estate to pursue a wrongful death claim for the benefit of the survivors, who were perhaps financially dependent upon the decedent and could face significant hardship without his or her income. In the absence of such survivors, however, the only party arguably damaged as a matter of law is the decedent, and thus the estate itself. It is therefore logical that our General Assembly would provide extra incentive—in the form of statutory fee awards—to personal representatives prosecuting such actions, in order to ensure that those who commit acts resulting in a wrongful death are held liable, which further encourages such actors to avoid that wrongful conduct in the future.
Id. at *9 (internal footnotes omitted).
Accordingly, where, as here, Robbins, as the surviving widow, pursues the recovery of attorneys’ fees as compensatory damages under the first category of the GWDS, she is not entitled to an award thereof. [Footnote omitted.] We reverse the trial court’s award of $2,400,000.00 in attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest in the amount of $622,028.11. See id. at *10.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Robbins, as the surviving spouse, is not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest as compensable damages under the GWDS.
Reversed.
Bailey, J. and Barnes, J. concur