Robb, J.
Case Summary and Issue
Gregory Reef, pro se, appeals the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Asset Acceptance, LLC. On appeal, Reef contends that the evidence designated by Asset Acceptance was not sufficient to allow the court to enter summary judgment. We conclude that the documents designated by Asset Acceptance were not properly authenticated and do not entitle it to summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse.
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We find merit in Reef’s claims that the documents designated as evidence by Asset Acceptance were not properly authenticated. The sufficiency of an evidentiary foundation is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Nasser v. State, 646 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Ind. Evidence Rule 901(a). “Unsworn statements and unverified exhibits do not qualify as proper Rule 56 evidence.” Smith v. Delta Tau Delta, Inc., 9 N.E.3d 154, 159 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted).
The only sworn statement designated by Asset Acceptance was its Affidavit of Debt. The remaining exhibits, however, were neither self-authenticating documents under Indiana Evidence Rule 902 nor authenticated by the Affidavit of Debt or another supporting affidavit. [Footnote omitted.] The exhibits proffered by Asset Acceptance were not authenticated and thus did not qualify as proper evidence supporting summary judgment under Trial Rule 56(C). Furthermore, the affidavit itself does not comply with Trial Rule 56(E), which requires that “[s]worn or certified copies not previously self-authenticated of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.”
Reef also complains that the Bill of Sale Agreement and the Schedule A document are unreliable and lack a proper foundation because the documents are heavily redacted, incomplete, and fail to adequately establish that Asset Acceptance owns Reef’s debt. Asset Acceptance essentially shrugs off Reef’s argument and notes that Reef does not cite a case supporting his argument. In fact, this court has previously held that “if a document is relied upon to support a motion for summary judgment, it must be exhibited in full; affidavits as to its substance, effect or interpretation are not sufficient.”[Footnote omitted.] Marich v. Kragulac, 415 N.E.2d 91, 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), disapproved of on other grounds by Presbytery of Ohio Valley, Inc. v. OPC, Inc., 973 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. 2012). We recognize that strict enforcement of such a rule may at times prove impractical, and a trial court’s exercise of discretion or the consent of the litigating parties may often result in the designation of partial documents. In this case, however, application of the rule is simple given the apparent incompleteness of the Bill of Sale Agreement and the somewhat dubious nature of the Schedule A document.
The Bill of Sale Agreement designated by Asset Acceptance is only a single page of what seems to be a larger agreement that sold to Asset Acceptance “the Accounts described in Section 1.2 of the Agreement.” Appellant’s App. at 21. The Bill of Sale Agreement does not specifically reference Reef or his account number, and “Section 1.2 of the Agreement” was not designated as evidence before the trial court. We assume, although Asset Acceptance does not explain on appeal, that the Schedule A document designated by Asset Acceptance is meant to be the relevant segment of Section 1.2. However, based on its format, it looks more like a reproduction of information contained in the original agreement. The date of the Bill of Sale Agreement was “February 24, 2010,” but the only date shown on the Schedule A is “04/15/2014.” See Appellant’s App. at 21, 24. There is no perceptible connection between the Schedule A document and the Bill of Sale Agreement. This is especially problematic because no other designated evidence authenticates and explains the significance of the Schedule A document.
In sum, we conclude that an adequate foundation was not laid for the documents designated by Asset Acceptance, and Asset Acceptance’s only designated affidavit did not comply with Trial Rule 56(E). [Footnote omitted.] Consequently, Asset Acceptance failed to properly designate evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment, and the trial court’s award of summary judgment was inappropriate.
Conclusion
Concluding that summary judgment was entered in error, we reverse.
Reversed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.