Brown, J.
Jason Stanke (“Stanke”) appeals the trial court’s order finding him in contempt of court. Stanke raises three issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the court erred in finding him in contempt. We reverse and remand.
….
Because it fails to clearly and distinctly set forth the facts underlying Stanke’s contempt citations for failing to return the Children to Swickard after his midweek parenting time and taking the Children out of the State of Indiana without notice to Swickard, and fails to even include these allegations as ones on which Stanke was being ordered to show cause, the court’s order does not comply with Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5(b). As it relates to the nonpayment of child support, the court’s order does not comply with Ind. Code § 31-16-12-6(c) as it fails to include when the court issued its order for support, Stanke’s history of child support payments, or the amount of his arrearage. Further, our review of the record reveals that, while Stanke did acknowledge that he had not made certain child support payments, he argued he was unemployed and did not admit he had the ability to pay support and thus did not admit to the factual basis of the contempt allegations regarding nonpayment of child support. See In re Paternity of C.N.S, 901 N.E.2d 1102, 1105-1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“Sizemore did admit at the hearing that he failed to pay child support . . . Sizemore did not admit he had the ability to pay support. Thus, the trial court could not hold him in contempt without first complying with the rule to show cause statute.”). Furthermore, we note that Swickard’s motion for contempt citation did not contain detailed factual allegations, and it neither clearly and distinctly set forth the facts she alleged to constitute contempt nor did it specify with reasonable certainty the time and place of the facts supporting the allegations of contempt. For these reasons, we conclude that Stanke’s due process rights were violated and that the court erred in finding Stanke in contempt of court. See In re Paternity of J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d at 451 (holding that there was “an almost complete failure to comply with the [rule to show cause] statute” and reversing the trial court’s finding of contempt); Carter, 745 N.E.2d at 241 (holding that, having failed to comply with the due process requirements of the indirect contempt statute, the trial court was without authority to order Carter incarcerated).
Additionally, we observe that a jail sentence for civil contempt must be coercive or remedial rather than punitive in nature. In re Paternity of C.N.S., 901 N.E.2d at 1106. To avoid being purely punitive, a contempt order must offer an opportunity for the recalcitrant party to purge himself or herself of the contempt. Id. Here, the portion of the court’s order that Stanke serve time in jail for his failure to return the Children to Swickard in a timely manner after his midweek parenting time and for taking the Children out of the State of Indiana without providing Swickard with required information contained no opportunity for him to purge himself of the contempt, which renders those orders purely punitive and impermissible. [Footnote omitted.] See id.
….
Conclusion
We conclude that Stanke has presented a case of prima facie error. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse with instruction to vacate the findings of contempt entered against Stanke, and we remand for a determination of appropriate attorney fees.
Reversed and remanded.
Friedlander, J., and Riley, J., concur.