Vaidik, C.J.
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Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. However, the evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving identity. The identity exception was crafted primarily for “signature” crimes with a common modus operandi. The exception’s rationale is that the crimes, or the means used to commit them, are so similar and unique that it is highly probable that the same person committed all of them. Crimes that are only “generally similar” do not qualify under this exception; rather, the crimes must be “strikingly similar.”
Anthony Lamar Caldwell was charged with Class A felony burglary and Class A felony attempted rape for breaking into [56-year-old L.C.]’s house, badly beating her, and attempting to rape her. At trial, the State introduced evidence that Caldwell looked in the window at [60-year-old J.H.]’s house—which was in the same neighborhood—fifty-seven days later [and about the same time of evening]. The trial court admitted this evidence under the identity exception in Evidence Rule 404(b) because it found that the second crime was “sufficiently similar” to the first crime and the crimes demonstrated Caldwell’s “signature.” [The court further found that because L.C. could not identify her attacker, the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.] The jury found Caldwell guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 100 years.
Although there are general similarities between the crimes, we find that the similarities are not striking, primarily because the second incident did not involve an entry into [J.H.]’s house or a sexual assault. Because they are not signature crimes, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the second crime. Nevertheless, we find that the error is harmless in light of the fact that Caldwell’s DNA was found at the scene of the first crime and the jury was admonished to consider the second crime for identification purposes only. …
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Robb, J., and Pyle, J. concur.
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Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. However, the evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving identity. The identity exception was crafted primarily for “signature” crimes with a common modus operandi. The exception’s rationale is that the crimes, or the means used to commit them, are so similar and unique that it is highly probable that the same person committed all of them. Crimes that are only “generally similar” do not qualify under this exception; rather, the crimes must be “strikingly similar.”
Anthony Lamar Caldwell was charged with Class A felony burglary and Class A felony attempted rape for breaking into [56-year-old L.C.]’s house, badly beating her, and attempting to rape her. At trial, the State introduced evidence that Caldwell looked in the window at [60-year-old J.H.]’s house—which was in the same neighborhood—fifty-seven days later [and about the same time of evening]. The trial court admitted this evidence under the identity exception in Evidence Rule 404(b) because it found that the second crime was “sufficiently similar” to the first crime and the crimes demonstrated Caldwell’s “signature.” [The court further found that because L.C. could not identify her attacker, the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.] The jury found Caldwell guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 100 years.
Although there are general similarities between the crimes, we find that the similarities are not striking, primarily because the second incident did not involve an entry into [J.H.]’s house or a sexual assault. Because they are not signature crimes, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the second crime. Nevertheless, we find that the error is harmless in light of the fact that Caldwell’s DNA was found at the scene of the first crime and the jury was admonished to consider the second crime for identification purposes only. …
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Robb, J., and Pyle, J. concur.