Massa, J.
We are asked to resolve a matter of first impression with respect to Indiana’s fifty-year-old General Wrongful Death Statute; specifically, whether attorneys’ fees are recoverable as a form of damages when the decedent is survived by a spouse and/or dependents. Finding that they are not, we reverse the attorneys’ fee award.
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Attorneys’ Fees Are Not Recoverable as a Type of Damages Under Indiana’s General Wrongful Death Statute if the Decedent Is Survived by a Spouse and/or Dependents.
As its text is of crucial import, the GWDS is reproduced in its entirety [footnote omitted]:
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action had he or she, as the case may be, lived, against the latter for an injury for the same act or omission. When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the action shall be commenced by the personal representative of the decedent within two (2) years, and the damages shall be in such an amount as may be determined by the court or jury, including, but not limited to, reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses, and lost earnings of such deceased person resulting from said wrongful act or omission. That part of the damages which is recovered for reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense shall inure to the exclusive benefit of the decedent’s estate for the payment thereof. The remainder of the damages, if any, shall, subject to the provisions of this article, inure to the exclusive benefit of the widow or widower, as the case may be, and to the dependent children, if any, or dependent next of kin, to be distributed in the same manner as the personal property of the deceased. If such decedent depart this life leaving no such widow or widower, or dependent children or dependent next of kin, surviving her or him, the damages inure to the exclusive benefit of the person or persons furnishing necessary and reasonable hospitalization or hospital services in connection with the last illness or injury of the decedent, performing necessary and reasonable medical or surgical services in connection with the last illness or injury of the decedent, to a funeral director or funeral home for the necessary and reasonable funeral and burial expenses, and to the personal representative, as such, for the necessary and reasonable costs and expenses of administering the estate and prosecuting or compromising the action, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, and in case of a death under such circumstances, and when such decedent leaves no such widow, widower, or dependent children, or dependent next of kin, surviving him or her, the measure of damages to be recovered shall be the total of the necessary and reasonable value of such hospitalization or hospital service, medical and surgical services, such funeral expenses, and such costs and expenses of administration, including attorney fees.
Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1. While this block text is arguably less clear than if it had been drafted in a more modern style, the GWDS nevertheless delineates two separate categories of decedents.
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We find the rule announced in Kuba and upheld in Durham controlling here. A wrongful death action is pursued by the personal representative of the decedent’s estate. Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1. As such, the estate is responsible for all legal expenses in pursuing a wrongful death claim. In wrongful death suits falling within the first GWDS category, however, the damages must be either: (1) a “reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expense” or (2) “inure to the exclusive benefit” of the surviving spouse or dependent. [Footnote omitted.] Attorneys’ fees thus do not qualify as damages, because since the estate ultimately bears the burden for their payment, such fees do not “evolve from a deprivation to a survivor.” See Durham, 745 N.E.2d at 763 (quoting Kuba, 508 N.E.2d at 2) (emphasis added). Although the payment of fees may deplete the estate and reduce the amount of a surviving spouse and/or dependent’s inheritance, such depletion is not “of the same genre as those [damages] enumerated in the statute,” such as lost earnings. [Footnote omitted.] See Kuba, 508 N.E.2d at 2.
This outcome is neither absurd nor contrary to public policy. The existence of a surviving spouse or dependent of a decedent creates a significant incentive for the personal representative of the estate to pursue a wrongful death claim for the benefit of the survivors, who were perhaps financially dependent upon the decedent and could face significant hardship without his or her income. [Footnote omitted.] In the absence of such survivors, however, the only “party” arguably damaged as a matter of law is the decedent, and thus the estate itself. It is therefore logical that our General Assembly would provide extra incentive—in the form of statutory fee awards—to personal representatives prosecuting such actions, in order to ensure that those who commit acts resulting in a wrongful death are held liable, which further encourages such actors to avoid that wrongful conduct in the future. [Footnote omitted.]
Moreover, it is well settled that Indiana adheres to the “American Rule,” under which each party is responsible for paying his or her legal expenses absent contrary statutory authority; thus, we “generally exclude[] the award of attorney fees from compensatory damages.” Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Techs., LLC, 964 N.E.2d 806, 817 (Ind. 2012) (holding attorneys’ fees were not recoverable in blacklisting claim and distinguishing McCabe, finding there was no conflict between the Indiana blacklisting statutes necessitating in pari materia construction). We therefore presume our General Assembly did not intend to provide attorneys’ fees as a compensatory damages remedy. See, e.g., Kosarko v. Padula, 979 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 2012) (“When resolving a conflict between the common law and a statute, we presume that the legislature did not intend to alter the common law unless the statute declares otherwise in express terms or by unmistakable implication.”).
In light of our precedent strictly construing the GWDS, the presumption against the abrogation of the American Rule, and a valid policy rationale in support, we find attorneys’ fees are not recoverable as compensatory damages under the GWDS when the decedent leaves a surviving spouse and/or dependents. [Footnote omitted.] Finding this issue dispositive, we need not reach the remaining issues presented by the parties on transfer.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the award of attorneys’ fees under the General Wrongful Death Statute, Indiana Code section 34-23-1-1.
Rush, C.J., and Dickson, Rucker, and David, JJ., concur.