Najam, J.
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… We hold, as a matter of first impression, that credit time for a defendant’s release on an appeal bond is prohibited under Indiana law. …
The essence of Ryan’s argument on appeal is that the conditions of his appeal bond were so above-and-beyond those authorized by Indiana Code Chapter 35-33-9 that he is entitled to credit time for the time he spent under those conditions. [Footnote omitted.] But we cannot agree with Ryan’s premise that he is entitled to credit time if the conditions of his release are onerous enough. Where the award or denial of credit time is plainly directed by statute, trial courts generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying such credit. Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “However, those sentencing decisions not mandated by statute are within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion.” Id.
We read Indiana Code Section 35-33-9-5(c) and Appellate Rule 18 to prohibit an award of credit time for the time a defendant is released from custody on an appeal bond. Again, Section 35-33-9-5(c) directs “the judgment of conviction shall be stayed” while a defendant is “released from custody under this chapter.” And Appellate Rule 18 likewise provides for a stay from the judgment being appealed. It follows from these mandates to stay the judgment of conviction that the issuing court shall likewise stay—and the defendant shall not earn credit time toward—the defendant’s sentence during his release on an appeal bond. Thus, the trial court here had no discretion in denying Ryan’s motion for credit time—the court was required to simply apply the mandate of Indiana Code Section 35-33-9-5(c). See Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 449.
This is not to say that Ryan was without a remedy to be relieved of the potentially unreasonable conditions of his appeal bond. But his remedy was to request immediate review of the trial court’s imposition of those conditions. …
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… [I]nsofar as Ryan’s arguments require this court to review the conditions of his release on his appeal bond, Ryan’s challenge is untimely. Ryan could have sought, but chose not to seek, immediate review of the conditions of his release pursuant to Appellate Rule 18. Having forfeited that remedy, Ryan’s challenge to the conditions of his release is now moot. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Ryan’s motion for credit time.
Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J. concur.
….
… We hold, as a matter of first impression, that credit time for a defendant’s release on an appeal bond is prohibited under Indiana law. …
The essence of Ryan’s argument on appeal is that the conditions of his appeal bond were so above-and-beyond those authorized by Indiana Code Chapter 35-33-9 that he is entitled to credit time for the time he spent under those conditions. [Footnote omitted.] But we cannot agree with Ryan’s premise that he is entitled to credit time if the conditions of his release are onerous enough. Where the award or denial of credit time is plainly directed by statute, trial courts generally do not have discretion in awarding or denying such credit. Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448, 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “However, those sentencing decisions not mandated by statute are within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion.” Id.
We read Indiana Code Section 35-33-9-5(c) and Appellate Rule 18 to prohibit an award of credit time for the time a defendant is released from custody on an appeal bond. Again, Section 35-33-9-5(c) directs “the judgment of conviction shall be stayed” while a defendant is “released from custody under this chapter.” And Appellate Rule 18 likewise provides for a stay from the judgment being appealed. It follows from these mandates to stay the judgment of conviction that the issuing court shall likewise stay—and the defendant shall not earn credit time toward—the defendant’s sentence during his release on an appeal bond. Thus, the trial court here had no discretion in denying Ryan’s motion for credit time—the court was required to simply apply the mandate of Indiana Code Section 35-33-9-5(c). See Molden, 750 N.E.2d at 449.
This is not to say that Ryan was without a remedy to be relieved of the potentially unreasonable conditions of his appeal bond. But his remedy was to request immediate review of the trial court’s imposition of those conditions. …
….
… [I]nsofar as Ryan’s arguments require this court to review the conditions of his release on his appeal bond, Ryan’s challenge is untimely. Ryan could have sought, but chose not to seek, immediate review of the conditions of his release pursuant to Appellate Rule 18. Having forfeited that remedy, Ryan’s challenge to the conditions of his release is now moot. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Ryan’s motion for credit time.
Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J. concur.