David, J.
After suing a mortgagee to foreclose on a lien, junior creditor Car-X Associates Corporation (Car-X) obtained a default judgment against co-defendant and senior creditor Huntington National Bank (Huntington) after Huntington failed to timely respond to the complaint and summons. A few weeks later, Huntington filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, arguing that it was entitled to relief under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1) because of its excusable neglect and under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8) because such relief would be just and equitable under the circumstances. Finding that Huntington failed to establish either avenue of relief, the trial court denied its motion. The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Huntington had in fact proven the existence of excusable neglect and accordingly held that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding otherwise.
By their nature, cases involving claims of excusable neglect are highly fact sensitive. Here, the record reveals that the source of Huntington’s untimely response was that, in the absence of the employee who typically received service, a supervisor failed to refer the summons and complaint to counsel until after the deadline had passed. “This is neglect, but not excusable neglect as the term appears in Rule 60(B)(1).” Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1999).
Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Huntington’s motion to set aside Car-X’s default judgment on this basis. But this conclusion does not terminate Huntington’s appeal, for there is still the question of whether the denial of Huntington’s motion was just and equitable under the circumstances. To best answer this question, we remand this case to the trial court to reevaluate the motion under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), especially in light of Huntington’s meritorious defense to the underlying foreclosure suit (as Car-X concedes), the substantial amount of money involved, and Car-X’s lack of prejudice from the delay, among other considerations.
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We now seek to resolve two factual inquires: whether Huntington is entitled to relief from the default judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(1) for excusable neglect or under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) for equitable reasons. Under subsection (B)(1), a trial court may relieve a party from a default judgment for “mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect” if the party files a motion within one year of the judgment and alleges a meritorious claim or defense. Addressed to the trial court’s equitable discretion, “[a] Trial Rule 60(B)(1) motion does not attack the substantive, legal merits of a judgment, but rather addresses the procedural, equitable grounds justifying the relief from the finality of a judgment.” Kmart, 719 N.E.2d at 1254 (citation omitted). Because “[t]here is no general rule as to what constitutes excusable neglect under Trial Rule 60(B)(1),” “[e]ach case must be determined on its particular facts.” Id. (citations omitted).
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After reviewing Boles, Whittaker, and Smith, it is apparent that the facts at hand are appreciably more similar to the latter than the two former. As in Smith, the entity’s untimely response to service is wholly attributable to the defaulted party’s inattentiveness. There was no true breakdown in communication between agents of the party that caused the party’s failure to appear; rather, the party was subjected to a default judgment because, in the absence of the employee typically responsible for handling legal mail, another employee let the notice sit on his desk until the time to respond had past. Comparatively, in Boles and Whittaker the defaulted party timely passed notice on to his insurer, and it was the party’s agent who was responsible for an inadvertent breakdown in communication. It would be far from accurate to conclude, as we stated in Boles and implied in Whittaker, that Huntington “had done everything that apparently needed to be done” upon receipt of notice to secure representation and answer the complaint. Boles, 449 N.E.2d at 291.
Further, unlike in Smith, Huntington is a bank that “understood perfectly the ramifications of foreclosure suits and summons.” Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Linton, 533 N.E.2d 1245, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). A savvy, sophisticated bank exceedingly familiar with foreclosure actions that fails to respond to a complaint and summons for no reason other than an employee’s disregard of the mail cannot successfully allege a breakdown in communication sufficient to establish excusable neglect. “The judicial system simply cannot allow its processes to be stymied by simple inattention.” Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1262. Therefore, under the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm its denial of Huntington’s motion to set aside the default judgment for excusable neglect under Trial Rule 60(B)(1).
II. “Any Reason Justifying Relief”
Having determined that Huntington is not entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(1), we now turn our attention to another subset of Trial Rule 60, subsection (B)(8), in order to resolve whether under the circumstances the trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the default judgment for equitable reasons, among them Huntington’s meritorious defense of a prior mortgage.
Under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), a trial court has the discretion to set aside a default judgment for “any reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment” other than those set forth in other subsections of Trial Rule 60 if the party’s motion is filed “within a reasonable time” and the party alleges a meritorious claim or defense. “When a Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion is filed, the burden is on the movant to demonstrate that relief is both necessary and just.” Gipson v. Gipson, 644 N.E.2d 876, 877 (Ind. 1994) (citation omitted). As with subsection (B)(1), the decision whether to grant or deny a party’s motion is left to the trial court’s equitable discretion and highly fact specific. Id.
In addition to claiming its 2005 mortgage as a meritorious defense to Car-X’s underlying suit, Huntington lists five considerations it contends support setting aside the default judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) for equitable reasons: (1) its substantial interest in the real estate through its mortgage; (2) its “excusable reason” for untimely responding; (3) its quick action to set aside the default judgment once the complaint and summons were discovered; (4) its significant loss if the default judgment is not set aside; and (5) the minimal prejudice to Car-X should the case be reinstated. (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) [Footnote omitted.] We think it best to remand to the trial court to reevaluate Huntington’s motion upon consideration of these and all relevant circumstances3—especially Huntington’s meritorious defense to the underlying suit, the substantial amount of money involved, and the lack of prejudice to Car-X. Should the trial court find that Huntington demonstrated sufficient grounds for relief from default judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), then the case shall proceed to a resolution on its merits.
Lastly, we caution that the important and even essential policies necessitating the use of default judgments—maintaining an orderly and efficient judicial system, facilitating the speedy determination of justice, and enforcing compliance with procedural rules—should not come at the expense of professionalism, civility, and common courtesy. Standard Lumber Co. of St. John, Inc. v. Josevski, 706 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). “An extreme remedy,” a default judgment “is not a trap to be set by counsel to catch unsuspecting litigants” and should not be used as a “gotcha” devise when an email or even a phone call to the opposing party inquiring about the receipt of service would prevent a windfall recovery and enable fulfillment of our strong preference to resolve cases on their merits. Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1264; Coslett, 798 N.E.2d at 861.
This is especially true where, as here, it is easy to locate the opposing party or counsel, and just as simple to pick up a phone and remind counsel of an imminent deadline—a courtesy every attorney would like (and may very well need) extended to him or her at some point in his or her career. Such a moment of professionalism and civility can reap significant dividends, both in the resolution of the case itself and the legal community in general. By fostering a spirit of fair competition and collegiality, courteous attorneys better serve their clients and greatly improve the quality of our profession. After all, the practice of law is a marathon, not a sprint, and attorneys would be well advised to remember that procedural rules are not intended to be used as swords to obtain judgments. Our profession deserves better. Though trial courts may continue to grant default judgments where a party undoubtedly fails to defend or prosecute a lawsuit, we strongly urge attorneys not to resort to seeking such a measure unless and until no other method would move the case forward.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Huntington’s motion to set aside the default judgment under Trial Rule 60(B)(1) for excusable neglect but remand to the trial court to reconsider whether equitable reasons support granting Huntington’s motion under Trial Rule 60(B)(8).
Rush, C.J., Dickson, and Massa, J.J., concur.
Rucker, J., concurs in result.