David, J.
The question before us is whether, under Indiana’s mechanic’s lien statute, lienholders are entitled to collect attorney’s fees incurred in foreclosing upon their liens from a party who posts a surety bond securing the liens. By the statute’s plain language, under the circumstances our answer is yes.
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At issue is whether, under Indiana’s mechanic’s lien statute, the subcontractors are entitled to collect attorney’s fees incurred in foreclosing on their liens from Roncelli, which posted a surety bond and filed an undertaking obligating it to pay attorney’s fees upon recovery of a judgment against it. To resolve this issue of first impression, we turn first to the language of the statute, which each side contends supports its argument. All agree that the mechanic’s lien statute should be strictly construed, as “statutes that provide for the award of attorney’s fees are . . . in derogation of the common law.” City of Jeffersonville v. Environmental Mgmt. Corp., 954 N.E.2d 1000, 1013 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Town of Georgetown v. Edwards Cmty., Inc., 885 N.E.2d 722, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)).
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The language of § 32-28-3-11 is unequivocal: a party who files an undertaking and posts a surety bond must pay fees and costs if the judgment is found to be a lien on the property. Thus, by the plain language of its bond, Roncelli obligated itself to do what § 32-28-2-11 already required: pay the subcontractors attorney’s fees incurred upon foreclosing on their mechanic’s liens.
As set forth in § 32-28-3-11 and in its bond, Roncelli’s obligation to pay the subcontractors for their work was not discharged upon the release of the real property from the liens. [Footnote omitted.] Rather, the subcontractor’s liens subsequently attached to Roncelli’s stated obligation in the undertaking to pay the full amount of the judgment plus attorney’s fees and costs. In other words, the bond released and replaced the real property as the liens’ security, and the subcontractors became entitled to foreclose on the bond.
Moreover, it would be an unfair and certainly unintended result if, as the subcontractors question, a general contractor could post a surety bond and avoid paying the attorney’s fees that it would otherwise have to pay if a subcontractor foreclosed on a lien, thereby leaving the subcontractor in a worse position than if it had foreclosed—especially when the subcontractor cannot object to the posting of a surety bond. See John Wendt & Sons v. Edward C. Levy Co., 685 N.E.2d 183, 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (explaining that if surety adequately provides security in event of judgment, then lienholder cannot object to substitution of security for lien). The Court of Appeals recognized as much in Bailey v. Holliday, where it held that when a party files a written undertaking with surety, “the surety must cover any judgment, including the amount of the lien, costs, and attorney’s fees . . . . Any other interpretation would result in the mechanic’s lien holder receiving less protection if the owner elects to provide an undertaking with surety than if the mechanic’s lien holder forecloses the lien.” 806 N.E.2d 6, 11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). It is therefore only fair that the subcontractor lienholders be fully protected and allowed to recover attorney’s fees under § 32-28-3-11 upon Roncelli’s filing of the undertaking and posting of the surety bond.
But even if Roncelli had not posted a bond under § 32-28-3-11, the subcontractors still would have been entitled to recover attorney’s fees from Roncelli under § 32-28-3-14, as we stated above. This is because subsection 14(a) expressly provides that a lienholder is entitled to fees upon the recovery of a judgment—not a judgment against a property owner, as Roncelli asserts. “[I]t is just as important to recognize what the statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say.” N.D.F. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted). Given subsection 14(b)’s express prohibition against recovering attorney’s fees from a property owner who has paid the contract consideration, and the lack of any similar exclusion in subsection 14(a), it is clear that the General Assembly intended for subsection 14(b) to apply solely to property owners who have so paid and subsection 14(a) to apply generally in all other circumstances. [Footnote omitted.]
Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the subcontractors attorney’s fees, albeit under a different section of Indiana’s mechanic’s lien statute. Returning to § 32-28-3-11, we hold that the subcontractor lienholders are entitled to collect attorney’s fees from Roncelli. We therefore affirm the trial court’s fee award.
Conclusion
Finding no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in awarding the subcontractors attorney’s fees incurred in their foreclosure suits, we affirm the trial court’s fee award.
Rush, C.J., Dickson, Rucker, and Massa, J.J., concur.