Bradford, J.
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On July 8, 2011, Appellant-Defendant Seth Curtis entered a CVS store located in Delaware County. While inside the store, Curtis threatened a customer at gun point. Also at gun point, he ordered the pharmacist [Nariman Al Shweiki] to give him certain drugs that were located in a safe within the pharmacy and ordered the pharmacy technician [Rebekah WIlliams] to give him the keys to her vehicle (“car keys”). After [Shweiki] and [Williams] complied with his orders, Curtis left the store with the drugs and [Williams]’s car keys. Once outside the store, Curtis took [Williams]the pharmacy technician’s vehicle. …
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On appeal, Curtis contends … that the imposition of judgment of conviction against him and a sentence for both of the armed robbery counts [one against Shweiki and one against Williams] and for both the armed robbery and auto theft counts violated the single larceny rule. We affirm.
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A. Counts I and II
Curtis argues that the imposition of judgment against him and a sentence for both Count I – Class B felony armed robbery and Count II – Class B felony armed robbery violate the single larceny rule. In making this argument, Curtis claims that the taking of the Opana pills from Shweiki, in her capacity as an employee of CVS, and the taking of the car keys from Williams, in her personal capacity, were part of a “single larceny” because the taking of both occurred within seconds of each other at the same place, i.e., in the pharmacy area of the CVS store. …
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Upon review we conclude that the facts of the instant matter are similar to the situations presented in Ferguson [v. State, 273 Ind. 468, 405 N.E.2d 902 (1980)] and McKinney [v. State, 272 Ind. 689, 405 N.E.2d 1378 (1980)] in that Curtis robbed two separate and distinct persons. He first robbed Shweiki, in her capacity as an employee of CVS, of property belonging to the pharmacy, i.e., the Opana pills. He then robbed Williams of her personal property, i.e., her car keys. Thus, in light of the Indiana Supreme Court’s holdings in Ferguson and McKinney, we conclude that Curtis’s actions did not constitute one single unitary robbery, but rather constituted two separate robberies. [Citations omitted.] Accordingly, … the imposition of a judgment against him and a sentence for these two separate robberies did not violate the single larceny rule.
B. Counts II and IV
Curtis also argues that the imposition of judgment against him and a sentence for both Count II – Class B felony armed robbery and Count IV – Class D felony auto theft violates the single larceny rule. In making this argument, Curtis claims that the taking of Williams’s car keys and, once outside the CVS, her vehicle were part of a “single larceny” because although the vehicle was taken from the CVS parking lot outside the store, it appears to have been taken “only seconds” after he took the car keys from Williams. …
… In Stout [v. State, 479 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1985)], the defendant was charged with taking certain items out of the victim’s home as well as taking the victim’s vehicle out of the attached garage. Id. at 568. Finding that an attached garage was part of one’s home [citation omitted], the Indiana Supreme Court held that the taking of the items from the home as well as the taking of the vehicle from the attached garage, all of which happened at the same time, constituted a single taking. [Id.] at 568.
The Indiana Supreme Court, however, has differentiated between its holding in Stout and situations where a perpetrator takes property, including car keys, from inside a building and a vehicle from a parking lot outside the building. In Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 945 (Ind. 1994), . . . the defendant was charged with the theft of the victim’s money and credit card from inside his motel room and the victim’s automobile from the motel parking lot. The Indiana Supreme Court declined “to deem the [motel] parking lot to be a part of the [victim’s] motel room” despite the defendant’s claim that when he took the victim’s personal property from within the motel room, he also took the victim’s car keys. Id.
Also, in J.R. v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, … the juvenile burglarized a victim’s home and took the victim’s vehicle from the victim’s attached garage. Id. at 1038. Citing to Stout, the juvenile argued on appeal that the imposition of sentences for both offenses violated the single larceny rule. Id. at 1038-39.
In distinguishing the matter from Stout [and] … concluding that the crimes of theft and auto theft are distinct offenses and that the violation of both does not violate the single larceny rule, we stated as follows:
At the time that Stout was decided, there was no distinct statute for the crime of auto theft. Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2.5 was enacted after the crimes in Stout occurred. The enactment of this separate statute indicated the General Assembly’s intention that auto theft be considered a completely separate offense from theft and that violations of the two statutes be considered distinct. Therefore, in Stout, the defendant was convicted of two counts of theft, which were identical offenses except for the identity of the property stolen. But here, true findings were made as to theft and auto theft, which are different offenses and violations of different statutes.
Id. at 1040 (emphases in original).
Upon review, we conclude that the instant matter is more akin to the situations presented in Bivins and J.R. than the situation presented in Stout. … Similar to … Bivins, we decline to deem the CVS parking lot to be part of the actual CVS pharmacy. In addition, similar to … J.R., Curtis was charged with two separate and distinct crimes, i.e., the offenses of armed robbery under Indiana Code section 35-42-5-1 and auto theft under Indiana Code section 35-43-4-2.5. … [W]e conclude that the taking of Williams’s vehicle from the CVS parking lot was a separate and distinct act from the taking of her car keys during the robbery of the pharmacy itself.
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The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.