Brown, J.
Opinion on Rehearing
Jamar Washington appealed his conviction for dealing in cocaine as a class A felony. In a memorandum decision, this court affirmed his conviction. [Citation omitted.] The conviction was based upon evidence found after Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Luke Schmitt initiated a traffic stop of Washington after observing him speeding and making an illegal lane change. During the traffic stop and prior to the completion of the writing of a ticket for speeding and failure to signal a lane change, a police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics. This court held that the dog sniff and Officer Schmitt’s actions were not conducted in a manner that prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket. [Citation omitted.] Washington has petitioned for rehearing, which we now grant in order to discuss Washington’s arguments based upon the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
….
The Court [in Rodriguez] held that because addressing the infraction is the purpose of [a traffic] stop, “it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’” [135 S. Ct. at 1614] (citing [Illinois v.] Caballes, 543 U.S. [405,] 407, 125 S. Ct. 834 [(2005)]). The Court held that “[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. The Court observed that its decisions in Caballes and Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), heed these constraints. Id. at 1614. … The Court held that the critical question is whether conducting the sniff prolongs or adds time to the stop. Id. at 1616. …
In our initial memorandum decision, this court [quoted relevant portions of Caballes and Johnson in recognizing] that “the question is whether the dog sniff was conducted in a manner that prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket.” [Citation omitted.] We held:
The record reveals that the video recording began thirty to forty seconds after the vehicles stopped and the recording shows a time stamp of 4:17:44. Officer Schmitt asked Washington a few questions and returned to his vehicle less than three minutes after the start of the video. His computer was in a dead spot and after four or five minutes of not receiving a response, he contacted control. At 4:25:30, dispatch informed Officer Schmitt that Washington had a valid driver’s license. Officer Wildauer deployed his dog at 4:27:33, less than ten minutes after the beginning of the video and less than eleven minutes after the vehicles stopped. At this point, Officer Schmitt had not finished completing the electronic ticket. At approximately 4:28:02, Officer Wildauer’s dog indicated the presence of the odor of narcotics. While Officer Schmitt typically hands the traffic ticket to the violator, he had to give the ticket to Detective Ingram because Washington was arrested for the other offenses. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the dog sniff or Officer Schmitt’s actions were conducted in a manner that prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket.
[Citation omitted.] We cannot say that our previous memorandum decision conflicts with the holding in Rodriguez. Accordingly, we reaffirm our previous decision.
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.
Opinion on Rehearing
Jamar Washington appealed his conviction for dealing in cocaine as a class A felony. In a memorandum decision, this court affirmed his conviction. [Citation omitted.] The conviction was based upon evidence found after Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Luke Schmitt initiated a traffic stop of Washington after observing him speeding and making an illegal lane change. During the traffic stop and prior to the completion of the writing of a ticket for speeding and failure to signal a lane change, a police dog alerted to the presence of narcotics. This court held that the dog sniff and Officer Schmitt’s actions were not conducted in a manner that prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket. [Citation omitted.] Washington has petitioned for rehearing, which we now grant in order to discuss Washington’s arguments based upon the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015).
….
The Court [in Rodriguez] held that because addressing the infraction is the purpose of [a traffic] stop, “it may ‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.’” [135 S. Ct. at 1614] (citing [Illinois v.] Caballes, 543 U.S. [405,] 407, 125 S. Ct. 834 [(2005)]). The Court held that “[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. The Court observed that its decisions in Caballes and Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781 (2009), heed these constraints. Id. at 1614. … The Court held that the critical question is whether conducting the sniff prolongs or adds time to the stop. Id. at 1616. …
In our initial memorandum decision, this court [quoted relevant portions of Caballes and Johnson in recognizing] that “the question is whether the dog sniff was conducted in a manner that prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket.” [Citation omitted.] We held:
The record reveals that the video recording began thirty to forty seconds after the vehicles stopped and the recording shows a time stamp of 4:17:44. Officer Schmitt asked Washington a few questions and returned to his vehicle less than three minutes after the start of the video. His computer was in a dead spot and after four or five minutes of not receiving a response, he contacted control. At 4:25:30, dispatch informed Officer Schmitt that Washington had a valid driver’s license. Officer Wildauer deployed his dog at 4:27:33, less than ten minutes after the beginning of the video and less than eleven minutes after the vehicles stopped. At this point, Officer Schmitt had not finished completing the electronic ticket. At approximately 4:28:02, Officer Wildauer’s dog indicated the presence of the odor of narcotics. While Officer Schmitt typically hands the traffic ticket to the violator, he had to give the ticket to Detective Ingram because Washington was arrested for the other offenses. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the dog sniff or Officer Schmitt’s actions were conducted in a manner that prolonged the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket.
[Citation omitted.] We cannot say that our previous memorandum decision conflicts with the holding in Rodriguez. Accordingly, we reaffirm our previous decision.
Bailey, J., and Robb, J., concur.