May, J.
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On June 25, 2013, Steele punched S.M., his girlfriend of twenty years, in the face. R.S., their twelve-year-old daughter, was present when the battery occurred.
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At [Steele’s] trial [for multiple counts of battery], S.M. testified she and Steele argued but her injury occurred when she tripped and hit her face on a table. R.S. was not called as a witness. The State called [forensic nurse examiner Nicolette] Baer [who had documented S.M.’s injuries in the emergency room and] who, over Steele’s objection, testified both S.M. and R.S. reported to her that Steele punched S.M. The court also admitted, over Steele’s objection, S.M.’s medical records, which included Baer’s notes that indicated S.M. and R.S. reported Steele punched S.M.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on four counts. At the sentencing hearing, the court merged all the guilty findings into one conviction of Class D felony domestic battery and pronounced a 545-day sentence.
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Admission of Evidence
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Steele asserts the court abused its discretion by admitting inadmissible hearsay. … Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by law or other court rules. Ind. Evidence Rule 802.
One [hearsay] exception is a statement made “for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.” Ind. Evidence Rule 803(4). For hearsay to fall into this exception, it must: (1) be made by a person “seeking medical diagnosis or treatment”; (2) be “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment”; and (3) describe medical history, symptoms, pain or sensations and their inception or general cause. Id.
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Steele asserts Baer was acting not as a nurse who was assisting with the diagnosis and treatment of S.M.’s injuries, but as a “law enforcement adjunct,” [record citations omitted throughout], whose function was to collect evidence on behalf of the police. Baer testified to the contrary, and we may not judge her credibility. [Citation omitted.]
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[Footnote 6:] Steele asserts: “A medical professional would not rely on the identification of Steele or the description of most of the events the prior night in rendering diagnosis and treatment for her eye injury.” We decline Steele’s invitation to interpret “diagnosis and treatment” so narrowly as to exclude the emotional and psychological injuries that accompany physical injuries sustained due to domestic violence.
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Double Jeopardy
Steele believes, based on his interpretation of the sentencing order and the chronological case summary, that judgments of conviction were entered on five counts of battery, which subjected him to double jeopardy. [Footnote omitted.] He was not.
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… [D]ouble jeopardy is not implicated when a defendant is found guilty of multiple counts that are merged into a single conviction. Green v. State, 856 N.E.2d 703, 704 (Ind. 2006) (“a merged offense for which a defendant is found guilty, but on which there is neither a judgment nor a sentence, is ‘unproblematic’ as far as double jeopardy is concerned”).
The trial court’s order did not infringe on Steele’s right to be free from double jeopardy. The “Sentencing Order” lists the “DISPOSITION” for each count as “Finding of Guilt.” Then, below, the court enters a single sentence of 545 days on Count I, and the court explains in the “CONFINEMENT COMMENTS” that “Counts 5, 4, 3, 2 Merge into Count 1. Judgement [sic] of conviction as to count 1.” Similarly, the Chronological Case Summary indicates the “Judgment” for each of the five counts was “Finding of Guilty,” and a single conviction of and sentence for Class D felony domestic battery. As Steele’s additional findings of guilt were neither “reduced to judgment,” Green, 856 N.E.2d at 704, nor “sentenced for,” id., we need not take corrective action. See id. (holding no corrective action need be taken when defendant was found guilty, but no conviction or sentence was entered).
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Affirmed.
Barnes, J., and Pyle, J., concur.