Vaidik, J.
….
On appeal, the State … argues that Williams’ conviction for possession of paraphernalia indeed qualifies as a “substance offense” under the habitual-substance-offender statute, and when that conviction is combined with one of Williams’ possession-of-cocaine convictions, “the State had the necessary number of prior convictions, namely two.” [Record citations omitted throughout.]
….
… Both parties concede that there are no appellate cases directly addressing whether possession of paraphernalia qualifies as a “substance offense” under the habitual-substance-offender statute. [Footnote omitted.]
Indiana, however, made significant changes to its criminal code effective July 1, 2014. One of those changes was to repeal the habitual-substance-offender statute effective July 1, 2014. See P.L. 158-2013. Now, drug felonies are included under the general habitual-offender statute. [Citations omitted.] Accordingly, whether possession of paraphernalia qualifies as a “substance offense” under the now-repealed habitual-substance-offender statute is not a pressing issue in light of the recent changes to our criminal code.
But even assuming that Williams’ possession-of-paraphernalia conviction did not qualify as a “substance offense” under the now-repealed habitual-substance-offender statute and therefore Williams did not have two prior unrelated substance-offense convictions, we find that Williams is still not entitled to relief on his claim that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. …
….
Although Williams said that had he known he was ineligible for the habitual-substance-offender enhancement he would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial, the objective facts … do not support the conclusion that Williams’ decision to plead guilty was driven by defense counsel’s alleged erroneous advice about Williams’ eligibility for the habitual-substance-offender enhancement. Accordingly, because Williams benefited from [a twelve-year reduction in sentencing exposure] his plea agreement and the specific facts do not establish an objective reasonable probability that competent representation would have caused him not to enter a plea, we conclude that Williams is not entitled to relief on his claim that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. [Footnote omitted.]
Affirmed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
….
On appeal, the State … argues that Williams’ conviction for possession of paraphernalia indeed qualifies as a “substance offense” under the habitual-substance-offender statute, and when that conviction is combined with one of Williams’ possession-of-cocaine convictions, “the State had the necessary number of prior convictions, namely two.” [Record citations omitted throughout.]
….
… Both parties concede that there are no appellate cases directly addressing whether possession of paraphernalia qualifies as a “substance offense” under the habitual-substance-offender statute. [Footnote omitted.]
Indiana, however, made significant changes to its criminal code effective July 1, 2014. One of those changes was to repeal the habitual-substance-offender statute effective July 1, 2014. See P.L. 158-2013. Now, drug felonies are included under the general habitual-offender statute. [Citations omitted.] Accordingly, whether possession of paraphernalia qualifies as a “substance offense” under the now-repealed habitual-substance-offender statute is not a pressing issue in light of the recent changes to our criminal code.
But even assuming that Williams’ possession-of-paraphernalia conviction did not qualify as a “substance offense” under the now-repealed habitual-substance-offender statute and therefore Williams did not have two prior unrelated substance-offense convictions, we find that Williams is still not entitled to relief on his claim that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. …
….
Although Williams said that had he known he was ineligible for the habitual-substance-offender enhancement he would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial, the objective facts … do not support the conclusion that Williams’ decision to plead guilty was driven by defense counsel’s alleged erroneous advice about Williams’ eligibility for the habitual-substance-offender enhancement. Accordingly, because Williams benefited from [a twelve-year reduction in sentencing exposure] his plea agreement and the specific facts do not establish an objective reasonable probability that competent representation would have caused him not to enter a plea, we conclude that Williams is not entitled to relief on his claim that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. [Footnote omitted.]
Affirmed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.