Najam, J.
Statement of the Case
David Taylor (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s retroactive modification of his child support payments. He presents one issue for our review, which we revise and restate as follows: whether the trial court erred when it modified his child support payments retroactively, based on his notice of intent to relocate, before either party had filed a petition to modify child support. The trial court held that when Father filed notice of intent to move and his petition to modify custody, the court was also authorized to modify support. We disagree and hold that the retroactive support order was contrary to law because the statute requires a party to file a petition to modify a child support order.
We reverse and remand with instructions.
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Thus, we agree with Father that we are faced with an issue of statutory interpretation: we must determine whether a statutorily-required relocation notice, without further motion by any party, also places the issue of child-support modification in front of the trial court for its determination. “Generally, statutory interpretation is a question of law and determinations in that regard are subject to de novo appellate review.” Higgins v. State, 855 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Because we agree with Father that the trial court’s child-support determination was contrary to law, we reverse. See Haley, 771 N.E.2d at 752.
There is no question that, in addition to the relocation notice itself, our relocation statute anticipates and also requires the filing of a petition to modify child support before the trial court has the authority to modify a child support order. Indeed, Indiana Code Section 31-17-2.2-3(a)(2)(H) requires that the relocation notice itself provide notice to the nonrelocating individual that she “may file a petition to modify a custody order . . . or child support order.” Even more telling, Section 31-17-2.2-1(b) states, “Upon motion of a party, the court shall set the matter for a hearing to review and modify, if appropriate, a custody order . . . or child support order.” (Emphasis added.) While the purpose of a relocation notice is “to provide the means for the trial court to modify visitation and support orders that may become unreasonable due to a long distance move by the custodial parent,” Fridley, 748 N.E.2d at 941, the filing of a motion is a procedural prerequisite that must be satisfied before the court may modify a support order under the statute, cf. Fight Against Brownsburg Annexation v. Town of Brownsburg, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2015 WL 2328736, at *3-6 (Ind. Ct. App. May 15, 2015) (explaining that, although a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a given issue, the parties must still satisfy certain procedural prerequisites to state a claim). A relocation notice is, in itself, insufficient to trigger consideration of a child support modification. [Footnote omitted.] Here, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that, without such a motion from either party, Father’s relocation notice gave the court the authority to modify the existing child support order retroactive to May 4, 2011, the date Father was no longer living in Indianapolis.
The parties’ competing petitions to modify child custody also did not place modification of child support in front of the court. The two issues, while frequently related, are distinct and are treated as such by our Code. Compare I.C. §§ 31-16 (governing the “Support of Children and Other Dependents”) with I.C. §§ 31-17 (governing “Custody and Visitation Rights”). Indeed, the relocation statute is written in the disjunctive; it speaks of motions by a party to modify child custody or child support. See I.C. §§ 31-17-2.2-1(b), 31-17-2.2-3(a)(2)(H). Our reading of the relocation statute also comports with prior case law. In this regard, we find instructive this court’s opinion in Smith v. Mobley, 561 N.E.2d 504 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied.
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Neither a relocation nor a change in child custody requires a child support modification. Both the Smith decision and our reading of the relocation statute comport with this understanding. Therefore, after a relocation notice is filed, if a party seeks a modification of an existing child support order that party must also file a petition to modify child support. A motion that makes other requests but does not expressly request a modification of child support is insufficient to place the issue of child support before the trial court for its modification. The statute unambiguously requires a “motion of a party.” I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1. Here, again, the first motion to request a modification of child support was filed by Mother on March 6, 2013. As such, the trial court’s order modifying Father’s child support obligation retroactive to May 4, 2011, was an abuse of discretion. See Carter, 829 N.E.2d at 567.
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FRIEDLANDER, J., concurs.
BAKER, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Baker, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority’s interpretation of the statutes at issue is overly technical. When Father filed his initial motion to modify child custody, he indicated his intent to move out of state and to seek custody of L.T. Prior to that time, the parties shared joint legal and physical custody of both children. Father’s initial motion indicated that he anticipated a change in custody and/or child support. All of these factors, together, served to put the parties and the trial court on notice that child support was an issue. Moreover, that would logically be the case, given the dramatic changes in custody and geographical location that would occur if Father’s motion was granted.
As the majority notes, the purpose of the statutorily required notice is “to provide the means for the trial court to modify visitation and support orders that may become unreasonable due to a long distance move by the custodial parent.” Fridley v. Fridley, 748 N.E.2d 939, 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). In this case, the trial court was aware that Father intended to relocate from Indiana to Alabama and that Father was seeking physical custody of L.T. Clearly, the parties’ existing child support arrangement would need to be modified, notwithstanding the fact that neither party filed a motion to modify until March 6, 2013. Under these circumstances, I believe that the trial court was correct to order that Father’s modified child support obligation was retroactive to May 4, 2011. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court and respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority.