….
Bryant does not dispute that at least some of the items stolen and later sold to him [at his pawnshop] were taken from victims in Wells County, nor does he argue that venue for the crimes of which he was convicted cannot lie in multiple counties. Bryant argues only that the State failed to establish Wells County as a proper venue for his prosecution because it produced no evidence that he knew the items were stolen from victims in Wells County. This argument is misguided.
….
Of relevance in this case, Indiana Code section 35-32-2-1(b) provides that “[i]f a person committing an offense upon the person of another is located in one (1) county and the person’s victim is located in another county at the time of the commission of the offense, the trial may be in either of the counties.” There is no dispute that the victims were in Wells County, where Bryant was tried. More importantly, and as with the federal statute at issue in [United States v.] Johnson, [510 F.3d 521 (4th Cir. 2007),] Indiana Code section 35-32-2-1 contains no mens rea provisions. Put another way, there is no requirement that Bryant knew his victims were in Wells County, only that they were, in fact, located there. As in Johnson, we are unwilling to read a mens rea requirement into Indiana Code section 35-32-2-1 when the General Assembly did not include it.
Moreover, as the Indiana Supreme Court has observed,
[v]enue is not limited to the place where the defendant acted. To the contrary, the legislature may provide for concurrent venue when elements of the crime are committed in more than one county. Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390-91 (Ind. 1997). Similarly, where the precise location of the act is unknowable, a defendant may not avoid trial on this basis. Cutter v. State, 725 N.E.2d 401, 409 (Ind. 2000).
Baugh v. State, 801 N.E.2d 629, 631-32 (Ind. 2004) (emphasis added). If the fact that the location of the offense is unknowable will not protect a defendant, then it follows that proof of such knowledge is not required. The upshot of all of this is that, even if we assume that Bryant was unaware that the goods were stolen in Wells County, his ignorance does not shield him from prosecution there. We conclude that the State adequately established proper venue in Wells County.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.